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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation explores a major change in the way the maintenance of recovery from mental 
illness was authoritatively represented between the mid 1950’s and the present. A shift from 
individual case reports to clinical trials as medicine’s authoritative knowledge-framework made 
possible a view of mental health as something to be achieved then maintained pharmaceutically. 
Through a controversial experiment that both produced and studied “responders” to maintenance 
drugs, it became possible to assess maintenance drugs in terms of an idealized, optimized state, 
rather than in relation to a personalized baseline. This new, idealized understanding of mental 
health emerged in the early 1970’s and operated alongside traditional concepts of psychiatric 
diagnosis and prognosis, where each disease category implied an expected trajectory that 
interventions could only temporarily alter, for example by sedating or restraining. It harmonized 
with a managerial style of thinking among mental hospital psychiatrists who imagined a future in 
which medicated inmates would “flow” and “circulate” through institutions, achieving “live 
release”, rather than “sedimenting” into long-term custodial care.  
 
Pharmaceutically-maintained mental health unfolded in treatment phases, in the margins of 
epidemiological diagrams, in the minds’ eye of life insurance company medical directors as 
financial payouts due to suicide, in the pages of medical journals devoted to narrative medicine 
and in the decisions of physicians considering self-reporting to medical regulators. Mental health 
achieved and maintained with drugs, viewed from the perspective of business or occupational 
risk managers was seen as inherently untrustworthy, fragile, and at risk of failing. The result was 
on the one hand, a medical discourse that confidently represented and even promoted the idea 
that mental health could be pharmacologically maintained, and on the other a discourse of 
corporate risk management that saw fragility and risk among anyone who used mind altering 
drugs. Diverging from studies that isolate specific categories of mental illness, the dissertation 
bridges histories of pharmacology, medical epistemology, insurance, and professionalization. It 
shows how a science of maintenance psychiatric drugs evolved to favor the interests of its 
makers, while at the same time stacking the odds against the very consumers it claimed to serve.  
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CHAPTER 1  
 
Introduction  
  
Why Write a Dissertation on Psychiatric Drug Maintenance?  
 
I first thought about psychiatric drug maintenance as an important problem for mental medicine 
during my training as a psychiatrist, when I had a chance to work with researchers who sought 
the blood of “responders” to lithium maintenance therapy as a way of investigating the genetics 
of bipolar disorder. Drug maintenance promised to prevent future symptoms in responders, to 
alter the long-term trajectory of their condition, and the premise of the study was that a long-term 
response to lithium maintenance signified a particular genotype. But it was not straightforward to 
discern who had responded to maintenance therapy, and patients who came to the research clinic 
were well aware that their ups and downs could resolve even without any medication. What I 
found fascinating was that senior researchers had learned to see with confidence the prophylactic 
effects of long-term drug maintenance. This experience sensitized me to questions surrounding 
the long-term use of psychiatric drugs, and since then I have struggled along with my patients to 
figure out if medications are working, whether they need “adjusting”, and the inevitable question 
of when to stop. Within what framework can I offer reasonable advice? Along these lines, 
questions from employers asked if drug maintenance posed an occupational hazard for safety-
sensitive workers, insurers wanted an expert opinion on the durability of symptom remission, 
and government agencies asked for information about not only drivers licenses but licenses for 
gun ownership. This project started with psychiatric drug maintenance in the clinic but 
developed as a way of seeing it as an interface between several social worlds, as an historical and 
social problem (Star and Griesmer 1989, Fujimura 1992). 
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1.1  Historicizing Psychiatric Drug Maintenance 
 
Historians of mental medicine have paid relatively little attention to psychiatric drug 
maintenance as an object worthy of dedicated study, preferring rather to organize pharmacology 
according to specific drug types or to consider drugs together with specific syndromes. When 
maintenance is considered as a particular mode of drug use that unfolds over long periods of 
time, it has been situated in the late 1960’s as part of a newly reformed science of mental 
medicine grounded in the laboratory of neuroscientists and in the objectivity of clinical trials 
(Healy 2008, Rose and Abi-Rached 2013). Consumers and physicians alike, it has been argued, 
came to think of mental health in terms of  brain chemicals, which created the perception that the 
long term, even life-long use of psychiatric drugs made sense as a logical step for those whose 
chemicals were imbalanced (Rose and Abi-Rached 2013). The argument that psychiatric drug 
maintenance grew out of a brain-based form of psychiatry has operated alongside scholarship on 
medicalization, in which the growing use of prescription drugs became a symptom of a society 
willing to reframe differences between people as manifestations of personal pathology in need of 
medical intervention (Conrad 1975, Tone 2009, Shorter 2013, Shorter 2015, Herzberg 2017).  
 
This project will re-situate psychiatric drug maintenance a decade and a half earlier as an 
outgrowth of clinical traditions developed by mental hospital psychiatrists. Working in the noisy 
and sometimes dangerous wards of crumbling institutions, psychiatrists did not wait passively 
for guidance from brain scientists on how to manage the mentally ill. Three decades before 
neuroimaging and molecular biology made it possible to think about mental health in terms of 
neurochemicals, and before designer drugs like Prozac generated vast fortunes, hospital 
psychiatrists found themselves in a semantic void when describing their use of extended courses 
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of electroshock and coma therapy. It was the resulting anticipatory grammar, to borrow a term 
from Robin Scheffler, that became the framework for drug maintenance (Scheffler 2014). In the 
1950’s and 60’s, psychiatrists understood the effects of drug maintenance in relation to expected 
illness trajectories, mapping out for each patient a personalized baseline. Maintenance drug 
therapy travelled beyond mental hospital wards as part of a statistical push to integrate 
psychiatric knowledge into hospital administration, public health, and business. As the practice 
of maintenance drug therapy moved from hospital to society, the way it was assessed also 
changed. No longer would authorities think in terms of modifying a natural illness trajectory. 
Through the 1970’s and 80’s, a process of standardization made it possible for psychiatrists to 
think in terms of an idealized, optimized state that had been achieved pharmacologically. Yet 
psychiatry’s new ideal of mental health was viewed outside the clinic as inherently 
untrustworthy, fragile, and at risk of failing. Despite this, by the end of the 20th century drug 
maintenance had entered mainstream medicine and a vast primary care network that became the 
prescribing platform from which more than 10% of North Americans would commit themselves 
to products like antidepressants for years and even decades1. 
 
The word maintenance has its roots in the mid 12th century Anglo-Norman French maitenaunce 
and post-classical Latin manutenentia, terms related to protection, preservation and upkeep. In 
the field of biology, it has been used since the early 1920’s to refer to “the process or action of 
maintaining physiological stability including designating the energy or nutrients required to keep 
an organism in such a state (as distinct from the energy used for growth or reproduction)” 
(Oxford English Dictionary 2017). Its entry into the medical field is much more recent, 
                                                        
1 Terms like ‘antidepressant’ and ‘antipsychotic’ also had roots in the mental hospital system, but 
their use in society became detached from the specific disease categories embedded in their 
names. Appendix A provides background on psychiatric drug naming conventions.  
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coinciding roughly with the rise of chronic illness after the Second World War (Weisz 2014). 
The Oxford English Dictionary traces its medical use to 1936 as “the action of maintaining an 
individual with a chronic illness or addiction on a drug or other therapeutic regimen designed to 
provide relief of symptoms, sustain a remission, or otherwise preserve the benefit of earlier 
treatment (often using lower doses of the same drug(s) used in the initial treatment)” (Oxford 
English Dictionary 2017). In the field of psychiatry, the term “maintenance therapy” first 
appeared in professional journals describing physical treatments like electroshock and insulin 
coma therapy in the 1940’s before its application to medications in the 1950’s.  
For post-war psychiatrists, maintenance treatments promised to modify the long-term trajectory 
of mental illness without risking the harms of lobotomy or other surgeries that had been used in 
early 20th century mental hospitals (Pressman 1998, Scull 2007). By the late 1950’s, drugs were 
the preferred vehicle for maintenance in North American psychiatric institutions.  
 
Figure 1.1, part of a marketing campaign targeting doctors in the early 1980’s, is a stark 
illustration of how the representation of drug maintenance became, especially after 1970, 
decontextualized from its roots in the mental hospital. The images are even more remarkable 
because the advertised drug, Mellaril®, was not new to readers of the medical journal in which it 
was published. On the contrary, doctors were familiar with Mellaril® as a powerful anti-
psychotic medication with side effects like Parkinson syndrome, sun-sensitivity, and weight gain. 
Pictured here, maintenance therapy has been unhitched from the locked wards of mental 
hospitals where it was mostly used, and re-attached to an idealized, affluent North American life-
style.   
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Figure 1.1. Readers of psychiatric journals in the 1960’s (mostly male physicians) were asked to 
suspend their disbelief as they imagined a future in which pharmacology would maintain an 
idealized version of the good life. Most physicians would have taken for granted that using 
Mellaril® would have made a golf swing difficult or impossible while restricting facial gestures, 
impairing posture, and causing significant weight gain (Pharmaceuticals 1981). 
 
 
Methodological Problems in Thinking about Maintenance Drugs  
 
 
With a generation of critical scholarship on psychiatric drugs behind us, the question could be 
asked – why bother thinking about drug maintenance (Conrad 1975, Healy 1997, Rose 2003, 
Callahan and Berrios 2005, Conrad 2005, Lakoff 2006, Horwitz 2007, Fisher 2008, Tone 2009, 
Whitaker 2010, Hertzberg 2013, Rose and Abi-Rached 2013, Shorter 2013)? Surely, one might 
think, drugs are simply tools of medicalization, binding the fortunes of pharmaceutical 
companies and medical professionals, who together with scientists, regulators, and marketers 
form the assemblage described by the sociologist Adelle Clarke as a “Biomedical TechnoService 
Complex Inc”(Clarke, Shim et al. 2010).  Yet critical appraisals of 20th century mental medicine 
have mostly passed over special problems that arise when a drug is incorporated into one’s life 
over years and decades.  Maintenance drugs, which automatically invoke the time element, 
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expose some of psychiatry’s messiest problems: prognosis, addiction, and the limits of 
objectivity. The tidier understanding of psychiatric drugs in society stays clear of maintenance. 
To think about psychiatric drugs without the element of time inclines the discussion toward 
frozen diagnostic categories instead of toward dynamic interaction and change (Berrios 1996, 
Horwitz 2007). So too, without considering the use of drugs over time, the untidy problem of 
addiction cannot emerge (Healy 1997, Callahan and Berrios 2005, Whitaker 2010). To think of 
drug-use over a few weeks, for example, makes it more likely that we will see late 20th century 
psychiatric knowledge-making along the lines of a traditional medical science that relies on 
standardized categories and trained judgement, rather than as a peculiar field of knowledge-
making stabilized in the form of cutting-edge medical science while concealing old mental-
hospital assumptions and traditions. Mental medicine has a long history of such concealment 
(Porter 2018).    
 
Conceptual messiness is not the only reason critics have shied away from thinking about 
maintenance drugs. Writers who have seen in psychiatric drugs objects of social enquiry often 
share a vision of humanity “no longer constrained by the apparent normativity of a natural vital 
order” (Rose 2007). The new order underlying their vision involves a society in which people 
understand themselves in terms of neurochemicals that can be pharmacologically improved 
(Kramer 1993, Healy 1997, Rose 2007, Shorter 2013). It is a given of their thought, that drug-use 
will unfold in a well-ordered society in which access to drugs is approved by government 
regulators, who shape markets with the advice of experts in neuroscience and bioethics. Some 
have extended their vision to a society governed by “neuro-law”, where neuroimaging plays a 
role in assessing deviant behaviour and pharmacology takes part in law enforcement (Rose and 
Abi-Rached 2013). Here, it is proposed, specific forms of psychiatric pathology linked to brain 
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images, will shape the flourishing of society, and some writers have proposed that even now, 
certain forms of mental illness should be reinterpreted as evidence that brain-dysfunction 
transcends both cultural expression and historical re-interpretation (Shorter 2015).  Such a vision 
of society emerges when looking at mental medicine stripped of the time element, but the 
passage of years and decades complicates things. With each generation, the language of mental 
illness tends to recalibrate, rendering psychiatric syndromes historically transient (Young 1995, 
Hacking 1998, Martin 2007, Cooter 2014). And even within the span of an individual life, people 
can recalibrate as they interact with their situations, at times conforming to expectations and at 
times resisting (Horwitz 2007)2.  
 
1.2   A Collection of Lenses for Seeing Psychiatric Maintenance Drugs  
 
Clinical trials 
 
Psychiatry’s use of statistics is perhaps best known for its connection to its diagnostic categories, 
compilations of signs and symptoms that form a point of reference for not only clinicians but for 
hospital administrators, public health officials, and insurance companies, whose work it is to 
oversee the mental health system (Shorter 2015, Porter 2018). But another role for statistics in 
shaping our perception of mental health lies behind the scenes, where it is a tool for experts in 
charge of the design, oversight, and analysis of clinical trials. As the historians Harry Marks and 
Jeremy Greene have shown, clinical trials became integral not only to re-framing medicine as a 
                                                        
2 To be fair, prognosis has been troublesome across all forms of medicine, it is only amplified in 
mental medicine Christakis, N. (2001). Death Foretold: Prophecy and Prognosis in Medical Care. 
Chicago, University of Chicago Press. 
 . 
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science, but also in reframing in a broader sense the way North Americans have perceived their 
physical health in terms of risks to be managed (Marks 1997, Greene 2005).  
 
Clinical trials have been historicized as fields of competition for ideas and priorities among 
multiple stakeholders, as Marks has shown in his study of American medical reform between the 
1950’s and 1990. Among the priorities of medical reformers was the remaking of clinical 
medicine in the image of science, distancing the profession from the idea of medical care as an 
art (Marks 1997, Timmermans 2003, Rosenberg 2007). Building on Marks’ study, Greene 
showed how anti-hypertensive trials operated at an intersection between commercial and public 
interests. The process of bringing hydrochlorothiazide to market became in the 1950’s and 60’s a 
model business-case, integrating industrial research and marketing departments at the earliest 
stages in product development (Greene 2007). At the same time, antihypertensive drug trials 
solidified in the minds of not only physicians but also in the minds of the general public, a clear 
relationship between quantifiable risk reduction and compliance with long-term prescription 
drugs. Prior to the 1960’s, it had been relatively easy to demonstrate the benefits of drugs among 
people with the most severely elevated blood pressure. But with much larger studies, sometimes 
observing more than a thousand people for decades, it became possible to demonstrate more 
subtle benefits even if the prevention of one heart attack meant that scores of people with mild 
hypertension would have to take daily medication for years despite feeling no immediate 
symptoms of illness. Confidence in anti-hypertensives was more than a matter of scientific proof. 
It flowed from sophisticated advertising campaigns (both private and public), and it was 
reinforced financially by life insurance companies through discounts to customers who could 
demonstrate sustained blood pressure reduction (Bouk 2015). The case of anti-hypertensives is 
perhaps more clearly than others an example of a convergence between corporate and 
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government science, an apparent win-win arrangement for pharmaceutical and insurance 
companies, public health authorities, and for individuals who could access effective, low-cost, 
medical technology. As we will see in the case of psychiatric maintenance drugs, the increasing 
influence of corporate science in late 20th century North America led to a new dynamic in which 
the profit motive offered little incentive for convergence across interest groups. 
 
Clinical trials are exceedingly expensive, contributing to the 1.5-2 billion U.S. dollars needed to 
bring each new drug to North American consumers (Fisher 2008, Clarke, Shim et al. 2010, 
Kaplan 2013, Ehrhardt, Appel et al. 2015). Regulated drug development has over the past half 
century been organized into phases in which teams of scientists, clinicians, statisticians, 
marketers and administrators evaluate the risks and benefits of ongoing investment in products; 
but most drug development fails before regulatory trials (Greene 2005). In their earliest stages of 
development, known as “Phase 0”, drugs go through pre-clinical testing in non-human subjects, 
followed by human experiments involving a handful of paid research subjects (Fisher 2008). 
Promising products move on to phase 1 clinical trials, which involve up to 200 people, followed 
by Phase 2 trials, that test for efficacy compared to a placebo, in studies involving up to 300 
subjects. 
Phase 3 drug trials (also known as “pre-marketing” and “regulatory” trials), are the large clinical 
experiments designed and conducted by pharmaceutical companies to obtain regulatory 
approval. They comprise the majority of experiments at the top of evidence-based medicine’s 
hierarchy of medical knowledge. Conducted just before drugs are mass-marketed, Phase 3 drug 
trials have been the object of ethical, sociological and anthropological study (Healy 2003, Fisher 
2008, Petryna 2009, Dumit 2012, Sismondo and Greene 2015).  
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The anthropologist Jill Fisher has published an ethnographic study of Phase 3 clinical trials in 
America showing that the studies offer a range of profits, both financial and social, to doctors 
who sign on. The experiments are mostly pre-packaged; companies provide the needed materials 
and pay for research staff. Lead investigators are paid by the head for recruiting research subjects 
(Fisher 2008). Sponsoring companies will even ghost-write the resulting publications if 
necessary, and as the philosopher Sergio Sismondo has pointed out, Phase 3 clinical trials, in 
addition to being lucrative for physicians, can also help them advance in their university 
departments (Sismondo 2007). Getting first dibs on clinical trials (and the prestige associated 
with being a lead investigator) is part of the exchange between social, and economic capital 
made by physicians who agree to become opinion leaders on corporate speakers boards, and who 
often occupy commercially sponsored university chairs (Sismondo 2007). This arrangement is 
far from Mertonian ideals of a scientific culture of open debate and the disinterested pursuit of 
truth.  
 
In the competitive environment of commercial science in which billions are riding on the results 
of Phase 3 clinical trials, it is not surprising that the designers of regulatory trials have to be 
careful what questions they ask. As the philosopher Martin Carrier asks, what incentive could 
any pharmaceutical firm have to pursue the epistemic interests of those who have not paid for the 
study? Carrier considers clinical drug trials to be non-representative of commercialized research 
in general.  
The aim pursued here is not to generate new knowledge but to get pre-supposed 
knowledge approved by the authorities in charge. Consequently, clinical trials are 
trivial in methodological respect; they involve nothing but routine procedures. No 
creativity, no novel perspectives are called for; the agenda involves no more than 
proceeding by the books. At the same time stakes are extremely high. Failed trials 
can hurt a company. … All these features are highly unusual and in no way typical of 
empirical tests in commercially relevant research. The exceptional factor is that no 
genuine epistemic interests exist among those who pay for the study. The sponsors 
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don’t want to know; rather they believe they know and want to pass an inconvenient 
and economically risky examination quickly without much ado. This is different in 
applied research proper, in which the sponsors of a study expect to receive new 
information and gain novel insights (Carrier 2010). 
 
 The regulatory trials which make up the bulk of medicine’s authoritative statements … “are not 
exactly part of the research endeavor but rather part of the legal procedure required for market 
access; they are obstacles to be overcome by pharmaceutical companies” (Carrier 2010).  
 
Late 20th century Phase 3 clinical trials are a knowledge-making tradition located firmly in what 
the historian Philip Mirowski calls science in a “globalized privatization regime” where 
knowledge gained through proprietary science feeds directly into capital production (Mirowski 
2011). In Phase 3 trials, one should not be expecting to see Mertonian science in action, a point 
made by David Healy in his description of psychiatric drug trials. In the 1990’s, producers of 
psychiatric drugs not only suppressed results of clinical trials that failed to show a desired 
outcome, but the manufactures of the SSRI antidepressant paroxetine (marketed under the trade 
name Paxil) published favorable trial results in more than one journal under different authorship 
(Healy 2003). In the knowledge-framework of evidence-based medicine, which places special 
value on combining clinical trials into meta-analyses, this practice is analogous to voting more 
than once in a democratic election. It skews the direction of statistical effects while increasing 
statistical confidence. Equally concerning, as Healy has shown, the manufacturer of paroxetine 
suppressed clinical trial data linking paroxetine to suicidal ideation, especially among 
adolescents (Healy 2003). Healy’s work led to international regulatory action and to black-box 
regulatory warnings. In other work, Healy, like Sismondo, has documented deep enmeshments 
between pharmaceutical producers and the career advancement of field leaders in North 
American and European psychiatry (Healy 1997, Healy 2003). Perhaps more troubling (if less 
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recognized) than the enmeshment of pharmaceutical companies, the medical profession, and the 
production of regulatory science is the increasing dependence of government regulators such as 
the FDA in the United States and the HPB in Canada on funding from the very companies whose 
products they adjudicate (Lexchin 2016).   
 
The dominance of commercial science in producing medicine’s most authoritative knowledge 
raises basic questions about its trustworthiness. The historian of science Norton Wise reflects on 
the concept of “trustworthy knowledge”, suggesting that it may be more productive to think in 
terms of knowledge that is “worthy of our trust” … 
 
… because we believe that the people and institutions who produce it have made 
every attempt to ensure that their interpretations are valid in the current state of 
things. … such sources of knowledge are crucial to the effective functioning of both 
legislators and the voting public. Without those sources, decisions can only be made 
arbitrarily or politically, in the worst sense of the term: purely ideologically or out of 
self-interest, or the interests of power, without any ground for judging what would 
best serve the public good. Collective, deliberative civic life depends on an informed 
public and informed legislators, whose knowledge is widely distributed. (Wise 2006) 
 
 
Surely research by Sismondo, Healy, Fisher, Petryna, Lexchin and others has demonstrated 
convincingly that knowledge about psychiatric drugs gained through commercial clinical trials is 
untrustworthy at the very least, and at worst, fraudulent. Have psychiatric field leaders 
effectively failed the public and the institutions that rely on science to make health policies 
(Horwitz 2011)? Perhaps, but in his definition of trustworthy knowledge, Wise describes not 
only people but also institutions who make every attempt to ensure valid interpretations of 
clinical trial data. Wise does not assume that corporate science will automatically hide all 
information that casts a negative light on its products or that practices once seen as advantageous 
will continue into the future.  
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Rather, science generated under a globalized privatization regime has every interest in 
engendering public trust, and companies who lie or suppress data do so at their own peril. Take 
for example measures to reduce corporate incentives to suppress data or produce duplicate 
publications. Since 2007, the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors (ICMJE) has 
required that all clinical trials be entered in its central registry before the trial is conducted 
(icmje.org). The registry requires each trial to conform to certain minimum standards and 
deviations must be satisfactorily explained. Once registered a trial is assigned a number, without 
which member journals including national medical journals such as JAMA, the BMJ, Lancet, 
The New England Journal of Medicine, and CMAJ will not publish the research. The extent to 
which this relatively recent policy is effective in bolstering the trustworthiness of clinical trials in 
the eyes of the public, medical experts and policy-makers remains to be seen. Publication in 
reputable medical journals is only one avenue producers have to move their ideas globally. 
Online for-profit journals that are not members of the ICMJE are widely accessible and to date, 
medical regulators accept clinical trial reports regardless of where they are published. 
Pharmaceutical companies also have vast advertising networks, including direct to consumer 
advertising that have proven effective in deploying scientific rhetoric to enhance sales (Segal 
2008).  
 
Even if we accept that institutional countermeasures will preserve some level of trustworthiness 
in the science of clinical trials, the question remains, who will fill in the knowledge-gaps, 
especially when there is no profit to be made from addressing them (Krimsky 2003)? Projects of 
public concern tend to be long-term, are often difficult to start and develop and at first seem to 
yield little (Radder 2010). Is it realistic to expect something along the lines of the thought 
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experiment referred to by the philosopher Phil Kitcher as “well-ordered science”, where 
government-funded science will fill in the gaps where private science left off (Kitcher 2011)?  
The philosopher James Brown sees clinical trials as conservative forces, using the term “one 
shot” science to describe the power of clinical trials to crystalize for a generation the kinds of 
questions that can be authoritatively answered. Large randomized clinical trials are so expensive 
he argues, that in practice once an hypothesis has been tested, plausible alternatives are never 
systematically explored. If alternative hypotheses are tested at all, it is using less expensive but 
also less authoritative methods. The answer to who fills in the gaps in authoritative knowledge 
left in the wake of regulatory science according to Brown is often “no one”. Martin Carrier does 
not agree, suggesting that commercial and public science often work together in a variety of 
ways depending on the problem and the circumstances (Carrier 2010). This project will add one 
more example to the way commercial science has shaped the kinds of questions that have been 
asked within medicine’s authoritative discourse and the kinds of questions, particularly those of 
high public interest (but high corporate risk) that have remained un-explored.       
 
Expert Consensus, Evidence Based Medicine, Translational Medicine, and Narrative Medicine 
 
It is easy to forget, given the influence of clinical trials, that they are only one of several 
frameworks in which authoritative medical knowledge is stabilized. Philosophers of science have 
been helpful in this regard. Looking at knowledge-formation more generally, Ian Hacking 
reminds us that we “assess statements as true-or-false only when there is some style of reasoning 
and investigation that helps determine its truth value. What a proposition means depends upon 
the ways in which we might settle its truth” (Hacking 1990). Miriam Solomon has recently 
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published on “epistemic pluralism” in medicine, where, especially after 1970, four overlapping 
frameworks have operated (Solomon 2015).   
 
1) Medical consensus conferences at the United States’ National Institutes of Health (NIH) 
in the 1970’s, “a neutral process with an expert panel meant to resolve controversy on a 
topic of importance to public health” (p2). NIH Medical consensus conferences operated 
behind closed doors, where experts would debate the merits of knowledge then issue 
clinical guidance, speaking as one.  
2) Evidence based medicine, a hierarchical framework developed in the early 1990’s for 
assessing medical knowledge. Evidence based medicine assigned its lowest confidence to 
case reports and the opinion of individual experts followed in ascending order by various 
kinds of observational studies while at the top of the hierarchy were randomized 
controlled trials (RCTs), the bigger the better, with syntheses of RCTs known as meta-
analyses at the very top.  
3) Translational medicine emerged in the early 21st century as a framework to encourage 
clinical innovation, especially the kind that linked laboratory and clinic with the potential 
for commercial upscaling. Translational medicine resisted rigid evidence hierarchies and 
instead emphasizing case-based reasoning, clinical judgement and general causal 
(mechanistic) reasoning. An example is pharmacological reason, which continues to drive 
research funding into brain research.  
4) Narrative medicine, a new framework incorporated widely into North American medical 
education in the early 2000’s, prioritized a reflective style of reasoning, asking doctors to 
reflect on their personal experience in the clinic, to “…hold on to the intimacy of the 
traditional physician-patient dyad as the core of the practice of medicine”.  
 
 
What Solomon means by epistemic pluralism is that physicians were not bound to assessing 
knowledge within any single system, but rather became comfortable working across several 
frameworks. For example, an intervention might be tested in a clinical trial, then, in the 1970’s 
and 80’s, it may have been discussed in a published NIH consensus conference. By the 1980’s, 
physicians would have expected to follow prescribing protocols from field leaders, and in the 
1990’s, they would have used an evidence hierarchy to rank the confidence they placed in 
various kinds of information, with case reports at the lowest level, and meta-analyses of clinical 
trials at the highest. Evidence based medicine, as Solomon interprets it, was part of a fifty-year 
shift toward the impersonal kind of knowledge that could be contained within statistical 
confidence intervals (Danziger 1990, Forrester 1996, Marks 1997). Her idea of epistemic 
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pluralism however is only one possible way of understanding the way medical knowledge 
formation has operated in the late 20th century. An alternative is to frame evidence based 
medicine as a productive force that cannot be understood merely in terms of a statistically-based 
process that cuts the human element out of medicine (Mykhalovskiy and Weir 2004). Rather, it 
can be understood as a platform that generates a new series of problems ranging from the 
evolution of new forms of textual communications to new roles for patients as loci of knowledge 
production (Mykhalovskiy 2003).  At the risk of oversimplification, this project will follow 
Solomon’s model of epistemic pluralism although the stabilization of psychiatric drug 
maintenance could also be framed as an critique of how evidence based medicine stabilized a 
form of knowledge based on the hybridization of statistics, clinical judgement, and the self-
disclosure of individual patients.   
 
Psychiatric Diagnosis  
More than simply a product of statistical aggregation required for administrative purposes and 
for clinical trials, a psychiatric diagnosis has, for the past century, implied a particular way of 
understanding mental health. Through the 1950’s and 60’s psychiatrists remained publicly 
divided on both the ontology and the ethics of diagnostic categories, which some understood as 
stable entities, perhaps expressions of brain pathology. Others saw diagnosis as a tool of social 
control in a society that was either incapable or unwilling to accommodate a full range of human 
abilities and challenges (Szasz 1961, Goffman 1963, Faderman 2015, Shorter 2015). The 
publication of the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) 
in 1952 was meant to unite the profession, ostensibly offering a framework for experimental 
reform (Shorter 2015). But psychiatrists as a group remained ambivalent about diagnosis 
(Horwitz 2011). Those who understood mental health through a lens of psychoanalysis described 
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each clinical encounter in terms of their “transference” experience, a form of knowledge based 
on trained judgement within a psychoanalytic thought collective (Daston 2010, Lunbeck 2011). 
Others, for example those trained by the influential Johns Hopkins psychiatrist Adolph Meyer 
(1866-1950) thought of each case as a complex unity that could be understood over time as 
adapting to changing bodily and environmental circumstances (Leys 1991, Lamb 2014).  
 
Psychiatric diagnosis as understood by North American biological psychiatrists in the mid 20th 
century was linked to lingering beliefs about disease specificity, with roots in the writings of 19th 
century asylum doctors and in the work of early 20th century eugenicists (Porter 2018). As David 
Healy has shown, psychiatrists in the 1960’s used a trial and error process of “pharmacological 
dissection” to infer specific neurochemical imbalances in their patients, a practice that informed 
biological psychiatry through the late 20th century (Healy 1997, Rose 2003, Scull 2015). If, it 
was felt, mental illnesses resulted from bodily dysfunction, it would be possible to identify 
specific deficits, reasoning backward from medication responses to biochemical causes. For 
some psychiatrists in the late 1960’s a new biologically-based nosology of mental illness 
appeared to be just around the corner and along with it, they thought, would come an ability to 
change the long-term prognosis of mental illness (Rose and Abi-Rached 2013). I will show how 
this hope converged in the late 1960’s with the standardization of drug maintenance to help 
stabilize a way of thinking about mental illness that would operate in parallel with official 
diagnostic categories. For the most part, I will try to stay clear of the problem of diagnosis, 
which carries with it a generation of scholarship so compelling as to risk sending the project into 
a terminal orbit around particular disease entities, rather than focusing on how drug maintenance 
evolved to operate across all categories  (Hacking 1995, Young 1995, Hacking 1998, Rose 2003, 
Callahan and Berrios 2005, Horwitz 2007, Martin 2007, Eyal 2010, Whitaker 2010, Horwitz 
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2011, Shorter 2013, Scull 2015). Drug maintenance stabilized as it was in the late 1960’s created 
a special problem for psychiatry, a highly abstracted, fragmented vision of mental health not only 
separated from a person’s environment, their relationships, community and work, but a way of 
conceiving of a person’s mental health in terms of symptom remission separated from their 
personal baseline. Hospital psychiatrists took for granted that most symptoms of mental illness 
waxed and waned over time, and a personal baseline was a description of these expected changes 
for each person. When a new vision of drug maintenance emerged in the late 1960’s, it did so at 
the expense of personal baselines as an authoritative frame of reference. Without a personal 
baseline to refer to, remission could be plausibly re-imagined as a state that had never before 
been experienced. Drug maintenance challenged traditional thinking about mental illness in 
terms of expected fluctuations and in its place set up the aim of making “complete and 
unequivocal responders”, as we will see in chapter 2. What exactly constituted a complete and 
unequivocal responder, however, resisted professional consensus.   
 
1.3  How this Project is Organized 
 
The project is divided conceptually into two halves. The first asks how psychiatrists between the 
1950’s and 70’s stabilized a vision of mental health, achieved and maintained through drug 
therapy. It looks at how statisticians played a crucial role in the process, de-contextualizing 
through clinical trial designs a traditional concept of mental health as something to be assessed in 
relation to a personal baseline. Proceeding chronologically from the 1940’s to the 1990’s, the 
first half of the dissertation draws on a survey of psychiatric journals (Appendix B), showing 
how an anticipatory grammar of maintenance therapy was already present in mental hospitals 
when long-term pharmaceuticals entered the picture in the mid 1950’s. It draws on a tradition of 
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visual analysis to interpret the traces left behind by psychiatrists, who modeled ways of seeing 
the effects of drug maintenance in their minds’ eye (Chadarevian 1993, Brain and Wise 1999, 
Chadarevian 2003, Dumit 2004, Wise 2006).  
 
Chapter 2 identifies the scope of psychiatry’s ambitions for drug maintenance, which was meant 
to operate at not only the level of the individual clinical encounter but also at the level of hospital 
administration. The scope of this ambition led to two competing ways of assessing drug 
maintenance, one at the level of individual cases and one at the level of institutions. Biological 
psychiatry in the 1950’s and 60’s was largely a hospital endeavor, and hospitals administrators 
had a lot to say about the way systems of care were structured and how new innovations such as 
drug maintenance were used and evaluated. Administrators had to show that their hospitals were 
getting results. As the sociologist Robert Castel puts it in his essay From Dangerousness to Risk, 
… “The manager becomes the genuine ‘decision maker’. The manager holds all the cards and 
controls the game” (Castel 1991). Granted, this can be taken too far, but its hard to imagine a 
world in which psychiatrists could have developed their practices free from the influence of 
managers (and vice versa). While clinical logic may have made sense on the hospital ward and in 
the consulting room, hospital administrators were expected to summarize the workings of their 
institutions to government officials. After the 1950’s, this also meant justifying ever increasing 
budgets for long-term drug therapies. Administrative pressures made it necessary for statisticians 
to dig into clinical reports, to draw inferences from a language based in clinical encounters, and 
to apply those inferences at an institutional level. Both clinical psychiatrists and hospital 
administrators left traces of their thinking in charts, tables and improvised diagrams that show us 
how they imagined an intervention focused on individuals bearing fruit over the long run at the 
level of institutional efficiency.   
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Chapter 3 looks at the stabilization of drug maintenance as a mainstream medical practice, 
culminating in a new way of thinking about mental health as something to be achieved and 
maintained pharmacologically. It situates psychiatry’s new way of thinking as a convergence of 
four factors: 1) Professional pressure to align psychiatry with physical medicine as an 
empirically-based clinical science; 2) Cost pressures in designing regulatory studies; 3) Ethical 
reforms restricting the use of placebos in clinical trials; and 4) The development of a 
standardized terminology for describing the course of mental illness over time, in relation to the 
use of medications. Material for this section comes from information surrounding two 
government-funded clinical trials conducted by the NIMH. It places the NIMH trials in the 
context of methodological debates recorded in professional journals, textbooks, personal 
correspondence with field-leaders, materials held at the Geffen library at UCLA, oral histories 
recorded in the archives of the American College of Neuropsychopharmacology, as well as 
material surrounding the development of research ethics guidelines for the NIH in the 1960’s. 
Also, in this section of the project, the idealized concept of the responder to maintenance drugs, 
an abstract product of clinical trials, comes into view within three epistemic frameworks of late 
20th century medicine; NIH consensus conference statements of the 1980’s, treatment guidelines 
produced by professional associations, and in the 1990’s, atop the knowledge hierarchy of 
evidence-based medicine.  
 
The second half of the dissertation moves outside the mental hospital to ask how maintenance 
drugs were assessed in the context of institutional risk management. It looks at risk through three 
lenses (Castel 1991, Weir 1996, Dean 2010); insurance risk, which is concerned with managing 
the loss of capital, epidemiological risk, which is concerned with matters related to public health, 
and case-management risk, which has also been called clinical risk. Case management risk has 
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been considered by sociologists since the 1990’s in relation to mental health, especially in 
relation to the danger that a mentally ill person might commit a violent act (Castel 1991). This 
sort of risk assessment is qualitative, based on clinical interviews, reviews of case files and 
expert judgement. People deemed “at risk” are subjected to therapeutics (for example 
counselling, medication), detention (for example hospitalization or imprisonment) and discipline 
(for example training) meant to reduce the danger they pose to society (Dean 2010).  
 
Chapter 4 started as an attempt to trace the perception among life insurance medical directors, of 
psychiatric maintenance drugs as mitigators of suicide risk. As Theodore Porter has shown, life 
insurance companies had devised methods to profit not only from picking the healthiest people to 
insure, but also from calculating elevated premiums for riskier applicants. For over a century, the 
task of adjudicating applications for “sub-standard insurance” fell to life insurance company 
medical directors, who formed a national organization called the Association of Life Insurance 
Medical Directors of North America (ALIMDA). The topic of sub-standard insurance was 
important enough to medical directors that it accounted for a significant portion of all association 
business (Porter 2000). I had initially hoped to find in the ALIMDA proceedings a specific 
approach to assessing applicants who used maintenance psychiatric drugs. However, after two 
weeks at the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom-Davis library at St. John’s University, New York, 
hand-searching trade journals including the Proceedings of the Association of Life Insurance 
Medical Directors of America (ALIMDA), On the Risk, Proceedings of the Home Office Life 
Underwriters Association and The Journal of Insurance Medicine, as well as hand searching the 
ALIMDA archives and related insurance publications, it was somewhat disappointing to find that 
the insurance industry had not developed methods to assess the effects of psychiatric drug 
maintenance, even though there is evidence that company medical directors kept a close eye on 
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developments in psychiatric research, bringing in field leaders to give updates on recent 
developments. It became clear to me that by the time maintenance drugs had moved beyond the 
mental hospital system and into the lives of customers for life insurance, medical directors had 
already stepped back from trying to identify specific indicators of suicide risk, which was their 
major concern for any applicant who used psychiatric drugs. Diagnosis, they found, was a poor 
predictor of payouts due to suicide, and they mistrusted the effects of any psychiatric 
intervention as a temporary mask of symptoms and thus as a temporary mask of underlying 
financial risk.   
 
What resulted, at least for the majority of retail insurance sales, was the adoption of standardized 
exclusionary periods to managing the risk of payout due to suicide among any applicant who 
used psychiatric drugs. The exception was the “jumbo policy”, which would be evaluated as 
usual on a case-by-case basis by the medical director, who had a full range of investigative 
methods at his disposal.  
 
Chapter 5 is an attempt to link psychiatric drug maintenance to occupational safety. I had 
initially hoped to trace institutional policies for workplace safety among users of maintenance 
drugs across three safety sensitive fields, commercial airline pilots, railway engineers, and 
medical doctors. This focus grew out of my clinical experience, where I have been asked to 
provide reports to employers attesting to the emotional stability of people who use drug 
maintenance. I had hoped to find relevant information in the Air Canada archives located at the 
National Archives in Ottawa. As a former crown corporation, there are extensive operational 
records to review, ranging from policies around pilot hiring to crash investigations. Yet aside 
from concerns about alcohol use among pilots, I could find little on mental health let alone 
psychiatric drug maintenance. As it turned out, until recently, commercial airline pilots who used 
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any form of mind-altering drug were banned from flying. This created a significant challenge for 
my goal of understanding how maintenance drugs moved out of mental hospitals and into the 
general population. My challenge with railways was similar. Although I knew of central data 
repositories from my clinical work with railway engineers, I could not locate a formal archive 
with relevant information. This left me with one occupational group for whom maintenance 
drugs were an ongoing concern, and for whom records were available – medical doctors. Thus, 
chapter 5 evolved into an investigation of how psychiatric drug maintenance became a tool of 
professional surveillance in the province of Ontario. They entered Ontario’s medical system 
through a combination of medical education, which put forward personal health as one kind of 
professional expectation, and medical licensing, which required increasing levels of self-
disclosure. Like all forms of professional licencing, medical licences have been historicized as 
tools of market protection, excluding competitors along the lines of education, race, class and 
gender (Olson 1983, Rayack 1983, Trebilcock and Shaul 1983, White 1983, Witz 1990, Law and 
Kim 2004). At the same time, medical licences have been framed in the context of consumer 
protection, an assurance that doctors will meet minimum standards of knowledge and technical 
competence (Starr 1982, Ludmerer 1985).  
 
Not surprisingly, the majority of historical work on medical licensing relates to the United States. 
Exploring licences as tools for restricting market access in the United States, the historian Ruth 
Horowitz has shown that prior to 1950, state medical boards prioritized methods for controlling 
the movement of doctors across state lines while after the 1950’s, Medical Boards turned their 
attention to immigrants who had been trained outside the United States, forming the Educational 
Commission for Foreign Medical Graduates (ECFMG), which became a central source of 
information for verifying credentials and documenting disciplinary actions taken by foreign 
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regulators against immigrant physicians (Horowitz 2013)3. While state Medical Boards protected 
their independence from one another, they found common ground in managing the national 
supply of foreign-trained doctors. Medical licences in North America are issued by state and 
provincial medical regulators known as Medical Boards in the U.S. and Colleges of Physicians 
and Surgeons in Canada, and regulators in both countries are ultimately accountable to elected 
government officials.  
 
The historian Rosemary Stevens has traced international changes in professional governance in 
the late 20th century, when licences came to signify more than a life-long certification of skills 
attained at one point in time. They became a dynamic marker of compliance with an approved 
program of continual self-improvement; continuing medical education helped solidify group 
identity and through increased cohesion, strengthened physicians’ political voice (Stevens 2001, 
Stevens 2005). Similar observations about medical licencing in the United States have been 
made by the historians David Johnson and Humayan Chaudhry and in Canada by Jason Frank 
(Frank 2004, Johnson and Chaudhry 2012). Not only did ongoing professional education serve to 
solidify physicians’ professional identity in North America, but it served as a barrier to foreign-
trained physicians, for example those trained in Egypt, India, Nigeria and Pakistan, where 
ongoing education was not centrally managed (de Vries, Sanderson et al. 2009). In the United 
States, a nationally mandated program for ongoing medical education was ratified for specialists 
in 2000, and the British National Health Service has since the 1990’s made adherence to a 
national program of continuing medical education a condition of employment for all doctors 
(Chao, McFadden et al. 2010, Kempen 2013). Canadian continuing medical education programs 
                                                        
3 Canada did not develop a centralized credentialing commission. Rather, each province verifies 
credentials of foreign medical graduates, who must then pass a national exam administered by 
the Medical Council of Canada before being considered for licensure.  
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are administered nationally by the Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons (for all specialists) 
and by the College of Family Physicians of Canada.  
 
While historians of medicine have described ongoing medical education as a tool of professional 
governance, little attention has been paid to an increasing emphasis on physicians’ personal 
health, both in the educational process and directly in medical licensing. Chapter 5 picks up on 
the theme of using doctors’ health as a mode of governance. It situates the emergence of the first 
Physician Health Program in Canada to monitor practicing physicians as a response to a crisis of 
public confidence in Ontario’s doctors’ association. Three processes led to this increased level of 
professional oversight; a provincial inquiry into the sexual abuse of patients, a 1-month 
provincial doctors’ strike, and a Canada-wide inquiry into the contamination of the national 
blood-bank by HIV and hepatitis.  
 
Ontario’s medical regulator, the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario (CPSO) 
developed several administrative strategies that made possible the transformation of doctors’ 
personal health information into a target of surveillance. Through cooperative information 
sharing agreements, the provincial regulator positioned itself centrally within a network of 
organizations including medical specialty groups, hospitals and universities. Hospitals across the 
surveillance network, for example, routinely included HIV and hepatitis testing as employment 
requirements, and this information began in the late 1990’s to flow to the CPSO. At the same 
time, a new administrative category, “the impaired physician” was expanded past doctors with 
alcohol and drug problems to include “potential impairment”, a broad category that included 
doctors who used psychiatric maintenance drugs.  
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Attempts by Ontario’s medical regulator to uncover potentially impaired physicians are 
reminiscent of early 20th century attempts by industrial psychologists to identify accident-prone 
factory workers and railway engineers (Burnham 2009). While industrial psychologists used 
psychometrics to identify accident-prone workers, Ontario’s medical regulator, seeking 
potentially impaired physicians, expanded their surveillance tool-kit to include psychiatric drug 
use as a proxy for occupational risk. While objective measures of impairment had been 
developed to verify recovery from alcohol and drug addiction, medical directors had to rely on 
their clinical intuition to adjudicate potential impairment among users of psychiatric drugs, 
compiling information from multiple sources in costly, often lengthy evaluations. Each licencing 
decision was made on a case-by-case basis.  
 
I will argue that in applying psychiatry’s authoritative knowledge framework to the field of 
medical licencing, medical directors at Ontario’s Physician Health Program had little choice but 
to impose strict monitoring criteria on users of psychiatric maintenance drugs. Psychiatric 
conditions had been linked to medical errors, and legal precedent showed that Ontario’s newly 
integrated surveillance network could be held financially accountable for its decisions. Medical 
errors committed by “impaired physicians” in Ontario were transformed legally into regulatory 
failures, not just errors committed by an individual.  
 
The disposition of doctors who declared their psychiatric drug use was not lost on applicants for 
medical licences, and by 2015 there were signs that doctors were beginning to resist, to conceal 
their use of psychiatric drugs, fearing disclosure would lead to intrusive workplace monitoring 
with negative career implications. The impaired physician had by 2015 gone from an 
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administrative category meant to enhance the public’s confidence in Ontario’s medical 
profession to a category that exposed the limits of regulatory surveillance.  
 
Over roughly half a century, maintenance drugs had moved out of the back-wards of North 
American mental hospitals into the medicine cabinets of roughly 10% of the general population, 
which included the very physicians who prescribed them. The next chapter starts at the 
beginning of that journey, in the post-war period, where a language of maintenance was already 
taking shape.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
Stabilizing a Vision for Psychiatric Drug Maintenance: 1940-1970 
Case reports and Graphical Images  
 
 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
This chapter offers a pre-history to the standardization of psychiatric drug maintenance, in which 
mental hospital psychiatrists and administrators consolidated a way of thinking about 
pharmacology as a way to change the trajectory of mental illness. This is a period of speculation, 
expressed in various case reports, that drugs, if taken over long periods of time, were capable of 
literally changing the minds of the mentally ill and that these changes could be observed (and 
eventually controlled) on multiple levels, from individual physiology to public health. Taken 
together, reports, scattered throughout professional journals and government publications, often 
generously illustrated with graphics, contain an anticipatory grammar of psychiatric drug 
maintenance (Appendix B). This grammar was anything but consistent as it jumped from 
physiology, to individual life histories, to the level of institutional analysis, but it would be a 
stretch to expect consistency in one of medicine’s messiest fields. Indeed, there is a case to be 
made for situating the grammar of maintenance drugs more than two decades before the first 
randomized controlled trials were designed, and a decade before the first anti-psychotic 
medications were distributed in North American mental hospitals. The term “maintenance 
electroshock” already appears in psychiatric journals before the end of the Second World War, 
along with extended courses of coma therapy, with both interventions meant to change the 
“natural course” of mental illness. It was onto these controversial practices that maintenance 
drugs were grafted. 
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As this chapter will show, the messy language of drug maintenance is tied up with its place of 
origin. Researchers working on specialized hospital units interpreted the effects of drugs in terms 
of their patient’s minute-to-minute physiological fluctuations; clinicians on busy, sometimes 
chaotic wards, re-constructed information from their patients’ charts and from recovered 
memories, often combining this with new information such as current clinical impressions and 
numerical rating scales. Administrators, on the other hand, worked at some distance from clinical 
care, reflecting in the quiet of their offices on admission and discharge rates as they decided on 
new fiscal priorities. It should not be surprising that from superintendents’ offices came a very 
different standard for assessing drug maintenance – hospital efficiency. Yet despite differences 
in the way knowledge about maintenance drugs was made, there were commonalities. We can 
see in the decades between 1940 and 1970, that psychiatrists stabilized their assumptions about 
the workings of maintenance drugs over time. These assumptions became the raw material for 
statisticians, who would eventually help drug maintenance travel from mental institutions into 
North American society. 
 
While it seems a logical place to start the chapter chronologically, at the time of maintenance 
shock therapy, a clearer narrative will perhaps emerge by opening with a programmatic lecture 
given in 1969 by Heinz Lehman, a Canadian psychiatrist whose career was entangled with the 
development and promotion of maintenance drug therapy. His lecture crystalizes a picture of 
psychiatry’s ambitions in the late 1960’s, summing up a shared view that binds together the 
apparently disparate illustrations that will follow in a more or less chronological order4.  
 
 
                                                        
4 This chapter draws on the journal survey outlined in Appendix B.  
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2.2   A programme for biological psychiatry 
 
 
Heinz Lehman 
 
Heinz Lehman (1911-1999) was, in the mid 1960’s, the president of the American College of 
Neuropsychopharmacology (ACNP), a professional organization for physicians interested in the 
development and application of drugs for the treatment of mental illness. Not surprisingly, since 
its inception in 1961, the organization had close ties with pharmaceutical manufacturers (Healy 
1997). Leaving Germany to escape persecution in the Second World War, Lehman’s career 
stands for a generation of psychiatrists whose clinical views were formed prior to the mass 
introduction of psychiatric drugs to the mental hospital system. In an oral history recorded in 
1994, he fashioned himself as an early adopter of technology, recalling how he had no qualms 
trying unconventional remedies on his patients, including administering laughing gas (nitrous 
oxide) to people diagnosed as clinically depressed and altering the acid-based balance of people 
diagnosed with schizophrenia (Dancey and Lehman 1939, Lehman and Bos 1947, Lehman and 
Risquez 1953, Lehman 1994). It was his early adoption of the antipsychotic drug chlorpromazine 
however, which he imported directly to Canada from its manufacturer in France prior to its FDA 
approval in 1954, that sealed his professional reputation.  
 
Delivering a plenary lecture to the 1969 annual meeting of the Association of Life Insurance 
Medical Directors of America, Lehman laid out his understanding of a future in which medicines 
would prevent future symptoms of mental illness just as medicines in the 1960’s had proven 
effective in the treatment of diabetes (Lehmann 1969). While drugs could, in the short term, 
change the way we felt, Lehman believed it was the prevention of future symptoms of mental 
illness that would, over time, be of greatest benefit to society. He was not talking about using 
drugs for primary prevention, which referred to the prevention of pathology before it even 
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started. Examples of primary prevention in physical medicine included public health measures 
like sewage management, access to clean drinking water and vaccination while primary 
prevention in mental medicine would have referred to educational initiatives, affordable daycare 
and basic income and housing security. Rather, Lehman had in mind drugs as early interventions, 
used before psychiatric syndromes had become full-blown, and also when clinical syndromes 
had already developed. In both cases he felt, drugs would reduce symptoms, optimize 
functioning and minimize future distress when taken over long periods of time. Like diabetic 
drugs which, he argued, could prevent or delay future kidney damage, heart attacks and 
neuropathy, psychiatric drugs could prevent symptoms of mental illness from disrupting people’s 
lives. In the 1960’s, secondary prevention was a public health term referring to early disease 
detection and intervention. Tertiary prevention referred to whatever reduced long-term disability 
once an illness had taken hold. The potential for any technology to prevent future disability from 
mental illness had massive financial implications not only for state hospitals seeking to reduce 
recidivism and close long-term wards (an example of successful tertiary prevention), but also for 
employers seeking to reduce employee absenteeism (secondary prevention). For drug marketers, 
maintenance medications were a way of maintaining profits; repeat customers represented a form 
of annuity. Lehman focused on the upside of psychiatric drugs, but he did not address 
contemporary concerns that well-meaning attempts at early medical intervention could lead to 
the misguided labeling of people as chronically ill (Goffman 1963, Weisz 2014).  
 
The therapeutic role of psychotropic drugs lies in secondary and tertiary prevention. As a 
corrective treatment approach, pharmacotherapy in psychiatry is more than symptomatic 
treatment without on the other hand, being curative. One might compare it to insulin 
treatment of diabetes and might point to the reduction of time spent in hospital and the 
prevention of deterioration and facilitation of rehabilitation which these drugs effectively 
achieve (Lehmann 1969).  
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Lehman saw an emerging technology capable of … “impacting the prognosis of psychiatric 
conditions, [including] changes in the form which psychopathology manifests itself” (Lehmann 
1969). Maintenance drugs would alter the experience and expression of emotional suffering, 
muting its intensity but also rendering sufferers more manageable. He used a rhetoric of 
scientific progress, starting with a summary of how he perceived mental illness from the 
perspective of a hospital psychiatrist, prior to the introduction of maintenance drugs.  
…  Manic depressive episodes usually ended in self-recovery if the patient did not die 
through suicide, inter-current disease or exhaustion. A manic attack would last an average 
of three to four months and depressive episodes from six to nine months. Of the patients 
with involutional melancholia, only about 50-60% recovered then, and their attacks lasted 
from one to two years. … But any patient diagnosed as schizophrenic would spend an 
average of 10 years in a mental hospital. Many schizophrenics spent 20, 30, even 50 years 
in institutions for the mentally ill.   
 
 
Lehman then follows up with a description of how drugs were changing the trajectory of 
mental illness.  
 
… Many clinicians in America and abroad have observed that schizophrenic patients today 
are less excited, more subdued and uniform in their pathological manifestations than they 
were in the pre-neuroleptic era. There are fewer catatonic patients today and more 
paranoids. Further, since the introduction of neuroleptic therapy, one sees more often the 
development of depressive states in schizophrenics. … The picture … of depressions has 
changed with the advent of drug treatment.  
 
 
Still, Lehman’s enthusiasm reflects a style of thinking about drug maintenance that, in the late 
1960’s, was largely bound to hospitals.  
 
2.3  Maintenance Electroshock: 1943-1965  
 
Psychiatrists had been using maintenance interventions for a decade and a half prior to the mid 
1950’s, so that when tranquilizers were introduced en masse to the mental hospital system, a 
language of maintenance therapy was already available to adopt. The practice of treating mental 
illness with electrically induced seizures was imported to America from Italy in the late 1930’s, 
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and by the end of the Second World War, descriptions of maintenance electroshock began 
appearing in psychiatric journals (Rabheru and Persad 1997, Shorter and Healy 2007, Petrides, 
Tobias et al. 2011). The procedure was meant not only to render hospital patients more 
manageable but also to keep those who had achieved release from hospital from requiring re-
admission.  
 
The decision to administer maintenance shocks was often based on an inmate’s prognosis, 
though it was also common for brief trials of shock therapy to be tried liberally on long-stay as 
well as in acute wards. The ideal candidate had been hospitalized for fewer than two years 
(traditionally people detained for more than two years were considered unlikely to leave the 
institution alive). That said, some psychiatrists were less concerned about a patient’s duration of 
stay, and instead advocated brief trials of shock therapy in a trial-and-error approach, on both 
long-stay as well as acute wards. Patients’ responses to a small number of electroshocks were to 
guide decisions about maintenance therapy (one psychiatrist referred to seeking “electroshock 
improvers” as ideal candidates) (Moore 1943).  
 
Organizing cases according to treatment phases 
 
 
Maintenance electroshock was divided into “treatment phases”. In the first phase of treatment, 
the goal was to “abolish the psychotic symptoms”. In the second phase, it was to “prevent a 
recurrence” (Karliner and Wehrheim 1965). The phases of treatment operated as a selection 
filter; only those people who had experienced a recovery in the first phase of treatment would 
continue into the prevention (maintenance) phase, ideally moving toward hospital discharge and 
flowing away from chronic care. Even so, it was not simple to define which cases had failed in 
the first phase of treatment; those who only partially recovered meant decisions had to be made 
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about stopping further shocks or perhaps continuing with more intensive therapies with the belief 
that more might be better. Then again, some believed that delivering a more intensive series of 
shocks to those who only partially recovered would only lead to “electroshock dependence”, a 
term describing people for whom the therapeutic benefits of shocks seemed to wane over the 
course of months following an initial improvement  (Bourne and Lond 1954). Some psychiatrists 
preferred to continue electroshocks to maintain even a partial improvement while for others, the 
division between acute and maintenance phases was more dogmatic. Typically, more intensive 
shock sessions continued until the patient had achieved a satisfactory symptom reduction (or 
presumably until exhaustion or a sense of futility set in). Most reports of maintenance 
electroshock reflect little or no agency on the part of hospital inmates, but one case stands out, 
idealizing maintenance shock therapy as something that might even be requested by patients.  
 
Example 1: A Panegyric to Maintenance Electroshock 
 
In 1939, a 34-year-old Minneapolis resident, a married professional man with an ‘obsessive 
compulsive personality’ was admitted to the hospital for treatment of his second attack of 
depression. His first attack had resolved without medical attention, 10 years earlier. This time, 
hospitalization seemed necessary, and during his 6 months as a patient, he received therapy with 
13 typhoid shots, 7 chemically-induced seizures, and insulin shock therapy. The next year 
following his release from hospital was not much better, and he attempted suicide by overdosing 
on barbiturates. In 1944, now 39 years old, he was hospitalized again, and treated with electric 
shock therapy. Immediately after the conclusion of this attack, “he went into a hypomanic 
episode, which required hospitalization for 8 months. He had nine shock treatments at this time”. 
It seemed to his psychiatrists that even the slightest thing could set off an attack of mental illness. 
Remarkably, on one occasion he fell into a 6-month depression while eating dessert at a 
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Thanksgiving dinner. Diagnosing a condition called ‘circular manic depression’, his psychiatrists 
reckoned he was a good candidate for “prophylactic shock therapy”.   
 
He … tried 5 years of prophylactic EST and monthly [depressive] cycles continued 
but the amplitude was reduced to the point where one would not have detected the 
pattern readily unless the patient had factually reported how he felt. At no time 
during the years 1948-1953 of ‘prophylactic EST’ did he require hospitalization and 
he continued throughout this period in an active and successful professional life 
(Hastings 1961). 
 
By the time his psychiatrist decided to write up this case for the American Journal of Psychiatry, 
he had been through a trial period without prophylactic shock therapy. After five years of shock 
therapy, his doctor considered the patient to be an authority on his own personal response. …  
 
It seemed prudent to let this highly intelligent professional man make his own 
decision, since by this time he was in truth an authority on manic-depressive disease 
and its treatment. He elected to stop and see what happened (Hastings 1961). 
 
Subsequently, he was re-hospitalized, received 7 shock treatments, which ‘provided remission’, 
then re-started another 5 years of treatments.  
 
… Electric shock therapy was resumed, followed by prophylactic shocks. …  To 
date, this man, now 56 years of age, has had 147 chemically or electrically induced 
convulsions spread over a 20-year period. He has had the usual temporary memory 
deficit after each closely spaced series of electroshocks but has had little trouble with 
memory disturbance subsequent to [shock sessions] spread at the monthly or greater 
intervals (Hastings 1961). 
 
 
The report, entitled “Circular Manic Depressive Reaction Modified by Prophylactic 
Electroshock”, represents psychiatric logic of the 1950’s and 60’s. The narrative revolves around 
a relationship between a natural illness type, the testimony of a man afflicted by the condition, 
and a psychiatrist. The man receiving maintenance shocks is described as a collaborator, 
reporting subtle internal changes (“one would not have detected the pattern unless the patient had 
factually reported how he felt”) while the severity of his problems is validated by the need for 
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hospitalization. Telegraphic descriptions, give us a glimpse of his life outside the hospital - he 
was married, worked as a professional, and celebrated Thanksgiving. What stands out is the two 
decades covered by the story, and the relationship between this man and his shocks. Nowhere is 
he referred to as a treatment responder or improver. Rather, treatments “reduced the amplitude of 
his cycles”; his personal baseline is the frame of reference, against which prophylactic shocks are 
assessed. The term prophylaxis is used somewhat loosely, since shocks both treat and prevent 
attacks of illness. Psychiatrists in the 1960’s did not distinguish clearly between active treatment 
and preventive therapy, a terminology that was not standardized in American psychiatry until the 
early 1990’s.  
 
Example 2: Trial and Error Approach to Uncovering “Electroshock Improvers” 
 
In the midst of the Second World War, the Journal of Mental Science (later the British Journal of 
Psychiatry) published a case series by a clinical researcher, Norman Moore, describing the use of 
maintenance electroshock treatment at the Crichton Royal Hospital, a large Scottish mental 
hospital (Moore 1943). The authors proposed that “some patients might be treated at intervals 
over an indefinite period” – what is called “maintenance treatment” … that “electrically induced 
convulsions repeated at intervals could maintain the improvement achieved after an initial course 
of treatment”.  
 
Hidden in the experiment was its method for identifying suitable candidates. Out of 1,250 
hospital residents, only 56 were deemed suitable, chosen due to their “initial response” to a series 
of 6-9 shock treatments. Anticipating a form of pragmatic logic that would return and dominate 
psychiatric experiments in the early 1970’s, Moore saw himself as intervening in nature, creating 
a new entity, which he called the “electroshock improver”. It was not valid, in Moore’s view, to 
draw comparisons between electroshock improvers and those who did not improve because non-
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improvement in his view implied a distinct disease entity with a negative prognosis, perhaps a 
form of schizophrenia. Each electroshock improver served as their own reference; a narrative 
was reconstructed for each patient, describing their experience before and after treatment. Moore 
gave priority to his patient’s electroshock response, over their diagnostic categories, even though 
his tabular descriptions included specific disease labels. The following example is typical of 
what he wants to communicate: electroshock improvers had to be uncovered by trial and error, 
and a diagnostic label said little about a patients’ ability to improve when shocked. This case 
describes a man with a diagnosis of schizophrenia, and a poor outlook for recovery. 
 
Case 17, Male aged 33. Admitted March 5, 1940. 
He was a sensible, intelligent, rather shy and solitary man, who liked his work as a 
miner. He was good natured and fond of his family, but found social adaptation 
difficult. For two-years before admission his family noticed a change; he became 
irritable, suspicious, self-absorbed and more markedly asocial. For the last six 
months of this period he refused to work, he had ideas of reference and expressed 
delusions of a persecutory and grandiose nature5. He thought he had found the secret 
of “perpetual motion” and for this reason was being spied on, and that attempts were 
made to poison him and to harm his body with electricity. He imagined people were 
listening to his thoughts and that everyone was against him. He had angry outbursts 
and was violent at times. He sat about the house or lay in bed all day.  
 
Rather than declaring his patient hopeless, based on his diagnosis, Moore demonstrates the 
virtues of therapeutic trial and error. Notably, Moore gauges maintenance electroshock a 
success in relation to his patient’s baseline, declaring a form of success that does not 
involve hospital discharge. Rather, it is his patients’ functioning within the hospital that 
constitutes a success. This would change in the coming decades.  
 
He was put on maintenance electroshock treatment just over a year ago. Since then 
he has had 25 fits [induced convulsions] and these have kept him almost constantly at 
a good level of behavior. He is pleasant and co-operative, helps with the work in the 
ward, accompanies the driver of a hospital lorry on his journeys and helps him to 
                                                        
5 The psychiatric term “ideas of reference” is an important signifier here, as it contrasts with 
delusions of reference, which would have signaled Moore’s belief that this man’s diagnosis was 
schizophrenia, a condition thought by many psychiatrists to be resistant to shock therapy. 
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load and unload. He enjoys full parole, eats and sleeps well. At intervals which vary 
from a few weeks to a few months he becomes moody, irritable, complaining that the 
doctors are experimenting on his body, that his food and cigarettes are being 
poisoned and he begins drawing plans for his “perpetual motion machine”. … These 
changes are the indication for further treatment, which at once brings about a 
dramatic improvement (Moore 1943). 
 
This man, possibly a coal miner in the area surrounding the Royal Crichton Hospital, had little 
say in his story, and we know of him only in the barest outline. The effects of maintenance 
electroshock (ironically given his fears of electricity being used to harm him) were inferred on a 
background of his frame of mind and behavior when he was not receiving treatments. We don’t 
learn if he eventually left the hospital, only that the therapy made him “pleasant and co-operative 
… almost constantly at a good level of behavior”, able to help a lorry driver on the hospital 
grounds.  Typical of the emerging tradition of maintenance interventions, when Moore went on 
to describe electroshock improvers at a group level, he provided his readers with no clear 
guidance on how to replicate his results at any other institution. Individual case reports, case 
series and later, clinical trials, would make therapeutic claims about responders while providing 
little in the way of guidance on how one might identify a responder in practice:  
 
Included in the study were … 37 schizophrenics, average duration of illness 9 years; 
8 are involutional or senile melancholics ill on an average of 4 years; 6 manic 
depressives; 3 periodic catatonics and 2 hyperkinetic mental defectives.  … The 
criteria for selection of cases were that the patient’s behaviour endangered their own 
health, for example by refusal of food, by being wet, dirty or destructive, or that their 
mental state was one of acute misery, as in agitated melancholia. Chronic patients 
who had become adjusted to hospital life and followed routine contentedly were not 
chosen (Moore 1943). 
 
 
Outcomes were described in general terms of sleep, appetite, symptoms (hallucinations) and 
behaviour; the desired outcome if not hospital parole was a more compliant, manageable inmate 
who had “an improvement in general physical health, shown by a brighter expression, better 
complexion and more spontaneous and better motor response”.  
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Example 3: Trusting Trial and Error over Diagnosis 
 
Two years later, in 1945, the psychiatrist Edward Kerman described 300 consecutive cases 
treated with electroshock over a period of 2 years at the Springfield State Hospital in Sykesville 
Maryland (Kerman 1945). The value of therapy was estimated by comparing each inmate’s 
behavior before and during electroshock maintenance. Like Moore, whose cases series is 
described above, Kerman was not at all optimistic about the value of psychiatric diagnosis in 
making treatment decisions, opting instead to use shock therapy itself as a method to uncover 
those who would “react favorably”. He described “the response of patients to electroshock 
therapy during the course of treatment, to note their ability to maintain the varying degrees of 
improvement thus sustained”: 
 
We learned, early in our experience, that it was difficult to predict which 
schizophrenic patient would react favorably and which would not. Hence a majority 
of the schizophrenics admitted to the hospital were given electroshock therapy. There 
were a few other patients who were treated because they were excited, destructive, 
assaultive and combative, creating problems in their management. … Much attention 
has been paid to the question of frequency of treatment and total number of 
treatments given. Adjustment of these two factors has been made a number of times 
in an effort to avoid relapses (Kerman 1945). 
 
Kerman believed that most people with schizophrenia relapsed because of inadequate treatment 
duration. The paper describes only those people who had improved (compared to their former 
selves) while remaining silent on those who had not. As his method implies, compliance with 
shock treatments was taken for granted.  
 
 The patient is given two courses of electroshock and if relapse follows improvement 
during both courses, he is started on treatment usually at the rate of two shocks per 
week. If improvement occurs again and is sustained for several weeks, the patient’s 
family is advised that he may be paroled and will probably continue in his improved 
state and be able to make a satisfactory social adjustment, provided that treatment is 
continued on the outside at the rate of two shocks per week. …. it will probably be 
necessary to continue at the rate of two shocks per week for a period of six months. 
Then the psychiatrists might attempt to decrease the frequency and see whether 
improvement is still maintained. … It is our experience at the hospital that most of 
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the relapsing patients who have their treatment decreased to once a week after having 
received shocks twice weekly for four to six weeks previous to the change, generally 
fail to hold their improvement and it is thought that after a longer period at twice a 
week it might be more feasible to attempt reduction in the frequency of treatment 
(Kerman 1945).  
 
 
As for the total duration of maintenance therapy, Kerman is silent.  
 The above schedule must be maintained rigidly in cases where relapse might usher 
in symptoms of socially unacceptable behavior. . … A maintenance treatment with 
weekly, biweekly or even monthly applications, possibly two on the same day, will 
keep such patients on a higher level and facilitate their management. … In this paper, 
where the emphasis is placed on adjustment in the home, more treatments are 
recommended so that not only is improvement maintained but relapse avoided 
(Kerman 1945).  
 
 
The relationship between a patient’s place of residence and the required intensity of treatment to 
prevent relapse exposes an emerging problem for maintenance therapy. If a certain level of 
recovery was acceptable in the hospital, an even greater (optimal) level of mental health would 
be needed to maintain one’s residence in the community. More treatment is equated with 
avoiding relapse. Kerman took for granted that if unchecked, mental illnesses would become 
worse, often leading to long-term institutionalization. A logic of preventing long-term 
deterioration through maintenance shocks appears across several papers in the 40’s (Moore 1943, 
Alexander 1945, Geoghegan and Stevenson 1949, G Stevenson 1951). 
 
Example 4: Using Specific Criteria to Guide Prophylactic Electroshock  
 
In 1949, a paper describing “Prophylactic Electroshock” appeared in the American Journal of 
Psychiatry, submitted by two Canadian psychiatrists at the Homewood sanatorium, proposed that 
early intervention, a series of monthly “prophylactic” shocks continued for 5 years, regardless of 
the appearance of symptoms, could modify the future “natural course of illness” (Geoghegan and 
Stevenson 1949). This was a departure from approaches that defined maintenance as a form of 
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therapy re-started at the first whiff of recurrent symptoms, and the report was unusual in spelling 
out a specific end-point to therapy after 5 years. The authors don’t tell us how they came up with 
this recommended duration.  
 
 We use the term ‘prophylactic electroshock’ to apply to electric convulsions which 
are induced after recovery from a mental illness, at approximately monthly intervals, 
for the purpose of preventing recurrences of the mental illness. The rationale behind 
this technique rests on the known fact that induced convulsions often cause the 
termination of a manic or a depressive attack. Such being the case we assumed that 
induced convulsions might break up and dissipate accumulating tensions before they 
became clinically visible as a definite mental illness (Geoghegan and Stevenson 
1949).   
 
People eligible for prophylactic therapy included  
 
...patients who had had 2 or more attacks of mental illness in the preceding 5 years 
and who recovered each time under electrotherapy. It was planned to induce in such 
patients, after recovery from the most recent attack, a single electric convulsion once 
a month for the ensuing 5 years, to ascertain if attacks of mental illness could be 
prevented by this method (Geoghegan and Stevenson 1949). 
 
As with reports of maintenance shock therapy, treatment effects were inferred by simply adding 
up the number of attacks each patient was said to have in the preceding 5 years and comparing 
these with the number of attacks experienced during the 5 years of prophylactic shock treatment. 
The authors concluded that …  “unquestionably many patients with too easy tendency to 
recurrence of mental illness can be kept free of attacks by a procedure such as is here outlined” 
(Geoghegan and Stevenson 1949).  
 
Still, prophylactic shocks were not without drawbacks and they reminded readers that …  
 
There are many patients who dislike intensely the electric convulsions and would 
prefer to run the risk of future attacks of mental illness or even to have them, rather 
than look forward to a long series of monthly shocks. In other words, the prevention 
may be worse than the disease.  … The economic aspect of time lost from work and 
the actual charges for the prophylactic shock are also important factors to be 
evaluated, but must be weighed against time that would be lost from recurring illness 
and expense of treatment and the difficulty of again securing employment.  .. and a 
great deal of urging and follow up is often needed, as in the continued treatment of 
certain physical diseases which may not be causing symptoms such as syphilis. … 
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we consider it the duty of the psychiatrists to keep the patient well and to prevent 
recurrences of mental illness if possible (Geoghegan and Stevenson 1949). 
 
By the mid 1960’s maintenance electroshock therapy had been used for well over two decades 
across North America, the UK, and in Europe to maintain recovery from mental illness. Yet 
recovery from mental illness, when maintained by long-term shocks was viewed as fragile. 
Questions raised about maintenance shock therapy recurred in the emerging practice of drug 
maintenance. Could responders to treatment be identified using standardized criteria, or were 
responders uncovered only by trial and error? What would constitute scientific proof that 
maintenance therapy was effective? Would the emergence of even mild symptoms guide the 
timing of maintenance, or should prophylaxis continue even in the absence of any symptoms? 
Questions linking maintenance therapy to the question of dependence would return with special 
relevance to drug maintenance. Maintenance electroshock therapy, while helpful to a few, 
seemed unlikely to materially impact the problem of mental illness in society. Neither 
psychiatrists, nor hospital administrators, attempted to model its effects on institutional 
functioning. Still, for people with severe illness and for those of modest means, it was viewed as 
a cost-effective option for avoiding the State Mental Institution.   
 
… With this approach private psychiatric hospital care has been brought within the 
reach of the middle and lower middle income groups, and prolonged hospitalization 
in a tax-supported institution can usually be avoided. … Relapses of psychotic illness 
following treatment with convulsive therapy can be prevented or considerably 
reduced by maintenance convulsive therapy without changing the patient’s 
personality or environment. This is of great practical importance since unfortunately 
for many patients psychotherapy and or environmental manipulation is impossible. 
… Maintenance convulsive treatments enable patients to avoid frequent hospital 
admissions, to continue with their occupation and remain active and useful members 
of their families and communities (Karliner and Wehrheim 1965). 
 
 
2.4  A Language of Lithium Maintenance: 1954-1967 
 
The terms ‘lithium maintenance’ and ‘lithium prophylaxis’, introduced in the mid 1950’s  
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mapped easily onto the grammar of maintenance electroshock therapy. As with electroshock 
therapy, only those people whose symptoms improved with treatment (lithium improvers or 
responders) were candidates for maintenance. Finding lithium improvers was, like finding 
electroshock improvers, an iterative clinical process. “Lithium improvers” were to be found 
among those whose symptoms were most likely to recover, even without treatment, if given 
enough time (Schou, Juel-Nielsen et al. 1954). Lithium’s effect, it was felt, was to shorten the 
duration and severity of disability while strengthening recovery, making it more likely that 
people could be discharged from hospital and return to their pre-hospital lives (Schou, Juel-
Nielsen et al. 1954).  
 
Unlike electroshock therapy, psychiatrists saw in lithium maintenance a scalable intervention, 
capable not only of increasing hospital efficiency by reducing recidivism, but also a model of 
preventing hospital admissions altogether. Lithium was believed to have non-specific effects on 
all people as a modulator of extreme emotions and impulses. By the early 1970’s, there was even 
speculation that lithium might be introduced to drinking water as a way of reducing violent crime 
and mental hospital admissions (Dawson 1970). One investigation went as far as trying to 
correlate (unsuccessfully) naturally-occurring lithium levels in tap water with hospital recidivism 
and crime rates (Dawson 1970).  
 
Speculations about lithium as a public health intervention aside, psychiatric symptoms, if 
uncontrolled, were understood as detracting from a person’s standing in their community, their 
relationships, and their self-confidence. Psychiatrists promoted early intervention with lithium, 
followed by long-term maintenance as soon as a pattern of relapsing and remitting mental illness 
had been established by a mental health authority (Baastrup and Schou 1967). At issue for 
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experts was how to authoritatively certify a baseline pattern of relapsing and remitting mental 
symptoms. Psychiatrists had to trust not only what they could observe but they also had to take 
their patients’ recollections as a valid form of data.    
 
Lithium researchers like the Danish psychiatrist Mogens Schou and the American Frederick 
Goodwin illustrated their approach to reconstructing their patient’s symptoms over long periods 
of time in calendar diagrams like the one shown in figure 2.1 below. Sensitive to professional 
criticism that therapeutic claims about lithium prophylaxis were based on case reports and not on 
randomized controlled trials, medicine’s emerging gold standard of knowledge-making, they 
fashioned their calendar diagrams as experiments known as “mirror image studies”, and referred 
to each patient as “their own control” (Schou, Juel-Nielsen et al. 1954, Goodwin F 1969).  
 
Calendar diagrams were one of the most common ways of communicating the effects of 
maintenance treatments between the mid 50’s and the mid 70’s. They were easily drawn, adapted 
to include standardized scales, and used in clinical records as a shorthand to communicate a 
person’s clinical history over years and decades, at a glance. Psychiatrists represented an 
individuals’ history of ups and downs over years in relation to various interventions including 
medicines, placebos, shock therapy and hospitalization (figure 2.1).  
 
 45 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Calendar diagram showing the effects of lithium and electroconvulsive 
therapy (ECT) on mania and depression (but no bouts of depression are shown here). The 
author offers two cases, graphical representations covering three years of clinical 
information. Between 1951 and early 1954, each case experiences regular attacks of 
mania. One case received electroconvulsive therapy in 1952. The images are meant to 
show the beneficial effect of lithium prophylaxis in early 1954 (Schou, Juel-Nielsen et al. 
1954).   
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 below, produced by the American psychiatrist Frederick Goodwin, describes two case 
reports in which lithium treatment alternated with a placebo. Unlike Schou’s diagram where the 
frequency and amplitude of horizontal squiggles reflect his expert impression of his patient’s 
symptoms, Goodwin quantified symptoms of mania using a standardized scale developed for 
quantifying symptoms of mania and depression in 1963 (Bunney and Hamburg 1963).  
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Figure 2.2: Calendar diagram describing the alternation of placebo and lithium salts in two 
cases, demonstrating “complete and unequivocal responders” over a period of 
approximately 170 days. Red arrows (not in the original graphic), indicate periods of 
lithium treatment corresponding to symptom reduction or resolution. The diagram was 
published in the Archives of General Psychiatry alongside a series illustrating various 
degrees of clinical response to prophylactic lithium. The use of shading drew readers to the 
contrast between lithium and placebo treatment. In these cases, periods during which the 
patient does not take lithium map directly onto periods of elevated mania scores.   
 (Goodwin, Murphy et al. 1969).  
 
A standardized rating scale allowed Goodwin to quantify clinical response, which was as he put 
it, a step toward linking relevant biological changes in people who had responded to lithium. 
Figure 2.2 shows mania rating scores under periods of lithium treatment in hatched lines while 
the solid black indicates mania rating scores, measured when he gave his patient a placebo. 
Goodwin’s diagram was meant to show what “a complete and unequivocal responder” to 
prophylactic lithium looked like in clinical practice (Goodwin, Murphy et al. 1969).  Rating 
scales allowed Goodwin to quantify “complete an unequivocal response” to lithium as a 
“complete remission of all manic or depressive symptoms within two weeks of starting lithium 
Archives of 
General 
Psychiatry, 1969
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carbonate AND a return of those symptoms during placebo periods”. Rating scales also allowed 
him to quantify lesser degrees of response, for example “partial and unequivocal response”, 
signifying a decrease in the mean mania or depression ratings of at least 3 points within two 
weeks of starting lithium AND an increase in symptoms during placebo periods. He had other 
categories, including “probable response” and “no response”, all of which could be compared 
with rating scores using a paired t-test to provide readers with statistical confidence in his 
conclusions.  
 
Yet Goodwin’s graphic representation points to considerable tolerance in the concept of 
“complete and unequivocal response”. Note the latitude assigned to the term midway along the 
diagram, where the mania ratings spike up to 4. Since the patient is considered his own control, 
even a rating of 4 is considered a relevant improvement. This way of thinking about complete 
and unequivocal response contrasts radically with representations of response two decades later, 
in which the frame of reference was a standardized score, not a personal baseline. Goodwin’s 
generous characterization of complete and unequivocal response was mirrored by his 
contemporaries, including a professional rival in the field of lithium research, Mogens Schou in 
Denmark. Schou’s representations of maintenance therapy, shown in Figure 2.3 below in a paper 
published with his junior colleague Christian Baastrup as first author, did not include a 
standardized scale for measuring symptoms but rather he quantified “episodes”, calculating 
response in terms of fewer than expected highs and lows over time.  
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Figure 2.3, Signatures on a calendar diagram (called a “mirror image study” by Mogens Schou) 
based on a compilation of case reports, became widely accepted as evidence that lithium 
maintenance therapy was an effective way of preventing future symptoms of mental illness 
among people diagnosed with manic depression. This diagram compared prospectively gathered 
observations of hospitalized patients with reconstructions of each patient’s past clinical history. 
A glance at the density of dark or shaded bars over the lines to the right (signifying lithium 
prophylaxis) shows that lithium was perceived to be effective (Baastrup and Schou 1967).  
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Figure 2.3 covers a span of 6.5 years and signifies clinical impressions gathered from the 
personal histories and observations of 40 patients. The figure, which precedes the appearance of 
randomized trials of maintenance drugs in medical journals, represents a transition from 
individual case reports to experiments. The term ‘signatures’, gestures toward a discomfort 
lumping together individuals into an idealized category, a maneuver accomplished by corporate 
statisticians, and described in the next chapter. The text accompanying figure 2.3 is replete with 
individual case descriptions. The following example stands out;  
 
Two young girls presented special problems. After having had several manic-
depressive episodes they were started on lithium treatment before the age of 18. 
During lithium administration they occasionally suffered from slight thirst and 
nausea, but their main complaint was that the treatment made them depressed. In the 
psychiatrist’s opinion they were not depressed at all; but they had made up their 
minds that they would accept only a hypomanic state as the normal, and lithium 
removed the hypomanic feelings of zest and self-assurance desirable to a girl in her 
teens. The patients therefore sabotaged the treatment to the best of their ability and 
often did not take the tablets prescribed. This may probably have caused some of 
their relapses during lithium treatment. One of them (case No. 44 05 25) is in the 
material, while in the other instance lithium could never be given continuously for 
very long, and her condition alternated between manias and depressions with only 
brief normal intervals (Baastrup and Schou 1967).  
 
 
Figure 2.3 would likely have been perceived by readers as an expression of cutting-edge 
technology. It resembles a computer punch card with its binary logic here illustrated as mania vs 
depression, normal vs abnormal. There is a category of ‘mixed form and/or rapid manic-
depressive alternations’ in hatched grey, but the diagram leaves little room for nuance, for a 
spectrum of colors. The black and white diagram offers a Manichean view of mental health in 
which liberation is offered through biotechnology to those who respond. The authors’ intent is to 
communicate that when patients took lithium as a prophylactic agent, they were less likely to 
experience symptoms of mental illness than when they did not take lithium. The unit of analysis 
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is the individual, depicted as having had longstanding emotional problems before lithium 
maintenance therapy was started. The relevance of lithium maintenance to institutions in terms of 
recidivism for example is not considered. Nor is the relevance of lithium maintenance to 
institutions outside the hospital such as workplaces or families.  
 
Schou and his colleagues offered a statistical analysis of their work, analyzing the “Mean 
Relapse Frequencies With and Without Lithium” (figure 2.4). The tables were based on the 
following calculation, which was meant to estimate the “expected psychosis-free period between 
discontinuation of lithium and the start of the first relapse (signified in the equation as f)” based 
on “the average duration of the episodes (signified below as e) and intervals before lithium 
treatment was started (signified in the equation as i)” (figure 2.5). The “frequency of relapse” as 
the main study outcome follows a view of mental health (and illness) as a process of constant 
flux and change. Pharmacology could at best, according to Baastrup and Schou, modulate the 
frequency of emotional change (though unlike Goodwin, they are unable to quantify the effect of 
lithium on the amplitude of emotional fluctuations).  
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Figure 2.4: Statistical analysis of calendar diagram shown in figure 2.3. The analysis included 
tests of statistical significance which were based on the estimated frequency and duration of 
episodes as calculated based on the patient’s history. Table 1 describes a general category of 
“mean relapse frequency” while Table 2 focuses on the most severe forms of relapse, which fall 
under the category of psychosis. While the report describes a series of individual cases using the 
term “individual signatures”, some of which are described in prose, the summary table erases all 
differences between participants, including age, sex, race and socio-economic factors. This 
report was published 6 years before the first randomized placebo-controlled trial of lithium 
appeared in the same journal.   
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Figure 2.5: Statistical equation used to calculate “relapse frequency”, the critical outcome 
variable in Baasrup and Schou’s study. Viewing mental health as inherently in flux, an 
individual’s frequency of relapse before and after treatment was perceived as the most relevant 
outcome of maintenance therapy. “ f “ signifies the “expected psychosis-free period between 
discontinuation of lithium and the start of the first relapse”. “e” signifies “the average duration of 
the episodes and i represents the “intervals before lithium treatment was started”.   
 
 
The paper ignited a professional debate with the British psychiatrist and epidemiologist Michael 
Shepherd and his college Barry Blackwell, who publically denounced the work as scientifically 
naïve because it relied on the testimony of individual patients to estimate the duration and 
frequency of symptoms prior to lithium therapy (Blackwell 1968, Shepherd 1970). The historian 
and psychiatrist David Healy has documented the professional debate (Healy 1997, Healy 2008). 
My point here is not to follow the specific differences in opinion between two research groups, 
but rather to point out that a common language was already in place for a debate to occur in the 
first place. While there was clearly disagreement over the scientific validity of Schou’s methods, 
there was agreement about the object of study (the lithium responder), and the way in which their 
experiences of recurrent emotional suffering should be organized into periods of discrete 
episodes, described in relation to treatment phases of acute and maintenance. Quantifying “clear 
and unequivocal response” opened the possibility of thinking in terms of symptom cut-points, 
which allowed recovery to be recalibrated in the next decade into statistically validated binary 
categories of remission and relapse. Statistical variables were, by the late 1960’s, becoming 
available for use in a process of standardization.  
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2.5   Seeing Mental Health through Psycho-physiograms: 1955-1969 
 
Just as psychiatrists like Frederick Goodwin used calendar diagrams to envision responders to 
drug maintenance, a generation of psychiatrists looked to high-tech monitoring to guide their 
interventions. Psycho-physiograms, produced in the 1950’s and 60’s, have been described by the 
historian Kenton Kroker in his book  The Sleep of Others and the Transformations of Sleep 
Research, as part of a research program aimed at correlating human experience and behavior 
with multiple physiological measures (Kroker 2007). The hope of this research was eventually to 
“overcome the artifice of the laboratory” through miniaturized devices that a research subject 
might carry around in their pocket, generating reams of data that investigators could later turn 
into a physiological understanding of human experience (Ax 1964, Kroker 2007) (Kroker p. 
330). Like the calendar diagrams used in pharmacological experiments, psycho-physiograms 
confirmed in the mind’s eye that mental health was anything but static and certainly too complex 
to be imagined in binary terms of recovery vs relapse. 
  
Overlapping with the study of epilepsy and the emerging field of sleep medicine, psycho-
physiograms of various kinds appeared in psychiatric journals through the 1950’s and 60’s in 
relation to the study of psychiatric conditions such as periodic catatonia and manic depression 
(Appendix B). Studies were usually brief and resource-intensive, though some spanned more 
than six months. Research subjects were hooked up to devices like electroencephalograms, 
cardiograms and oxymeters while they were given medications meant to alter brain chemicals 
like serotonin and noradrenaline.  
 
Similar to their role in sleep medicine, psycho-physiograms, when applied to the study of 
medicated patients, were meant to make private experiences available to objective study. Unlike 
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their role in sleep medicine, however, there is no evidence the psychiatrists made a systematic 
effort to integrate psycho-physiograms to clinical practice. Nor is there evidence that 
psychophyiograms were standardized, either through quantification or through expert consensus.  
Psycho-physiograms disappeared from medical journals by the early 1970’s, yet they tell us 
something about what psychiatrists saw in their mind’s eye when they thought about the 
maintenance of recovery from mental illness. The diagrams and their accompanying text are 
compatible with an understanding that the connection between physiology and mental health 
would be difficult to ascertain, and that hopes were fading that drug therapies could be informed 
by objective, physical measurements.  
 
Psycho-physiogram Example 1:  
The term ‘periodic catatonia’, which faded from medical publications by the mid 1960’s, 
referred to a diverse set of signs and symptoms united by a disorder of motility that waxed and 
waned over the course of a lifetime. In the ‘intervals’ between ‘catatonic episodes’, people 
regained a level of personal health and functioning. The term has been linked to the expanding 
late 20th century category of manic depression (Berrios 1996, Healy 2008) . Figure 2.6 is one of 
eight phyisiograms in a report of a 6-year “kinetic longitudinal study of 3 patients with periodic 
catatonia at the metabolic unit of the Toronto Psychiatric Hospital” (later known as Toronto’s 
Clarke Institute and then CAMH, the Center for Addiction and Mental Health). The study had 
“been oriented towards the ideal of a longitudinal type of survey in which interacting variables 
have been observed from day to day over extensive periods and the metabolic patterns they have 
assumed correlated sequentially with the changing psychiatric pictures” (Bonkalo 1955).  
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Figure 2.6: A psycho-physiogram documenting the ‘natural history’ of periodic catatonia. The 
individual serves as their own ‘control’ during a 5-month period of intensive bodily and 
behavioural monitoring.  Bodily measurements include hematocrit, pulse rate, alpha waves 
(EEG) and oxygen saturation while psychometrics include responsivity score and gross physical 
movement score (Bonkalo 1955). 
 
Observations began after an “initial habituation period of 6 months” in hospital and continued for 
2 years including three EEGs per week, measurements of diet nitrogen content, psychiatric rating 
scales, nursing observations, rectal temperatures, pulse rates, blood pressures, uric acid, 
creatinine, amino acids, total nitrogen, glucocorticoids, and oximetry several times per week. 
“All results in each patient were individually recorded for checking purposes and master-charted 
on giant graphs the abscissae of which were the days of the investigation and the ordinates were 
severally the many procedures simultaneously involved.”  
 
The graphic accompanies a narrative describing a span of 5 months in the hospital life of R.H., a 
25-year-old man whose disturbance tended to “present with a precipitous onset, to endure for 10 
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day periods and to be characterized by a semi-stuporous condition lasting 6-10 days before a 4-8 
day remission interrupts another descent into deep stupor”. Readers are meant to see the passage 
of time reading from left to right, while noticing patterns in his brain waves. “As the level of the 
patient’s awareness gradually rises in the following semi-stuporous phase the alpha frequency 
increases again, often somewhat steeply, and appears to reflect rather closely the constant 
consciousness variation in this unstable period of homeostatic adjustment. … “Deep stupor is 
accompanied by [a fall in] arterialized capillary blood oxygen from 86%-87% … In the short few 
hours of adequate awareness in the remission phase the oxygen saturation might peak at 93%-
96% and the responsivity scores vary between +10 and +50”. Each case is accompanied by a 
mechanistic explanation that allows clinicians to explain in terms of physiology their patient’s 
behavior … “With the onset of stupor the vegetative balance slips markedly in an adrenergic 
direction. The patients become tense and anxious, the alpha rate increases markedly, and the 
anoxaemia and responsivity score plunge to lower levels”.   
 
Psycho-physiograms and Drugs as Tools for Seeing Mental Health   
Example 2: 
 
 “A Longitudinal Drug Study and Central Amines”, published by the Toronto psychiatrist 
Harvey Stancer in 1969 was described as an intensive 219 day longitudinal study of a 16 year old 
girl who had been diagnosed with an ‘atypical form of manic depressive psychosis’ (Stancer 
1969). The manuscript can be understood as an enhanced case report, a journey from surface to 
hidden meaning, opening with a prose description of the case.   
    
A 16 year old Hebrew girl was born in June 1949 and admitted to our hospital in 
February 1963. Her illness began in December 1962 with no discernible precipitating 
cause. She became frustrated with school work and began to cry a great deal. In 
January 1963 she became hyperactive, overtalkative and overambitious for a period 
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of one week. From then on she continued to fluctuate cyclically between depression 
and hypomania. Her cycles usually lasted about 39 days. Treatment with either 
psychotherapy, chlorpromazine, perphanazine, thyroid extract or triiodothyronine 
was unsuccessful. … She was a deeply religious, perfectionistic, orderly, self-
possessed girl prior to her illness.  
 
… The patient was closely studied on a metabolic unit for more than a year prior to 
commencing this study. During this time we observed no evidence of schizophrenic 
symptomatology such as delusions, hallucinations or bizarre behavior (Stancer 
1969). 
 
 
This narrative is juxtaposed to a summary of daily rating scales collected under five headings. 
Readers are drawn gradually into the story, moving from the surface description of a clinical 
history to a deeper, physiological explanation for her troubles, supported with multiple tables 
with statistical analysis of biological measurements ranging from blood pressure to glucose, 
blood steroids, ‘fluid balance’ and sleep measurements including EEG summaries. Graphical 
representations consume roughly a third of the publication.  
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Figure 2.7: Summary of a 219-day natural experiment on a 16-year-old girl who has received 
sequential drug treatments for treatment of a mental disorder. Multiple physiological 
measurements are presented in tabular form, corresponding to each clinical phase illustrated here 
(Stancer 1969). 
 
We are instructed to interpret figure 10 and its accompanying charts as a result of sequential … 
 
 … drug regimes designed to alter brain serotonin and norepinephrine in a patient 
with predictable affective swings.  … Psychological, physiological and biochemical 
parameters were measured throughout the investigation using the patient as her own 
control. The changes in the clinical state, together with the biochemical findings, 
suggested a possible interrelationship of at least two amines (Stancer 1969). 
 
The reader is meant to see ‘phase 1’ as representative of the subject’s ‘natural state’, followed by 
different kinds of responses to drugs. Phase 2 represents response to drugs acting on the 
serotonin system, while phase 3 is meant to show response to a drug that modulates 
norepinephrine. Interpretation of the graphic is difficult, and, as the authors explain, it needs to 
be understood together with the accompanying tables, from which a mechanistic understanding 
of moods and behavior emerges.   
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While the authors use 3 pages to explain in detail their mechanistic model, the overall message is 
that …  
 
the patient responded to both drug regimens with clinical improvement during the 
expected depressed phase [phase 2] and a worsening during the expected elated 
phase [phase 3] (Stancer 1969). 
 
 
In other words, to draw their conclusions, to see this patient as having responded to drug 
therapy, clinicians needed to see their patient’s body as going through fairly predictable 
phases of depression that medications could modulate. Uncertainty among psychiatrists 
about the predictability of mental changes created a puzzle for statisticians designing drug 
maintenance trials in the late 1960’s, as will be discussed in chapter 3. In contrast with 
what became the standardized way of seeing drug responders in the 1970’s and beyond, the 
psycho-physiogram used by Stancer et al showed that mental stability, the aim of 
maintenance therapy, was assessed in relation to an individual patient’s personal baseline, 
in this case characterized by multiple physiological measurements.  
 
 
2.6  Imagining Psychiatric Maintenance Drugs in the Mental Health System: 1956-1966 
       
In 1956, the New York State Department of Mental Hygiene implemented reforms meant to 
‘intensify’ treatment for patients newly admitted to mental hospitals (Brill and Patton 1959). The 
policies would have been immediately visible to anyone looking past the institution’s gates; 
because of less physically restrictive policies for mental hospital inmates, the proportion of 
residents spilling out of their wards onto the hospital grounds increased from 10% in 1956 to 
60% in 1959. Henry Brill (1906-1990), director of the world’s largest mental institution, the 
Pilgrim Psychiatric Center in Brentwood New York and Robert Patton, Deputy Commissioner 
and Director of the Department of Statistics at the New York State Department of Mental 
Hygiene, co-authored a series of reports between 1957 and 1962 arguing that new ‘liberalizing’ 
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policies were made possible by the effects of the major tranquilizer chlorpromazine and other 
similar drugs released in the mid to late 1950’s (Brill and Patton 1957, Brill and Patton 1959, 
Brill and Patton 1962). New York State hospitals were early adopters of chlorpromazine, with 
small clinical trials starting in 1953 (Brill and Patton 1957). The drug was widely used in the 
state hospital system in late 1954, not only for its proposed effects on people diagnosed with 
schizophrenia but for its general sedative and calming effects on all inmates. New York State 
hospital data showed a 75% reduction in the use of physical restraints between 1954 and 1957, 
coinciding with the widespread application of major tranquilizers (Brill and Patton 1962). In its 
first fiscal year of “full-scale chlorpromazine use”, over 30,000 patients or 28% of the entire 
hospital population, had been exposed and 50% of discharged patients were prescribed 
“maintenance medication”. By 1958, more than half of New York State’s mental hospital 
residents (including state schools), over 48,000 people, were receiving daily doses of 
chlorpromazine at a public cost of $2,200,000 per year (Brill and Patton 1959). Read by a 
psychiatrists at the time, Brill’s report would have been interpreted as a form of case report, 
following a kind of trial and error logic used in the clinic. It is tempting to assume that 
responders to drug therapy were seen to have achieved an adequate level of recovery to leave the 
hospital, and that recovery once achieved, was held in place by long-term maintenance drugs. 
But that would be projecting an understanding of what it meant to maintain one’s mental health 
with drugs that came into being decades later. What Brill and Patton had in mind when they 
referred to maintenance was something quite different than late 20th century psychiatrists 
understood by the term. Brill and Patton had in mind the maintenance of hospital efficiency 
through long-term drugs. In their mind’s eye, the effects of maintenance drugs could be seen at 
the level of the mental health system. They tell us that “…it has proved practical to carry an 
estimated 50% of cases for a time on maintenance drug therapy after leaving the hospital and this 
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has undoubtedly stabilized the results [of the recidivism study]. Now it can be said that patients 
who are released under therapy with drugs show a somewhat smaller return rate than the non-
treated cases in the first year after release”.  
 
Brill saw maintenance medications not in terms of a disease-specific intervention but rather as 
preventing what he termed the “sedimentation” of inmates into hospitals and eventually to life-
long custodial care. Whatever increased the flow and circulation of inmates away from life-long 
care he thought, was desirable. Whether movement happened between locked wards and the 
hospital grounds or between the hospital and the community, the objective was to drain New 
York’s overflowing mental institutions. To an extent, maintenance drugs seemed to be living up 
to administrative hopes for increased hospital efficiency. Aggregate statistics from the New York 
Civil State Mental Hospitals between 1956 and 1960 for example showed a slow but steady drop 
in the total inmate population in the four years after the mass-introduction of maintenance drugs, 
about 1.5% each year, from 93,300 in 1956 to 89,800 in 1960 (Brill and Patton 1962). Still, it 
would be a mistake to assume that administrators in the 1950’s saw a simple cause and effect 
relationship between the use of maintenance drugs and declining inmate populations. That could 
also have been explained by changing admission and discharge policies, along with the effects of 
technologies like lobotomy and electroshock (Brill and Patton 1962). Further complicating an 
explanation of declining asylum populations, there was a corresponding increase in nursing 
home beds in New York from 31,950 (in 1955) to 42,341 (in 1960), an indicator that a century-
old view of the mental hospital as the default institution for chronic care was recalibrating (Brill 
and Patton 1962). Administrators looked at hospitals as technologies unto themselves, as 
geographic centers of analysis, whose policies and procedures taken together directed the flow of 
inmates within a defined catchment area.    
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Maintenance tranquilizers were made available to mental hospitals in the mid 1950’s, bypassing 
the experimental scrutiny that would by the mid 1960’s be required by federal law for all drugs 
destined for human consumption. Instead of using randomized controlled trials to demonstrate 
long-term efficacy and harms, hospital clinicians used case reports to describe drug effects, and 
hospital administrators used institutional-level data before and after introducing drugs, as a 
measure of efficacy. For hospital administrators working with aggregate data, the institution, not 
the individual inmate, was the object of analysis. One common object of analysis was the 
category of  “first time admissions”, forming a population to be tracked as it moved through 
various hospital wards and eventually out of the hospital. “First time admissions” became the 
objects of a natural experiment aimed at studying recidivism, a central theme in the mental health 
system of the 1950’s and 60’s (Castel 1991). For hospital superintendents and those in 
surrounding catchment areas, a lot was at stake. If, as some thought, maintenance drugs merely 
slowed the inevitable movement of first time admissions into life-long care, then the decline in 
hospital populations seen in the early 1950’s would only be temporary. If on the other hand, 
maintenance drugs not only slowed the movement of first time admissions into chronic care but 
also helped some get a toe-hold in their communities, allowing them to find employment and 
move past a life of chronic disability, then administrators might anticipate shifting budget flows 
as the demands for institutional care ebbed.  
 
Imagining Maintenance Drugs as Filters to Hospital Admission 
 
 
Hospital psychiatrists tended to think in terms of their clinical experience, which involved direct 
contact with patients, with matching individuals with therapies, and with directing the movement 
of patients within the institution based on their intuition about prognosis. Psychiatrists who saw 
maintenance drugs as only temporarily slowing the sedimentation of inmates into custodial care 
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units were not optimistic about the long-term effects of drugs on hospital budgets. Those who 
saw maintenance drugs as effective long-term filters to re-admission, on the other hand, saw 
promise for modestly increased hospital efficiency. 
 
 
Imagining Maintenance drugs as porous filters 
 
 
The nomogram in figure 2.8, published in 1966 by hospital clinicians, shows changes to the 
population of schizophrenia wards before and after the mass-introduction of major tranquilizers 
in 1955, and it includes a future projection; the age distribution of hospital residents, expressed 
in relation to the total state population. The diagram illustrates the authors’ view that response to 
maintenance tranquilizers would not endure the test of time -- at best people who responded to 
treatment initially would have a few more years of non-institutional life but ultimately all would 
end up in long term care. The result was that over time, despite an initial slowing of growth, the 
total hospital population would resume its growth in proportion to the general state population.  
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Figure 2.8: Nomogram taken from a 1966 paper called “Problems in Prediction of a 
Schizophrenic Population”. Numbers on the Y-axis naturalize the mental hospital population as a 
segment of the New Hampshire general population. The multi-generational time scale on the X-
axis models this arrangement over 60 years, with projected hospital growth seen as an organic 
extension of state growth. Recidivism here is pictured as an inevitable, multi-decade process of 
sedimentation (Bryce, Haslerud et al. 1966).  
 
 
Graphically and metaphorically in the accompanying text, Bryce et al presented the mental 
hospital as New Hampshire’s sedimentation filter, a description that conjures analogies between 
the mental hospital and municipal water processing, perhaps an analogy of the mental hospital as 
a kidney to the body politic, acting to modulate the concentration of people diagnosed with 
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schizophrenia in society at large. Produced by mental hospital employees, the psychologist 
Forbes Bryce and psychiatrist Donald Niswander, with the assistance of two psychology 
graduate students, this compelling image spoke to psychiatrists familiar with the organization of 
chronic mental hospitals. Reminiscent of cross sections showing sedimentary layers in geological 
survey maps, horizontal lines running from left to right like sedimentary strata represent the 
hospital’s population sub-groups (Rudwick 1976). Compared to the time frame of studies 
elsewhere in psychiatric journals, usually less than a year, the diagram’s time-horizon from 1905 
to 1960 was remarkable. It naturalized permanent sedimentation as an expected trajectory for 
society’s most vulnerable people. Reinforcing a solidity to this arrangement, the image portrays 
the deepest stratum, the foundational layer as established prior to 1910, more than half a century 
before this paper appeared in the American Journal of Psychiatry. Its accompanying text 
encourages readers to think in terms of metaphors of flow, re-circulation, filtration and 
sedimentation, terms that jibe with the phrase ‘downward drift’, manifested geographically and 
socially.  
 
The authors start with the premise that “it can no longer be assumed that a patient hospitalized 
for one year will remain in the hospital indefinitely”. But in what follows, they explain why 
merely releasing inmates would not reduce the need for institutional care.  
… A circular current in and out of hospital is taking place when first admissions are 
being released and coming back as readmissions. … Years ago, these patients might 
never have been released and might have become part of the large long-term 
population. Today at least 50% of all admissions are readmissions and 50% of all 
readmissions are multiple readmissions with two or more previous stays at the 
hospital (Bryce, Haslerud et al. 1966).  
 
As the chronically mentally ill became economically and culturally impoverished, they 
tended to settle into inner city shelters, rooming houses and asylums (Robert Faris 1939, 
Donald Gerard 1953, Hare 1956, Cooper 1961, E.M. Goldberg 1963, Berthold Grunfeld 
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1968). Once detained in a mental hospital, the most recalcitrant cases were moved to the 
‘back wards’, the architectural analogue to skid row (Adams 2008). 
 
Imagining Maintenance Drugs as Fine Filters 
 
 
 
Not all clinicians were as pessimistic as Bryce et al on the promises of maintenance drug 
therapy. An alternative, more optimistic view of flow and filtration under the influence of 
maintenance drugs was produced by Donald Peterson, a practicing psychiatrist and Gordon 
Olson, head of the mental hospital psychology department at Minnesota’s Anoka mental 
hospital. Figure 2.9, taken from a Peterson and Olson’s 1964 statistical analysis of people 
admitted to the Anoka mental hospital with a diagnosis of schizophrenia, describes the 
movement of 177 people in their first, second and third hospitalizations between 1956 and 1958 
(Peterson 1964).  
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Figure 2.9: An image from a 1964 Archives of General Psychiatry publication “First Admitted 
Schizophrenics in Drug Era: Follow-Up Anoka Schizophrenic Cohort, 1956-1958”(Peterson 
1964) Recidivism is shown as a flow over seven years. Study outcomes are ‘at home to stay’, ‘in 
hospital to stay’ and ‘number of hospital admissions’. The authors took for granted that 
maintenance medication acted as an initial filter to re-admission, between initial discharge and 
re-admission. In contrast to figure 2.8, which assumes that maintenance drugs act as a porous 
filter, this figure was made possible by a belief that at a population level, maintenance drugs are 
effective ways of keeping some people out of hospital over the long run. It could be read as an 
early visual representation of how drugs might operate on a large population, “pharmacological 
dissection” at a population level. The practice of pharmacological dissection was popularized by 
the psychiatrist Donald Klein in relation to anxiety and depression treatments and was later 
operationalized in a decision tree (Klein and Fink 1962, Klein 1964, Klein 1968).  
 
From top to bottom, the horizontal containers became smaller with each progressive admission. 
The eye is drawn to the right side of the page, which can be understood as a progressive 
concentration of chronic cases, represented in dark, reminiscent of a distillate or condensate in a 
laboratory process. The proportionally smaller rectangles at the center of the page become 
progressively condensed until finally the small dark rectangle at the bottom right contains only 
chronic cases, the final sediment relegated to long-term institutional custody.  This close-up view 
of the mental hospital-as-filter (or perhaps as sorting machine) corresponds to the first ‘stratum’ 
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of re-circulation in Figure 2.8. Maintenance medication is described in the paper as extending 
institutional reach outside the asylum walls, where it functions as a pre-admission filter. Unlike 
the highly porous filter assumed by Bryce et al in figure 2.8 however, Peterson assumes that 
maintenance medications work more stringently, effectively keeping up to 76% of an initial 
admission cohort permanently out of hospital. Inside the institution, procedures could influence 
the average length of stay by modulating death rates or ‘live release’ (Peterson 1964). There 
were two ways an inmate could leave the hospital, dead or alive. 
 
This graphical model can be interpreted as reflecting a contemporary form of clinical logic, 
pharmacological dissection, popularized in the context of antidepressant prescribing by the 
psychiatrist Donald Kline (Klein 1964, Klein 1968, Healy 1997). The increasingly condensed 
group is a result of failed passage through multiple rounds of treatment, a managerial approach 
not codified in standardized flow diagrams for clinicians until two decades later (see chapter 3). 
Peterson and Olson show maintenance medication acting ahead of the second horizontal 
rectangle named “2nd Admission Hospital”, thus diverting the flow of inmates away from the 
institution. Drugs or other technologies including maintenance shock therapy, could act similarly 
at various points to prevent permanent institutionalization, which is represented by the small 
hatched rectangle at the bottom right of figure 2.9. The versatility of flow and filtration 
metaphors leading quite literally to the backwaters of mental hospitals is illustrated by reading 
the following 1962 text along with the Anoka diagram:  
… if the stream which has been feeding the pool of chronic cases has been 
diminished by 22%, we may logically project from this a final reduction of the 
chronic group by 22% providing death rates for chronic cases remain stable … 
although improved medical treatment methods promise to decrease rates of death in 
the future (Brill and Patton 1962).  
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2.7   Maintenance Drugs and Hospital Efficiency: A Statistician’s Perspective 
 
 
Although there is no published record of a subsequent rebuttal, the clinical researchers Bryce et 
al used figure 2.8 to challenge Brill and Patton’s estimates that the use of maintenance drug 
therapy would lead to a 20% reduction in the population of state mental hospitals by 1970. 
Clinically-oriented analysts, not only Bryce et al but also the more optimistic Paterson and 
Olson, were thinking very differently about the relationship between maintenance drugs and the 
declining populations of state mental hospitals than were Brill and Patton. Patton, like a 
generation of biostatisticians, was influenced by the chief NIMH statistician at the time, Morton 
Kramer. 
 
Unlike clinicians, who equated long-term hospitalization with the syndrome of schizophrenia, 
and who thought in terms of treatment decisions like sorting between short and long-stay wards 
based on clinical judgement, Brill and Patton developed a model that made no assumptions about 
disease categories or prognosis at the level of individual patients. Instead, Brill and Patton, both 
trained statisticians, built their model on a consistent observation that when first-time admissions 
under the age of 65 were detained for more than 2 consecutive years, the chances of ever being 
discharged home alive were only in the range of 20-30% (Kramer, Goldstein et al. 1954, Brill 
and Patton 1962). They reasoned that if hospitalization for 2 or more years was a risk for life-
long institutionalization, then any combination of technology and policy that could stir the waters 
of the hospital, to keep the top layers ‘circulating’ just enough, would also reduce long-term 
sedimentation and thus reduce the number of people inhabiting mental hospitals (Brill and Patton 
1962).  
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Brill and Patton fashioned their research as a response to a 1955 Public Health Service 
monograph by the lead NIMH biostatistician Morton Kramer (1914-1998) and his research team, 
which used life tables to model the impacts of hospital discharge policies on mental hospital 
populations6 (Kramer, Goldstein et al. 1954). Kramer’s monograph was meant to be accessible to 
non-statisticians, and is laden with graphics, with only 8 of its 27 pages restricted to prose. The 
report  
… demonstrates a method for studying the flow of patients through the mental 
hospital, with an application of this method to a study of changes that have occurred 
in the period 1916-50 in the rates at which first admissions to Warren State Hospital 
have been returned to the community or have died in the hospital” (p 1). It was meant 
as “…a background for discussion of some basic epidemiological and clinical 
research needed to assist in the interpretation of the findings and in the formulation 
of public mental health programs directed toward care, treatment and the prevention 
of illness and disability (Kramer, Goldstein et al. 1954).  
 
 
Kramer’s programmatic intentions are reflected in the survey’s inclusion of summary statistics 
for all psychiatric hospitals (private, public and veterans) in the United States between 1903 and 
1951 housing 584,000 people by the end of 1951. There were 201 State, 111 County and 35 
Veterans Administration and 228 private mental hospitals in the United States, with 3.8 per 
1,000 population incarcerated, most involuntarily.  
 
The monograph laid out an approach for organizing mental hospital statistics according to the 
life table methodology used by the insurance industry to calculate health risks (Malzberg 1952). 
Approaching asylum populations as one homogenous group rather than according sub-
populations (which was the tradition among clinicians), successive admission cohorts could be 
                                                        
6 The Morton Kramer collection is at the Alan Mason Chesney Medical Archives, Johns 
Hopkins. Kramer was head of the NIMH Biometrics Branch at the time of this publication. His 
work on asylum epidemiology pre-dates his work on validating disease constructs, which makes 
up the bulk of archived papers and correspondence.    
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easily arranged into life tables, which made it possible to think about movement of the mentally 
ill as a function of the hospital’s treatment policies in aggregate. Kramer et al used a full-page 
chart (figure 2.10) to demonstrate visually an actuarial approach in which mental institutions 
were the objects of analysis. At stake was hospital efficiency. Efficiency was defined in terms of 
the ability of a hospital to increase its annual admission rates (even if this included re-
admissions) provided the total number of inmates housed at any time remained constant. Figure 
2.10 shows that any combination of policies and technologies capable of discharging a fixed 
proportion of the total hospital population in any year would lead to maximal gains in hospital 
efficiency. Of note, Kramer’s model was indifferent to clinical logic, which assumed that first-
time admission cohorts contained a mix of good and poor-prognosis cases, but that over time, 
repeat admissions would inevitably sediment into chronic care (Example 1 in figure 2.10). 
Instead, Kramer’s model needed only to assume that cases (even the most intransigent) could 
potentially recover long enough for a brief discharge so that the entire hospital population was 
always “at risk” for discharge. In Kramer’s vision of the mental hospital, the idea of a 
geographically permanent resting spot had little or no place. Clinicians on the other hand took for 
granted that room would always be needed for a group of inmates who could not recover. As a 
result, clinician-made models based on admission cohorts could never achieve the efficiency of 
hospitals run on the basis of discharging a fixed proportion of the total hospital population each 
year. The following quote from Kramer et al sets up the thought experiment in figure 2.10 which 
in turn sets the groundwork for Brill and Patterson’s analyses.  
… Assume that there are two communities of the same size that have always been free of 
mental disorder. Suddenly on Jan 1 1940, 1,000 individuals become mentally ill for the 
first time in each community. To simplify things further, assume these people are all 
afflicted with the same disorder and are hospitalized immediately on January 1. 
Thereafter on January 1 of each year, 1,000 new cases of the same disorder appear in 
each community and the sick individuals are hospitalized immediately. Let us also 
assume that the members of each annual cohort of admissions are returned to the 
community at some specified rate (Kramer, Goldstein et al. 1954).  
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Figure 2.10: Model actuarial table showing the comparative effects of thinking in terms of 
discharge rates from the hospital as a whole vs the effects of focusing achieving a certain rate of 
discharge for each admission cohort. The latter approach went along with clinical logic, which 
looked at first-time admissions as containing a higher proportion of good-prognosis cases. Over a 
period of 10 years, a hospital that defines its discharge rates in terms of its total population will 
be more efficient (that is, will be able to admit twice the number of people) as a hospital that 
focuses only on achieving a fixed rate of annual discharge for each admission cohort. The cohort 
approach (Example 1 above) resembles the clinical logic of fine filtration illustrated above in 
figure 2.9 (Kramer, Goldstein et al. 1954).    
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 Efficiency and the Definition of “Hospital Discharge”  
 
Having established that hospital efficiency hinged on discharge rates, Kramer et al also identified 
an issue unrelated to the effectiveness of treatments7. At the time of their analysis, multiple 
definitions of ‘discharge’ were applied in mental hospitals (P. Sartwell 1952). As a result, it was 
possible for an institution to have a low official discharge rate even though it had physically 
empty beds being held open in case an inmate needed to return following discharge.  
 
“Discharge” has a different meaning in relation to a mental hospital than to a general 
hospital. Discharge from a mental hospital means discharge from the books. Although a 
patient may be discharged directly from the hospital in the generally accepted sense of the 
word, he is usually placed in convalescent care status prior to discharge from the books. 
During this period the ability of the patient to adjust to normal community life is tested and 
he is still carried on the books of the hospital (in some states the term ‘parole’ or ‘trial 
visit’ is used). The procedure is far from standardized among the various State hospital 
systems of the Nation, and, in many instances the patient is automatically discharged from 
the books without any follow-up (Kramer, Goldstein et al. 1954).  
 
 
The following way of measuring discharge rates is particularly difficult to interpret because it 
can, at least for a time, make large chronic institutions appear efficient. Large institutions can 
draw on many potential inmates for discharges, which make up the numerator for the discharge 
rate, while the denominator is restricted to the number of new admissions for example in 
response to alternative care arrangements or perhaps to the emergence of a new medical 
technology.  
 A second rate is the annual discharges per 100 admissions. … It has the disadvantage that 
patients discharged during the year do not all come out of the group of patients admitted 
during the same year and the annual admissions included in the denominator of the rate 
                                                        
7 It is not surprising that Kramer et al looked for reasons other than treatment policies to explain 
different efficiency rates across U.S. mental hospitals. They could not identify changes in 
efficiency at the Warren State Hospital related the effects of different treatment regimes over half 
a century including what they called “no major treatment” in the period between 1916-25, 
“industrial and occupational therapy for all patients” between 1926 and 1935 and then “malarial 
therapy for syphilitics, shock therapy and Dilantin for epilepsy” between 1936 and 1945.  
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have unequal periods of exposure to risk of discharge in the calendar year of admission. 
Depending on the date of admission, some patients may be hospitalized for 364 days 
during a calendar year while others may be hospitalized for only 1 day (Kramer, Goldstein 
et al. 1954).   
 
Not surprisingly, size could also work against institutions and the ‘average discharge rate’ was a 
case in point, as Kramer explained. Imagine a 5,000 bed mental hospital that wants to look at the 
effects of a treatment policy. Say it discharges 100 inmates under treatment 1 and 150 under 
treatment 2. Even though the discharge rate has gone up by 50%, the average discharge rate 
based on the total resident population will have only increased from 2% to 3%.  
 
Because ‘most discharges from a mental hospital take place within the first 2 years 
following hospitalization’, the average daily population is heavily weighted with longer-
stay’ … patients who contribute proportionally few of the discharges. The discharge 
rate with the average daily resident patient population as the denominator gives a very 
poor representation of the changes of discharge from a mental hospital (Kramer, 
Goldstein et al. 1954).  
 
2.8   Discussion  
 
Between the end of the Second World War and about 1970, mental hospital psychiatrists and 
administrators stabilized in general terms, ways of thinking about maintenance psychiatric drug 
therapy. At the heart of it, clinicians gauged the effects of maintenance drugs in relation to a 
perceived natural illness trajectory, and according to a personal baseline. Regardless of how 
troubled a person might be at a single point in their life, clinicians had first-hand experience with 
the tendency of mental health to shift over time, and they considered it preferable to assess 
maintenance drugs in terms of even the most imperfect understanding of a person’s life history, 
cobbled together from memories of patients, sometimes from the testimony of family, and 
sometimes from a review of clinical records. Clinicians took for granted that many hospital 
patients who seemed destined for a lifetime of custodial care could recover and leave the 
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institution for good, while those whose diagnosis pointed toward long-term recovery could on 
the other hand, fail to sustain themselves in the community. As we have seen, even those 
clinicians who made it their life work to study the effects of drugs on human physiology felt it 
important to acknowledge, along with their graphical reports, narratives describing the complex 
interplay of family, friends, personal temperament, and work experience on their patients’ lives.  
 
Administrators and statisticians, on the other hand, could bracket this messiness, instead 
restricting their assessment of maintenance drugs to their effects on hospital discharge and re-
admission rates. From this vantage point, maintenance drugs merely had to impact the average 
duration of hospital stay. Questions of diagnosis, life context, and personal baselines were simply 
beside the point. Long established in the life insurance industry as a way of managing the 
ultimate effect of the time element – mortality. Life-table methodology gave mental hospital 
administrators a way of assessing the effects of drug maintenance at the level of the institution, 
with hospital efficiency mathematically linked to the average length of hospital stay (Porter 
2000). Still, it is worth keeping in mind that administrators were not immune from the problems 
inherent to very concept of mental health, so a seemingly straightforward event like hospital 
discharge was often not what it seemed at first; while some superintendents defined discharge 
quite literally as any departure from the hospital grounds, others created a transitional category 
of “temporary leave”, which became a full discharge only after a period of successful integration 
to community life. Hospital discharge rates, it turned out, could be manipulated to favor the 
maintenance of large institutional budgets for chronic care, making it difficult to infer any effects 
from long-term drug use. That said, the contribution of hospital administrators to the language of 
maintenance drugs was far from peripheral. Rather, their detached vantage-point in the front 
office shows us how calculations could produce authoritative statements about the effects of drug 
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maintenance that had little connection to the way clinicians organized mental illness and 
probably, little connection to the way patients understood their troubles.  
 
While administrators developed a way of assessing drugs at an institutional level, a more 
nuanced conversation emerged from the wards and from the clinical case histories complied by 
psychiatrists, borrowing from the existing traditions of maintenance shock therapy and coma 
therapy. It was clinicians who introduced the concept of the drug responder, filling what the 
historian Leo Marx has referred to as a semantic void, which psychiatrists perceived just as they 
began using various technologies to alter the long-term course of mental illness (Ernst 1995, 
Marx 2010)8. While administrators encouraged their clinical staff to use drugs to keep hospital 
stays under a certain maximum period of time, it was up to clinicians to figure out who exactly 
would benefit, and to invest their efforts accordingly. Clinicians also introduced new terms for 
thinking about drugs, according to their duration of use. Psychiatrists came to associate the term 
acute with the management of observable symptoms, usually over a few weeks or a month, while 
maintenance became associated with years or even decades - whatever unfolded for an individual 
after their symptoms had abated. This division of clinical time into acute and maintenance phases 
helped psychiatrists see themselves as participants in a creative process in which drug responders 
became a desirable product. In their minds’ eye, older questions of psychopathology, of detailed 
categories that followed certain trajectories, began to seem less relevant if drugs, in any case, 
could change diseases, presumably for the better (Berrios 1996, Fish 2007).  
 
                                                        
8 The process of filling semantic voids has been described among psycho-dynamic psychiatrists 
who combined their patient’s mental content with conventional nosologies to create a specialized 
language, even if that language was understandable only within a community of trained 
psychoanalysts. 
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Then there was the question of dependence, lurking just beneath the surface of most 
correspondence on maintenance drugs. How could any mind-altering drug, if taken over a long 
period of time, be good for you? Like sedatives, did people develop tolerance to these 
substances? While the case reports in my journal survey do not offer deep insights into the way 
psychiatrists understood dependence, the passing mention of the term in conjunction not only 
with mind altering substances but also with maintenance electroshock, may signal a strand of 
ambivalence even among the most enthusiastic advocates of drug maintenance. Some have 
drawn connections between the idea of drug addiction and the way experts thought about 
character, but also the way they thought about hereditary defects (Lombardo 1996). At the very 
least, hospital psychiatrists in the 1950’s and 60’s would have been well aware of public 
concerns about addiction to prescription sedatives, mass-marketed under euphemisms like 
“mother’s little helper” (Valium®) (Tone 2009). Related questions about the effects of drug 
withdrawal, as will be seen in chapter 3, continued to plague the standardization of maintenance 
drug therapy, and to an extent, unresolved questions around physiological dependence on 
maintenance drugs, raised in the 1950’s and 60’s, persist today (Whitaker 2010).  
 
Finally, it is worth considering that while clinical psychiatrists and mental hospital 
administrators had very different views about the way maintenance psychiatric drugs could be 
assessed, one common assumption is evident: drug responders, once identified, were perceived 
as a stable entity over time. True, some hospital administrators were openly skeptical of the 
durability of pharmacological maintenance, but these were in the minority, and their voices are 
no longer heard in the pages of psychiatric journals after the mid 1960’s. Clinicians represented 
in the pages of my journal survey mostly conformed to the enthusiastic outlook for drugs, 
summed up by Dr. Lehman. Response, once achieved, could be maintained through life-long 
 78 
drug compliance. It was the task of psychiatry not to question this assumption but rather to find 
methods for uncovering hidden responders, wherever they were. It is ironic to consider, as the 
next chapter suggests, that it was statisticians, who had little or no experience working with the 
mentally ill, who built a way of thinking about maintenance drugs that would eventually fulfill 
that aim on a massive scale.   
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CHAPTER 3 
 
Standardizing Psychiatric Drug Maintenance: 1970-1990 
A Tidier Vision of Mental Health 
 
 
 
3.1   Introduction  
 
 
Psychiatrists who worked in the busy wards and outpatient departments of mental hospitals saw 
the effects of maintenance drugs through a very different lens than their administrative chiefs, 
who worked with admission and discharge data from the relative calm of their front offices. Yet 
both views, administrative and clinical, were from a sequestered place, on the grounds of mental 
hospitals that were often, by the 1970’s, in decline. Just as the relevance of mental hospitals to 
society was waning, other vantage points were coming to bear. Starting in the early 1970’s, 
government researchers assembled from psychiatry’s traditional ideas a way to experimentally 
assess drug maintenance, and commercial scientists created highly efficient methods for a 
generation of regulatory science. Clinical psychiatrists agreed to a standard language that 
mapped onto efficient prescribing protocols. No longer would busy doctors assess maintenance 
drugs against their patients’ baselines, constructed from a composite of memories and clinical 
records. Instead, clinicians learned to think in terms of an optimized mental state, achieved and 
maintained pharmacologically. The new way of thinking about drug maintenance benefitted both 
the medical profession and the pharmaceutical industry. For busy primary care physicians, it was 
possible to keep clinical encounters to allotted time schedules, which in turn kept a steady stream 
of patients flowing through the office. For manufacturers, the standardization of psychiatric drug 
maintenance translated into a path to regulatory approval, while shaping a market of recurring 
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drug sales, analogous to the thriving markets for anti-hypertensives and cholesterol lowering 
agents (Greene 2007).  
 
This chapter picks up where chapter 2 left off, tracing the grammar of drug maintenance out of 
the mental hospital system into government-sponsored clinical trials and eventually into the 
regulatory science that would allow 10% of North Americans to entrust their minds to drugs 
ranging from Prozac to Zyprexa. The standardization of maintenance psychiatric drugs is a prime 
example of how medical knowledge is inextricably bound to the historical circumstances under 
which it is made. Drug regulation was put in place to reign in the profit motive, and to ensure 
that each marketed medication was safe and effective. But by the time American drug regulators 
first began evaluating psychiatric maintenance drugs in the 1970’s, they had already been 
evaluating drugs used in physical medicine for two decades. After two decades of clinical trials 
studying physical conditions like hypertension and diabetes, ethical problems about the use of 
placebos in human research had arisen. How could a clinical trial deny a known, effective 
treatment, to a suffering person? By 1970, clinical trials testing anti-hypertensives and diabetes 
drugs no longer asked whether the most severely affected people could be helped. Rather, they 
had shifted to questions of treatment thresholds, and to questions of diminishing therapeutic 
returns (Marks 1997, Greene 2007). Also, by the early 1970’s, the pall of the Tuskegee 
experiment had begun to settle over all forms of human research conducted in North American, 
making it unlikely that psychiatric maintenance drugs could be tested as they would have been, 
had experimental reforms been implemented in mental medicine only two decades earlier, using 
long-term placebo-group comparisons. This chapter will start by situating maintenance 
psychiatric drugs in a time of regulatory reform and in the shadow of the Tuskegee experiment.  
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3.2    Re-Assessing Maintenance Drugs in a Shifting Regulatory Landscape: 1970-85 
 
When we think about psychiatric drug trials, we are most likely to think of the kind of pre-
packaged science described by Jill Fisher, in her study of commercial drug trials in the United 
States (Fisher 2008). Fisher has shown how the 1962 Kefauver Harris Amendment to the Federal 
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act transformed human experiments into an integral, and profitable 
part, of modern drug-market formation. She points out that by the end of the 1990’s, 75% of all 
clinical trials conducted in North America amounted to standardized research protocols (known 
as Phase III trials), often contracted to private firms by pharmaceutical manufacturers 
(Bodenheimer 2000, Meadows 2006, Fisher 2008).  
 
This section of the dissertation offers, in the case of Phase III trials studying maintenance 
psychiatric drugs, a messier story, involving a combination of private and public scientists and 
statisticians who, together, moved drug maintenance out of the mental hospital system and into 
mainstream North American medicine. While, as Fisher has shown, most commercial drug trials 
are brief, lasting no more than 4-6 weeks, maintenance trials are, by definition, much longer and 
more difficult to administer, lasting at least 6-12 months. Even today, almost half a century after 
experimental methods had been worked out, the majority of maintenance trials, while funded by 
pharmaceutical companies, are conducted at university hospitals (Deshauer 2007, Deshauer 
2008). Their technical complexity is not the only factor that sets maintenance trials apart from 
the vast majority of psychiatric drug trials. The standardization of drug maintenance trials 
deserves special attention for two main reasons; its origins in government-sponsored science, in 
which the US federal government bore the financial risks of what was seen at the time as a risky 
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commercial endeavor, and its roots in a period of ethical concern about the potential abuses of 
placebos in human research.   
 
The Kefauver Act of 1962, along with an experimental reform movement in the field of physical 
medicine, were perceived by psychiatrists in the late 1960’s as clear threats to the aspirations of 
biological psychiatry. As senator Kefauver put it in 1962, an essential task of regulatory science 
was to ensure that “drugs of dubious efficacy were not being marketed”  (Peltzman 1973, 
Jasanoff 1998) (Peltzman 1050). Kefauver placed his confidence not in the opinions of 
charismatic physicians, whom he saw as self-interested, but rather in the more objective 
language of clinical experiments of the kind used in the 1950’s to demonstrate the effects of 
drugs used to manage physical ailments (Peltzman 1973). Whether it was an antibiotic, used to 
cure an infection in a few weeks, or a diabetes treatment used for a lifetime, Kefauver was 
confident that clinical trials would sort truly helpful products from the ineffective or even 
harmful (Timmermans 2003). Psychiatrists were concerned that the practice of maintenance drug 
therapy, which had been widely adopted in the 1950’s on the testimony of a few influential 
experts, would fall into the latter category. To quote the British psychiatrist Barry Blackwell, 
there was a good chance that drug maintenance would be exposed as “another therapeutic myth”. 
Blackwell was sensitive to psychiatry’s marginal position in an era of experimental reforms that 
had reframed physical medicine as a clinical science (Blackwell 1968, Marks 1997).  At stake 
was the larger agenda of biological psychiatry. If maintenance drugs were shown ineffective in 
clinical trials, what were the implications for a research agenda that prioritized a search for 
specific biological deficiencies among the mentally ill? Mental hospital doctors for more than 
two decades, starting in the mid 1950’s, had confidently administered maintenance drugs, based 
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on a form of clinical reason that, by the 1960’s, looked out of step with the kinds of science 
regulators had come to expect (Timmermans 2003).  
 
Biological psychiatrists, responding to this professional threat, focused their efforts on testing 
lithium maintenance therapy. Lithium, long considered a default choice in the ‘prophylaxis’ of 
manic depression, became a test case for a larger group of maintenance interventions used in 
mental hospitals before rigorous clinical experiments had become a marketing requirement. 
Robert Prien, a senior psychiatrist and researcher at the NIMH, shared Blackwell’s concerns, 
writing in 1973 that … “the possibility that lithium carbonate may have a prophylactic effect in 
recurrent affective illness has been a subject of international controversy”. He went on to 
diagnose the problem with psychiatry’s knowledge-making practices. … “Initial claims for the 
prophylactic efficacy of lithium were based on longitudinal studies that compared the incidence 
of affective episodes before lithium therapy with their incidence during lithium therapy”.  “There 
is still skepticism about lithium prophylaxis”, wrote Prien, using lithium to represent a range of 
drugs that had been pressed into use with a similar form of clinical logic (Prien R 1973, Healy 
2008). Lithium had been prescribed in North America since the 1950’s, and psychiatrists like 
Prien, had been trained on the wards of mental hospitals, commonly prescribing it for people 
diagnosed with manic depression. It was perhaps his clinical experience that informed a healthy 
scepticism, even as lithium, through a grandfathering clause, was designated by the FDA in 1970 
as a “maintenance drug”, based on cumulative information from case reports (Michell and 
Hadzi-Pavlovic 2000).  
 
When Prien wrote about his uncertainties, it was as the lead researcher of a multi-center 
government-funded trial to test lithium maintenance therapy, which had just been conducted 
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under new, tighter rules governing human research. Prien did not likely see in his experiment, an 
important transition between a tradition that assessed drug maintenance in relation to the concept 
of a personal baseline, and a new way, where a pharmacologically optimized state became the 
point of clinical reference.  
 
The Responder Trial as a Response to Government Regulations:   
 
One of the most trusted forms of human experimentation in the 1960’s, referred to by 
statisticians as the “classic randomized controlled trial” involved the comparison of research 
subjects suffering from similar conditions, but treated differently, some with a placebo and some 
with an active medication (Shadish, Cook et al. 2002). The use of placebos in the 1950’s was 
relatively uncontroversial, seen as necessary in forming comparison groups in the production of 
gold-standard knowledge about medical interventions (Shapiro and Shapiro 2000, Timmermans 
2003). Into the 1960’s, however, the ethics of placebos came into question (Stark 2011). Harry 
Marks and Jeremy Greene have shown this clearly in the case of hypertension and diabetes 
research, where experts became confident by the early 1960’s, that for the most severe cases, the 
life-saving effects of medication were incontrovertible. By the 1960’s, researchers studying 
hypertension and diabetes turned to questions about treatment thresholds, shifting their questions 
to the effects of drugs at the population level, where their effects were ever subtler to detect. 
Clinical trials would enroll thousands to demonstrate how many people would require life-long 
treatment to prevent a single death, heart attack, or stroke. Reflecting on changes in his field in 
1965, the insulin researcher Charles Best wrote to a colleague that … “progress in research is a 
wonderful thing, but it is becoming increasingly difficult for the clinician to decide what applies 
to his patient and what is only of experimental interest” (Feudtner 2003).  
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The assessment of medications for heart disease and diabetes in the mid 1960’s offers a 
remarkable contrast to the assessment of psychiatric drugs. While epidemiologists studied 
treatments for heart disease and diabetes in trials involving thousands of people from all walks of 
life, psychiatrists drew their inferences from small case descriptions and quasi-experiments, 
often involving fewer than 20 cases, often in mental hospitals (Deshauer 2005). Thus, when 
Robert Prien applied for NIMH funding to conduct a placebo-controlled trial of lithium 
maintenance, he found himself in an unusual position within the broader context of medical 
research in the early 1970’s. Policy changes at the NIMH by the early 1970’s meant that the use 
of placebos in all human research funded by the US National Institutes of Health would be 
restricted to special circumstances only (Stark 2011). In 1966, none other than the NIH director, 
Dr. James Shannon, supported by the Surgeon General William Stewart, had implemented a 
policy stating that no research subject suffering from an illness [mental or physical] would be 
denied a basic level of care in any experiment [added for emphasis] (Stewart 1966). The NIH 
after 1966 required oversight of all human experiments by institutional review boards, who 
would ensure that government funded medical science conformed not only to methodological 
standards, but also conformed to new ethical regulations. For doctors of Prien’s generation, 
trained on mental hospital wards, using a placebo in the treatment of severe forms of mental 
illness would have undoubtedly seemed to be denying a ‘basic level of care’, and it was his 
generation of doctors that provided clinical input to both NIMH grant review boards and the 
institutional review boards needed to approve the NIMH/Veterans study application (Kupfer 
1996). Still, to be clear, the notion of offering a placebo to people with serious mental illness did 
not strike all psychiatrists as unacceptable. Indeed, a leading American psychiatrist and drug 
researcher, Donald Klein, in a letter written two decades later, described his belief that for 
psychiatric drug trials, it was especially important to compare long term outcomes among 
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patients treated with placebos, against those treated with medication (Klein 1996). The 
NIMH/Veterans study design was a compromise between those in favour of traditional placebo-
comparison studies, and those who felt the traditional design was unethical. Unfortunately, no 
direct material traces have survived, to document exactly how this compromise came about, or 
what went on behind closed doors in the multiple institutional review boards involved in this 
study. Minutes from ethics review boards (conducted at 5 independent sites in the 
NIMH/Veterans study) have all been destroyed, just as records from a subsequent NIMH study 
involving 8 sites have been destroyed9. We can surmise with some confidence however that for 
review boards in the early 1970’s, extra caution was exercised around any placebo-controlled 
human experiment10. Between 1932 and 1972, the United States Public Health Service had 
conducted a study of the untreated progression of syphilis in African American men under the 
guise of health care provided by the United States government (CDC). In fact, the study failed to 
provide penicillin, the known cure for the disease, long after its effectiveness had been 
established. As a result, many research subjects were permanently harmed with the enduring 
effects of syphilis on the brain and on the cardiovascular system. News of the Tuskegee debacle 
came out in the early 1970’s, coinciding with the design and approval phase of the 
NIMH/Veterans study (Kupfer 1996). The Tuskegee case drove ethical reforms culminating in 
the Belmont Report of 1978, which governed human research in the United States for over 3 
decades11 (Stark 2011). It is in this space, the NIMH of the late 1960’s and early 70’s, that 
                                                        
9 United States federal law required that records of institutional review boards be retained for 
only 3 years following completion of deliberations and follow up with each research site has 
confirmed destruction of review board meetings. 
10 Institutional review boards have, since the 1990’s found it acceptable to expose people with 
psychiatric symptoms to relatively short-term placebo-controlled trials ranging from 4-6 weeks, 
following a principle of minimizing harms to research subjects.  
11 The Belmont Report of 1978 is also known as code 45 of Federal Regulations part 46, created 
by the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral 
Research. 
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Robert Prien worked, and where he, along with a team of clinicians and biostatisticians, designed 
and conducted a multi-center trial of lithium prophylaxis, focusing primarily on male veterans 
from the Vietnam and Korean wars who had been designated with severe mood disorders. The 
trial was remarkable not only for its ambitious size, which required coordination across multiple 
centers and multiple ethics review boards, but also for its timing, almost two decades after 
lithium was introduced to the mental hospital system. The experiment conformed to the new 
NIMH regulations on the use of placebos in human research, while incorporating the kinds of 
experimental outcomes that psychiatrists at the time would have expected from any report of 
maintenance drug therapy. 
 
Prien’s study was officially called the Joint NIMH/Veterans Administration Study on Lithium 
Prophylaxis for Recurrent Affective Illness (1970-1973) (Prien R 1973). The NIMH is a US 
federal agency within the Department of Health and Human Services that appropriates federal 
money to psychiatric researchers across the country. Until the mid 1970’s, it was the largest 
patron of clinical trials, a role later assumed in private research campuses by the pharmaceutical 
industry (Fisher 2008, Mirowski 2011, Stark 2011). While the institute conducted some research 
at its campus in Bethesda, Maryland (called ‘intramural research’), most of its projects were 
conducted off-site, at other institutions, where grant-applicants were based (Stark 2011).  
 
For readers of psychiatric journals in the 1970’s and early 80’s, the publication of the 
NIMH/Veterans study represented a noticeable departure from not only the case series that had 
come before, but also from the kinds of studies psychiatrists would have encountered in their 
general medical training. Up to the early 1970’s, randomized clinical trials assigned research 
subjects to one of two study groups; a placebo group and an active treatment group (MacLehose 
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2000, Greene 2007) (Figure 3.1). This design was known as a “classic randomized controlled 
trial” or the “gold standard” RCT, to distinguish it from variant designs adapted to situations 
where it was not suitable (MacLehose 2000). The NIHM/Veterans study used a variant of the 
classic RCT known as a “responder trial”, or a “randomized discontinuation trial”, which offered 
a study medication to all people who met standardized criteria for a study condition. Only those 
who achieved a certain degree of recovery while taking treatment, continued the experiment and 
were then randomized, after a period of time, to an ongoing medication or a placebo. While 
technically, both designs qualify as randomized placebo-controlled trials, they answer very 
different questions. The classic design illustrated on the right of figure 3.1 answers the question 
“if I don’t take any treatment at all, what will happen to my health in the long run?” In contrast, 
the responder trial on the left can only answer the question …  “assuming I use a treatment and 
recover from this condition, how long should I continue that treatment?” In other words, 
responder trials generate authoritative knowledge only for people who are willing to accept that 
their recovery was due to a drug, and not to changing life circumstances, learning new skills, or 
simply the passage of time. It defined people at risk for future mental illness as anyone who had 
recovered (“responded”) while receiving medication. Responders, as we will later see, could be 
represented in medical journals as rather abstract entities, that appeared to have no past at all, and 
only a future in which relapse remained a constant possibility.   
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Figure 3.1: Design of responder trial, also known as a ‘randomized discontinuation 
trial’ (left) compared with a classic randomized trial (right). Classic randomized trials 
directly compare long-term outcomes with and without treatment while responder trials 
only provide information about people who are considered ‘responders’. Responder 
trials had the advantage of offering active treatment to people with acute psychiatric 
symptoms and of minimizing the number of people exposed to a placebo.  
 
Given the importance of the NIMH/Veterans study to the evolution of late 20th century 
psychiatric knowledge, it is disappointing that so few archival records have survived to 
document the rationale for its design. Even so, it is reasonable to infer that the study responded 
to several pressures;  
 
1) Pressure from within the psychiatric profession to present maintenance drug therapy as a 
scientifically-grounded practice. 
2) Ethical reforms that prevented researchers from offering a placebo to research subjects 
when it was perceived that effective treatment was available. 
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3) Pressures to produce cost-effective medical knowledge, which translated into efficient 
designs capable of generating results with the lowest number of experimental subjects.  
 
While Prien makes no mention of cost containment, the escalating cost of clinical trials was most 
certainly a concern for pharmaceutical companies, who saw maintenance trials as unacceptably 
risky, even speculative in the 1970s. Maintenance psychiatric drugs were perceived as a high-
risk endeavor, in part because classic randomized controlled trials, used to achieve regulatory 
approval for long-term drugs like anti-hypertensives, would be tremendously expensive in 
psychiatry, not only because they would extend for at least a year, but because medication 
compliance was notoriously poor among users of psychiatric drugs. It is tempting to speculate 
that drug manufacturers preferred to let the federal government put its research funds at risk 
before making their own investments. We can infer this from the commercial researcher 
Frederick Quitkin, who specialized in testing speculative treatments for drug companies. While 
Prien and his team, funded by the US federal government, were conducting their trial of lithium 
maintenance in the veterans hospital system, Quitkin was interested in discontinuation trials as a 
relatively low-cost method for … “screening treatments of dubious value” (Quitkin and Rabkin 
1981). Quitkin cited work by the corporate statistician Willem Amery at Jansen Pharmaeuticals 
in Belgium, who was already applying discontinuation trials in the field of cardiovascular 
research (Amery and Dony 1975):  
 
The trial is divided into two phases, the open phase and the double-blind phase. In 
the open phase, patients selected according to criteria set for each individual trial are 
given the medication which is being studied. They continue on such active therapy 
for a period decided before the commencement of the study. At the end of this time, 
patients who have shown no response are taken off the trial. Those who have 
responded are divided into two groups, one continuing with the medication and one 
being given a placebo, both on a random double-blind basis. … The initial phase of 
the study is intended to establish what (if any) effects appear to result from 
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administering the new formulation to the whole patient population. The second phase 
sets out to establish whether such observed results are indeed true drug effects or 
merely responses of a placebo type. In more formal terms, the second phase sets out 
to test the null hypothesis that all the favorable effects observed during the open 
phase are placebo effects. If this is so, then there will be as many relapses observed 
in the placebo group, since the responding patients are randomly allocated to the two 
groups. If the null hypothesis is invalid however, all relapses will occur during 
placebo therapy and none during continuous medication (Amery and Dony 1975). 
 
Amery was interested in finding efficient ways to minimize placebo exposure in studies of 
angina prevention, and discontinuation studies looked suitable because they could demonstrate 
therapeutic effects while minimizing the number of people exposed to placebo treatment, 
provided a set of assumptions were met: 
a) the treatment should not cure the condition during the initial treatment phase and  
b) the effects of stopping the experimental treatment should be distinguishable from the 
condition being treated.   
 
Quitkin worked closely with pharmaceutical companies, testing a range of new products, many 
of which turned out to be ineffective. Discontinuation trials for Quitkin made intuitive sense as 
initial product screens, since the design would efficiently identify promising products. If a 
discontinuation trial failed to demonstrate a positive effect, no further money need be invested 
and if it identified a potential therapeutic success, further and more definitive studies could be 
justified. Quitkin personally wrote that research into maintenance psychiatric drugs was highly 
speculative:  
 
Most psychiatric disorders are characterized by fluctuations in severity of symptoms, 
and the affective disorders also frequently show periods of remission. Therefore, 
unless a study utilizes a placebo control group, it is difficult to assess the efficacy of 
a new treatment. However, in preliminary trials on what may quickly turn out to be a 
useless drug, the added cost of including a control group may not be justified, or too 
few patients of the specific diagnostic type may be available to make up a placebo 
control group. …  
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In prophylactic studies, a discontinuation design also appears to have the added 
virtue of shortening the length of time on a placebo and exposing fewer patients to a 
useless agent. (Quitkin and Rabkin 1981) 
 
Whether or not Quitkin believed that Amery’s assumptions were met in psychiatric maintenance 
trials is not known, but assuming Quitkin’s interests were closely aligned with those of his 
corporate employers, it is easy to understand why he might have been supportive of 
discontinuation trials, which tended to cast any test product in the best possible light (Kopec, 
Abrahmowicz et al. 1993).   
 
Re-Presenting Trial Data to Physicians:  
 
Between 1970 and 1984, only two randomized clinical trials testing maintenance psychiatric 
medications were conducted in North America, both funded by the National Institute of Mental 
Health. The first was Prien’s study, conducted between 1970 and 1973, and the second was a 
larger multi-center trial that built on Prien’s design,  The National Institute of Mental Health 
Collaborative Study Comparing Lithium Carbonate, Imipramine and a Lithium Carbonate-
Imipramine Combination (1980-1982) (the “NIMH Collaborative Study”) (Prien R 1973, Prien, 
Kupfer et al. 1984, Deshauer 2005, Deshauer 2008). The NIMH Collaborative Study’s initial 
report has been cited over 28,000 times since its publication in 1984 (Web of Science, accessed 
Sept 16, 2016). 
 
While both studies used discontinuation designs, they were reported in very different ways, 
reflecting changes in the way psychiatrists perceived drug maintenance through the 1970’s. The 
NIMH/Veterans Study can be understood as a time-capsule of psychiatric beliefs at a point of 
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inflection, transitioning from a way of thinking in terms of case reports that took into 
consideration personal baselines, where beneficial treatment effects could be seen, based on a 
reduced number or severity of symptoms experienced over time, in a treatment group compared 
with a placebo group12. For Prien, even a reduction in the total number of admissions over a 
period of time counted as a good outcome. A discontinuation trial, the NIMH/Veterans study 
only enrolled hospitalized men who had been said to respond to treatment with either lithium or 
with imipramine. Responders to either treatment were then randomized to a 2-year follow up, 
during which time they had a 50:50 chance of receiving either the same active medication they 
were receiving at their time of recovery, or a placebo. Unlike the subsequent Collaborative study 
that analyzed only the time to an initial return of symptoms (relapse), the NIMH/Veterans study 
tried to capture the effects of medication on the number of relapses over time. That is, 
“responders” in the NIMH/Veterans study were not dropped from the study when their 
symptoms returned, while in future studies, a relapse in symptoms defined treatment failure.  
Figure 3.2 below, from the first report of the NIMH/Veterans study, quantifies the “number and 
percent of bipolar and unipolar patients who had episodes during treatment”.  Figure 3.2 shows 
us that during the 2-year trial, men who received a placebo had almost twice the number of 
symptom attacks (defined by a pre-set threshold on a rating scale) than those who received active 
treatment. An exception was the group with bipolar disorder who received imipramine (which 
led to more attacks than the placebo group).  The analysis of the NIMH/Veterans study contrasts 
starkly with the analysis of the subsequent NIMH Collaborative study in which the use of 
                                                        
12 Subsequently, trials would consider any single fluctuation in moods, of a pre-determined 
severity, to constitute treatment failure. This went along with psychiatry’s emerging frame of 
reference, an idealized state of symptom remission, achieved pharmacologically, and it contrasts 
with the profession’s older frame of reference, a fluctuating personal baseline.  
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survival analysis allowed statisticians to declare a treatment failure on the first instance of 
symptom relapse. In the later study, relapse signaled the end of study participation.  
 
 
Figure 3.2. Organization of outcome data in the NIMH/Veterans study. Participants deemed 
“responders” were permitted (expected) to have multiple periods of intense symptoms, and the 
hope was that drug treatment would modulate the number and/or the intensity of attacks. 
Investigators did not associate maintenance therapy with complete symptom-less recovery, 
similar to the way clinical investigators reported maintenance therapy in the 1960’s, using 
calendar diagrams, in which success was defined in relation to a personal baseline.  
 
The NIMH Collaborative Study studied people deemed responders to a pre-set 
treatment strategy, either lithium, imipramine or a combination of lithium and 
imipramine (Prien, Kupfer et al. 1984). Like the NIMH/Veterans study, which studied 
responders to lithium or imipramine (but not the combination), the Collaborative study 
people deemed “responders” to receive either ongoing drug therapy or a placebo. The 
authors of the first published analysis of the Collaborative study organized its data into 
tables and prose summarizing the total number of men and women who entered the 
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study, the severity of their symptoms and the number of previous hospitalizations its 
subjects had experienced. Beyond familiar categories like gender, age and prior 
hospitalizations (psychiatric studies typically said little or nothing of their participant’s 
social or economic situation), the report created three main categories of analysis into 
which each of its participants were placed. Regardless of one’s personal history and life 
circumstances, only three categories of analysis drove the numbers; ‘remission’, 
‘relapse’ or ‘non-responder’. Non-responders were excluded from any description or 
analysis, as they were dropped from the study prior to the randomization phase (more 
on this later). The three categories for study participants, corresponded to changes on a 
standardized mood rating scale. Remission signified a score that fell under a pre-
determined threshold. Relapse referred to a combination of clinical diagnosis 
(including for example, symptoms severe enough to require hospital admission) and an 
elevated depression score. The category of non-responder referred to those who failed 
to achieve remission in the initial treatment phase. The most important change in the 
NIMH Collaborative study and all subsequent maintenance studies was that relapse 
was counted only once.  
The single-relapse calculation allowed statisticians to replace psychiatry’s traditional 
way of thinking about each person’s mental health in relation to their own baseline. 
Instead, clinicians would be introduced to thinking with survival curves, the visual 
analogue to survival analysis (fig 3.3). Survival analysis made possible a standardized 
approach to maintenance drug prescribing in the coming decades, as psychiatry sought 
to present itself as a clinical science.   
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Figure 3.3: This survival curve summarizes results of the NIMH Collaborative study 
comparing “recurrences in unipolar and bipolar affective disorders” among people who 
had recovered from symptoms while taking lithium, imipramine or a combination of 
these drugs (Greenhouse 1991). At a glance, readers see that people who recover while 
taking a combination of lithium and imipramine (group ‘C’) are only half as likely to 
experience relapse as people who took lithium alone (group ‘L’) or placebo alone 
(group ‘P’). The lithium and placebo curves are very similar in this case, interpreted as 
evidence that lithium was relatively ineffective in preventing future depression while it 
was helpful to prevent future attacks of mania.  
 
Survival analysis and its graphical representation, the survival curve, signified the rate at which 
something failed or broke down over a period of time (Kaplan 1958). Rooted in a binary 
metaphor of life and death, survival analysis was a mathematical function used initially by a 
student of the statistician Karl Pearson in the description of cancer mortality (Greenwood 1926). 
In 1958, the statisticians Edward Kaplan and Paul Meier, while working at Bell Telephone and 
MIT respectively, published a paper called “non-parametric estimation from incomplete 
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observations”, which outlined what became the methodological backbone for biomedical 
research dealing with long-term outcomes. As an indicator of the widespread interest in 
quantifying systems failure and maintenance in the late 1950’s, Kaplan and Meier included an 
acknowledgement of patronage by the US Office of Naval Research. This standardized method 
for understanding the effects of maintenance on failure proved useful beyond medicine, where 
reliable machines and human resources had economic and military implications (Jones-Imhotep 
2012). Survival curves, whether mapped onto the lives of people, things or entire systems were a 
way of framing the risk of breakdown over time, within the boundaries of statistical confidence. 
In mental medicine, they would become the backbone for a prescribing system based on 
managerial principles. 
 
For the reporting of data from the NIMH Collaborative Study, visualizing maintenance 
drug therapy in terms of survival curves also created a way to represent people who 
either failed to recover while taking medication (non-responders) or who simply 
dropped out of the study before a recovery could be recorded. Because discontinuation 
trials were only meant to study medication responders, readers would learn not to 
expect any information about those who failed to respond. These people would come to 
populate a new category of “treatment resistance”, which, as figure 3.3 shows, was a 
sizable group. By time zero on the Y-axis of figure 3.3 for example, 46% of an initial 
206 research participants diagnosed with bipolar disorder had already been excluded 
from the study for either non-compliance or failure to improve during treatment. Only 
38 of the original 206 enrolled, deemed responders, completed the full study so that in 
the end, 168 participants were deemed non-responsive. It is this majority, the 168 ‘non-
responders’ (to the left of the Y-axis) who would, in the coming decades, help populate 
a designation of treatment resistance.  
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The NIMH Collaborative study therefore represented a break with the past in more than 
one way. Not only did the study create a new way of generating knowledge, but it 
created a new way of reporting data. Unlike a previous generation of representations 
based on case reports and re-constructions of individual life narratives, survival curves 
depicted their objects of study appearing at time zero without any past at all; the 
study’s outcome of interest was the durability of remission only among responders. It 
remained silent on all other outcomes. Responders are represented visually in survival 
curves as abstractions, as entities without a past, beginning at a hypothetical time zero 
with a future consisting of two health outcomes; ongoing remission or relapse.  
 
3.3   Statistical Re-analysis and Controversy: The problem of Drug Withdrawal  
 
Joel Greenhouse, a statistician who specialized in the analysis of longitudinal data and long-time 
collaborator of David Kupfer, one of the lead investigators of the NIMH Collaborative study, 
offered a somewhat different explanation for the way both NIMH studies were designed, than 
did his colleague (Greenhouse 1991, Kupfer 1996). Rather than focusing on ethical concerns 
about the use of placebos in people with relatively severe forms of mental illness, Greenhouse 
recalled concerns within the NIMH study design team about the cost of studying conditions that 
tended to wax and wane (Greenhouse 2016). For psychiatric conditions, which fluctuated over 
time, he reflected, “the motivation for the discontinuation design was to try to ensure that 
patients being randomized at the maintenance phase at a similar stage in terms of their biological 
illness, that is having recovered from an acute episode”. A classic randomized controlled trial 
would have to observe symptoms in people until their symptoms had resolved, and then continue 
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to observe them until they experienced a relapse or perhaps, as in older studies, across several 
symptomatic relapses, to determine if maintenance drugs helped over time. As the case reports in 
chapter 2 have shown, this could in some cases take many years, and Greenhouse felt there were 
pragmatic issues in retaining research subjects untreated in the therapeutic environment of the 
NIMH studies (the studies were conducted on hospitalized people, so its participants were 
expecting to receive active medication). Furthermore, Greenhouse was concerned that in a 
classic RCT, a variable drop-out rate would mean the study would retain in the placebo arm only 
those people whose mood fluctuations were relatively mild, thus downplaying the relative effect 
of active treatment in more severely disturbed people (Greenhouse 1991). Studying people with 
mild symptoms would have further increased the number of people required to yield a 
statistically significant result using a classic (head-to-head) placebo controlled randomized 
controlled trial, thus spiraling research costs beyond available budgets. Figure 3.4 below from 
the NIMH/Veterans study lends support to Greenhouse’s pragmatic concerns about maintenance 
drug trials. Drop-out rates between 64 and 77 % in the placebo arm of this discontinuation trial 
(double the proportion in the active treatment group) suggest that a classic randomized controlled 
design exposing half of all study participants to a placebo would have been difficult to complete 
at any cost, regardless of ethical concerns.  
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Figure 3.4. Table from the NIMH/Veterans study analysis.  
 
Still, Greenhouse recognized important limits to discontinuation trials, and he showed how, in a 
re-analysis of the NIMH Collaborative study, the study’s results could be plausibly explained as 
resulting from an artifact of the study design – drug withdrawal symptoms (Greenhouse 1991).  
 
 
In 1991, Greenhouse and Kupfer re-analyzed the NIMH Collaborative study out of concern that 
the study produced spurious results because the symptoms of drug withdrawal in themselves 
could have explained away the study's support for maintenance therapy (Greenhouse 1991). The 
question of withdrawal effects related to psychiatric interventions had a long history, extending 
(surprisingly) even to maintenance electroshock, where one report provided methods for 
preventing ‘electroshock dependence’(Bourne and Lond 1954)13. Better known were concerns 
                                                        
13 As the historian David Hertzberg has pointed out, physical dependence has operated as a 
boundary concept at the intersection of addiction and regulated therapy, even transforming some 
drugs into racialized and gendered tools of policing Hertzberg, D. (2013). Happy Pills in 
America: From Miltown to Prozac. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press. 
 . 
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with addiction to sedatives like Valium and Seconal for example, in the 1950’s and 60’s (Tone 
2009, Herzberg 2017). Withdrawal symptoms from prescription drugs that doubled as street 
drugs, for example valium, were severe enough to cause seizures and the rapid withdrawal of 
anti-psychotics like chlorpromazine were known to produce intense symptoms in people 
designated with schizophrenia.  
 
Greenhouse reasoned that if the ‘maintenance effects’ described in the Collaborative trial were 
spurious, then a close re-analysis of the data would show that more people would have relapsed 
in the first few weeks following lithium withdrawal. This was indeed the case. When he looked 
at the numbers, after subtracting all relapses in the first 8 weeks following randomization to the 
‘maintenance phase’, no maintenance effect could be shown. The implications of Greenhouse’s 
re-analysis were significant, not only for the specific cases of lithium and imipramine 
maintenance but for all psychiatric drugs, since reports were emerging that withdrawal effects 
from antidepressants for example could mimic the symptoms of a clinical relapse.  
 
For corporate statisticians designing and analyzing regulatory trials, this challenge was taken 
seriously, and changes were immediately implemented to quantify withdrawal effects in 
regulatory trials. Soon after the Greenhouse-Kupfer re-analysis, regulatory trials began to appear 
in psychiatric journals with two modifications; a gradual taper of medications among people 
randomized to receive a placebo after having recovered on an active drug and a second analysis, 
conducted and presented to readers, following Greenhouse and Kupfer’s re-analysis of the 
NIMH Collaborative trial. To gain the confidence of readers, it was important for pharmaceutical 
manufacturers not only to describe the gradual withdrawal of active medications following 
randomization to placebo, but also to show their re-analysis excluding relapses in the first week, 
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using a second survival curve. The second curve reflected the most cautious interpretation of the 
data. By the end of the 1990’s, 6 maintenance trials (all products of corporate research 
campuses) had been conducted and published along with statistical tests for withdrawal effects 
(Montgomery, Rasmussen et al. 1993, Keller, Kocsis et al. 1998, Reimherr, Amsterdam et al. 
1998, Terra and Montgomery 1998, Feiger, Bielski et al. 1999, Rouillon, Warner et al. 1999). 
The impact of drug withdrawal led only to a modest overstatement of treatment effect, and the 
concerns raised by Greenhouse and Kupfer were perceived as curious, but of not great practical 
relevance to the way maintenance drugs were tested, regulated and prescribed.  
 
Regulatory science used by pharmaceutical companies to obtain market access for psychiatric 
maintenance drugs, did not need to engage debates past their most immediate relevance to 
product safety and efficacy. One can only speculate at how the perception of psychiatric 
maintenance drugs would have been different, had classic randomized controlled trials been used 
to test psychiatric drugs from the outset. Rather than answering only the question “supposing I 
recover while taking this drug, how long should I take it”, classic trials would have answered the 
question “supposing I don’t take the medication, how long until I’m likely to feel better”? 
Psychiatric knowledge developed in a direction that benefitted its makers, and for drug 
manufacturers, answering the latter question would have meant taking high risks, with little 
upside for long-term drug-sales.   
 
3.4   Standardizing maintenance in the clinic: protocols and expert consensus 
 
 
While the NIMH Collaborative study presented a new way of thinking about 
psychiatric drug maintenance, in which drug maintenance could be assessed, with little 
concern for personal baselines, clinical trials were not the only mechanism of change. 
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Educational efforts to standardize clinical care across North America were visible in 
psychiatric publications. In various formats, field leaders offered advice to clinicians, 
translating the latest research into more practical terms. Just as changes in the way 
psychiatric researchers assessed maintenance drugs were gradual, so also was the shift 
in the way researchers framed maintenance drugs to a more general audience of 
practicing physicians. Into the early 1980’s, following the highly publicized NIMH 
Collaborative Study, experts continued to encourage clinicians to think about the 
effects of maintenance drugs in relation to their patient’s personal baselines.  
 
The NIH Consensus Development Program 
 
 
The National Institutions of Health (NIH) Consensus Development Program, 
established in the 1970’s, produced summaries of cutting-edge research, geared to 
inform clinicians. Reports were circulated directly from the NIH and were sometimes 
published as special features in professional journals. Such was the 1984 consensus 
statement entitled “Mood Disorders: Pharmacological Prevention of Recurrences” 
dealing with the use of maintenance psychiatric drugs. Its authors included the lead 
investigators from the NIMH/Veterans study and the NIMH/Collaborative study 
(Kupfer, Berger et al. 1984).  
 
The report was organized into a summary of the group’s recommendations followed by 
a series of questions (along the lines of “Frequently Asked Questions”), with extended 
answers mimicking an informal conversation between medical practitioners and 
experts on the consensus panel (though there is no record of who exactly responded to 
any question, since the consensus panel spoke with one voice). Disagreements among 
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panelists were not documented in the consensus statement. Representative questions 
included “How common are recurrent mood disorders and what are the variations in 
the course of these illnesses?” and “What groups of patients with mood disorders 
should be considered for preventive maintenance medication?”  Answers to these 
questions reflect the views one might have expected from psychiatrists trained in the 
1950’s and 60’s. The panel’s cautious recommendation on the use of maintenance 
drugs was that “there are groups of patients with recurrent mood disorders for whom 
treatments are available which effectively reduce the frequency and intensity of 
subsequent episodes”. This is revealing, because it exposes a boundary between a new 
generation of knowledge in which maintenance drugs were assessed in relation to an 
idealized, optimized state, and an older generation of knowledge, in which personal 
baselines were valued as a point of reference. Under the heading “What principles 
guide selection of specific therapeutic agents for these groups?”, the panel was once 
again cautious: 
 
Repeated and candid discussions with the patient and the patient’s spouse or other 
relatives are mandatory to ensure full understanding of potential advantages and risks 
of preventive treatment as well as of no treatment (italics in the original) (Kupfer, 
Berger et al. 1984). 
 
 
Nowhere in the consensus report was a specific method or protocol by which a “full 
understanding of potential advantages and risks” could be achieved. Nor did they 
provide guidance on what they meant by “no treatment”, though the italics in the 
original text speak for themselves about the perceived limits of maintenance therapy.  
 
Competing Advice from Competing Interest Groups:  
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As the philosopher Miriam Solomon has shown in her historical study of late 20th 
century medical epistemology, the NIH consensus statement program operated 
alongside and was eventually displaced by other expert consensus groups, some 
supported financially by pharmaceutical companies, some supported by local health 
authorities (Solomon 2015, Kendler and Solomon 2016).  
 
A case in point is an efficient prescribing protocol that showed clinicians how to 
embrace a new vision of mental health, optimized then maintained pharmaceutically. 
This new view appeared in the Journal of Clinical Psychiatry in 1981, three years prior 
to the NIH consensus panel statement summarized above (Coleman 1981). Written by 
employees of the VA hospital in Memphis Tennessee, the diagram makes clear, step by 
step, a method for converting people with symptoms of depression into medication 
responders, who were then optimized and maintained at the discretion of the senior 
medical consultant. The protocol divided clinical tasks among members of an 
interdisciplinary team (Figures 3.5 and 3.5a).  Notable is the complete absence of 
reference to a patient’s personal baseline in assessing the success or failure of drug 
treatment. Rather, the diagram emphasizes decision points in moving patients through a 
mental health clinic, starting with paramedical staff, and moving toward the referral of 
the “treatment resistant” case to a senior medical consultant. People deemed to have 
relapsed re-entered the process of treatment until they had achieved remission.  
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Figure 3.5: A 1981 functional flow box diagram published in the widely circulated 
Journal of Clinical Psychiatry offering direct guidance for the management of 
responders and non-responders to the pharmacological treatment of depression 
(Coleman 1981). See inset below (figure 3.7a) for more detail.  
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Figure 3.5a. Detail from a 1981 prescribing protocol showing how prescribing 
decisions are efficiently divided into numbered steps with arrows guiding the next step. 
 
 
Functional flow block diagrams were adapted from systems engineering, showing how 
managerial logic was applied in the clinic (Chestnut 1951). The diagrams break down 
processes into numbered steps, which serve as a framework for developing operational 
or contingency procedures. Each numbered step stands for a discrete action to be 
accomplished by system members (defined in figure 3.7 as clinical pharmacists, 
medical residents or physicians). Numbering established relationships between steps 
and system members, with the flow of actions indicated with arrows. Like engineering 
diagrams, figure 3.5 was arranged so that the flow was from top to bottom, from the 
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conversion of medication non-responders to responders. The central line was organized 
around a series of binary decisions about medication response, starting at box 5, in 
which the clinician followed arrows to the left for non-responders and continued 
straight for patients deemed ‘responders’. For responders, the figure flowed toward 
drug monitoring procedures.  
 
If treatment and/or response is determined to be inadequate, the reasons must be 
determined and these necessarily include an assessment of drug response, possible 
physical problems and /or psychological problems (Coleman 1981).  
 
In the case of non-response, clinicians were directed to conduct various investigations including 
blood monitoring. Further direction at step 27 advised specific medication changes (detailed in 
figure 3.5a) 
 
… Simple alteration of the dosage of the drug, a change to another tricyclic 
antidepressant or to another class of antidepressant drug (MAOI) or the addition of a 
drug from another group of psychoactive agents (antipsychotics) may be necessary 
depending on the individual and the severity of the situation (Coleman 1981).  
 
 
Non-responders were gradually moved down the left side of the system. Those persistently 
deemed non-responsive are directed to the ‘physician’ for unspecified further action while people 
converting to ‘response’ status were moved over to the right side of the diagram, to a series of 
steps that eventually culminated in ‘maintenance’. At step 32, a decision about the duration of 
treatment was made. The diagram preceded Greenhouse and Kupfer’s re-analysis of the NIHM 
Collaborative trial and controversies over the effects of drug withdrawal effects on 
discontinuation trials.  
 
How long to continue maintenance therapy with tricyclic antidepressants is a 
question which has no specific answer. If, in the clinician’s opinion, the duration of 
treatment has been inadequate, no action is indicated except to continue treatment … 
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Regardless of which treatment plan one uses, it seems plausible to assume that at 
some arbitrary point after remission of depressive symptoms, a trial dosage reduction 
is warranted (step 34) (Coleman 1981).  
 
 
 
Functional flow block diagrams operationalized at a systems level, what the 
anthropologist Andrew Lakoff has described as ‘pharmacological reason’, a way of 
thinking that placed the perception of drug-response at the center of psychiatric 
practices (Lakoff 2006).  Up until the early 1980’s, ideas for mixing and changing 
drugs had been described in scattered reports, usually organized in prose or tables so 
that the ideas like “responder”, “non-responder” and “treatment-refractory depression” 
had not been brought together within a scalable process. (Desilverior 1970, McLellan 
1970, Merlis 1970, Stern 1981).  
 
Perhaps it was scalability that would have stood out to readers of treatment protocols in 
the early 1980’s. This was a vision of efficient prescribing, already emerging alongside 
more cautious speculation about mental health, achieved and sustained, through 
pharmacology. Psychiatric journals in the early 1980’s document a period of transition, 
in which some experts promoted the efficiencies inherent to a new, standardized 
approach to drug maintenance, while others (ironically those most closely connected to 
research) remained more comfortable assessing maintenance in terms of a personal 
baseline, rather than in terms of an idealized state.  
 
Entangling remission with drug compliance  
 
 
Since the 1950’s, maintenance therapy in the field of mental medicine had been 
associated with chronicity. As chapter 2 has shown, mental hospitals organized patients 
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according to their flow, circulation and ultimately sedimentation into chronic back-
wards, where “live release” was understood to be more unlikely with each passing year 
(Kramer, Goldstein et al. 1954, Brown, Parkes et al. 1961).  
 
According to the logic of mental hospital superintendents, it made sense to focus maximal 
therapeutic efforts on patients early, usually a critical threshold of two years in hospital, before 
they became permanent institutional residents. It is not surprising that administrators in the mid 
20th century organized a hospital stay into two main phases, the first two years corresponding to 
acute treatment followed by anything that came after. “Early intervention” in the first two years 
of hospitalization would lead to two outcomes, either failed treatment (inability to discharge or 
parole an inmate) or successful discharge. Remission, hastened by electroshock or 
pharmaceuticals and extended by maintenance therapy was proven by hospital discharge. A 
person’s ability to leave the hospital and ideally return to a life with family, friends and 
employment was part of the concept of remission. But it would have been foreign to psychiatrists 
in the mid 20th century to think about recovery in terms of continuous compliance with a 
maintenance therapy. Consider for example Schou’s “mirror image” diagram (figure 2.7) in 
which the desired object of knowledge was an illness’ “natural course”, which in turn dictated 
how maintenance interventions would be understood (and used intermittently, for example).  
 
With the waning of “natural illness course” from psychiatry’s vernacular, authoritative 
discussions about the end-points for drug therapy began to lose their traditional frame of 
reference in a personal baseline.  Re-framed as an optimized state, and represented without 
reference to a person’s past, any recovery while using a maintenance drug became, by default, a 
state of increased risk. Put another way, if psychiatrists could not frame their expectations in 
terms of a natural illness course (or in terms of a personal baseline), they would come to imagine 
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recovery on a survival curve, much like doctors might think about future risks for heart attack or 
stroke among people with hypertension as continuous states of elevated risk to be mitigated with 
various life-long interventions. Clinical logic dictated that if an optimized state of mental health 
(remission) had been achieved because of a drug, then long-term remission would be predicated 
on long-term compliance. (An instance of how this logic caused problems in the field of medical 
licensing will be discussed in chapter 5). As the architectural structures reinforcing a 
geographical definition of recovery began to crumble, remnants of an administrative logic that 
moved inmates through acute and chronic wards, survived in psychiatry’s standardized language. 
A new, official psychiatric nomenclature for drug prescribing, that compressed institutional time 
frames of years and decades, into weeks and months, congealed by the early 1990’s. 
Maintenance therapy became de-facto evidence of successful passage through a labyrinth of 
treatment protocols meant to optimize mental health. Sustained drug response (remission) 
became, by definition, the object of therapy.  
 
The MacArthur Foundation Research Network Consensus Statement:  
 
In 1991, an expert consensus statement proposing a common professional language to describe 
changes in mental health over time appeared in the prestigious journal, Archives of General 
Psychiatry (Frank 1991).  The consensus reflected the views of the 1988 MacArthur Foundation 
Research Network on the Psychobiology of Depression, which had examined “ways in which 
change points in the course of depressive illness had been described and the extent to which 
inconsistency in these descriptions might be impeding research on this disorder”. … The phrase 
“change points” referred to presumed hidden biological changes that corresponded to clinical 
observations and ultimately to interventions. The task force concluded that there were 
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“considerable inconsistencies across and even within research reports and research could benefit 
from … an internally consistent, empirically defined conceptual scheme for the terms remission, 
recovery, relapse and recurrence”. They went on to lay out an “atheortical” set of criteria for 
each term.  
 
Terms were meant to work across diagnostic categories. Mental illness began, predictably with 
the onset of symptoms … “any period before the patient’s first episode, during which the patient 
is in the asymptomatic range except for short periods is said to be disorder free”. Remission of 
symptoms was defined as “a period during which an improvement of sufficient magnitude is 
observed that the individual is asymptomatic (ie. no longer meets syndromal criteria for the 
disorder and has no more than minimal symptoms). Remission could be full or partial, with the 
latter giving rise to a curious term, “flurry” – a borderzone concept that referred to symptoms 
occurring during remission that did not meet criteria for relapse or recurrence.  The term seems 
to have died in the consensus statement and does not appear in subsequent research or guidelines. 
Finally, relapse was defined as “a return of symptoms satisfying the full syndrome criteria for an 
episode that occurs during the period of remission”. Of relevance to psychiatric practice, the 
panel stated that “A relapse signals a need for treatment intervention or modification of ongoing 
treatment”. With this statement, the consensus panel discarded the mode of analysis in the 
NIMH/Veterans study, along with the notion of assessing the effects of maintenance medications 
in terms of a personal baseline (contrast this to the NIH Consensus Panel statement published 7 
years earlier). No longer could treatment response be defined in terms of reducing or 
ameliorating the number or intensity of episodes; rather, it would be defined simply in terms of a 
person’s ability to achieve and maintain a state of symptom remission. The concept of a personal 
baseline had no role in this nomenclature.  
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The MacArthur Foundation Research Network on the Psychobiology of Depression became the 
underpinning for a prescribing practice that officially mapped terms related to the symptoms of 
mental illness onto treatment phases, re-inserting the time element to psychiatric practice in 
relation to standardized prescribing practices (Figure 3.6). The acute phase corresponded to the 
use of treatment to achieve remission, which in turn was quantified on a rating scale. Assuming 
symptoms had responded to treatment, a continuation phase followed, defined as the 16-20 
weeks following symptom remission (corresponding to the consensus term “remission”). Finally, 
people who remained symptom-free for more than 20 weeks entered the maintenance phase, 
which corresponded with the term remission, which could extend indefinitely (APA 1993). Of 
interest, the term ‘recovery’ as used here only refers to a duration of remission, and it does not 
carry the more fulsome context given to the term ‘recovery’ by consumer movements for 
example (Bellack 2006).  
 
Figure 3.6, conceptual diagram in which time is divided into discrete treatment phases 
and the terms “remission”, “relapse”, “recovery” and “recurrence” as described in the 
MacArthur Foundation Research Network consensus statement (Hirschfeld 2001). The 
diagram makes no reference to a person’s natural illness course unfolding over years or 
decades, as psychiatrists in the 1950’s would have understood it. Rather, it is a generic 
pattern that allows prescribers to imagine mental health in relation to movement 
through treatment protocols over time.  
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Standardized nomenclature as a new organizing principle for psychiatric practice:  
 
As opposed to statements produced by NIH consensus panels, which ended in the early 
1990’s, treatment guidelines produced by professional organizations like the American 
Psychiatric Association became by the late 20th century a way of codifying professional 
norms among North American physicians. Their legal status as “learned documents” 
meant that physicians who deviated from their recommendations did so at their 
professional peril (Zonana 2008). The MacArthur Foundation Research Network 
consensus statement became an organizing principle for the first American Psychiatric 
Association Practice Guideline for Major Depressive Disorder in Adults, published in 
1993 (Kerasu, Docherty et al. 1993). The 21-page document was organized into three 
main sections, the first dealing with “disease definition, epidemiology and natural 
history”, the second with “treatment principles and alternatives” and the third with 
“summary recommendations”, but 80% of the guidelines were dedicated to treatment. 
Practitioners were encouraged to follow the MacArthur Foundation consensus 
approach, organizing their patients’ symptoms to correspond with pharmacological 
treatment phases. Put another way, the first set of APA guidelines for the treatment of 
depression offered a way to map clinical observations onto a pharmacological time-
table. Even so, the 1993 guideline producers elected not to use a simplified protocol-
based guidance of the kind outlined above in figure 3.5, preferring instead to frame the 
use of maintenance drugs cautiously:  
 
For many patients with recurrent unipolar depression of sufficient severity and 
frequency, maintenance therapy using the medication effective in inducing remission 
may be best continued for a prolonged period of time, in some cases indefinitely. In 
cases where there has been a long period of stability with maintenance treatment the 
physician and patient may wish to discuss the pros and cons of a trial without 
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medications. … Psychological and interpersonal factors often play a substantive role in 
increasing the risk of recurrence and psychotherapy may be very productive during the 
maintenance phase (Kerasu, Docherty et al. 1993).     
 
The tentative acceptance of a standardized nomenclature that organized mental illness 
and recovery around a pharmaceutical timeframe gave way a decade later to a more 
directive approach in the APA revised depression guidelines, published in 2000. 
Increased to 45 pages, all but 3 of which were dedicated to interventions, treatment 
protocols encouraging psychiatrists to optimize treatment during the acute phase. Full 
and sustained remission of symptoms (defined according to a standardized symptom 
check-list, not related to a personal baseline), became the goal of prescribing.  
   
The APA depression guidelines stand for a broader tendency across professional 
consensus guidelines for the long-term use of psychiatric drugs to maintain a new ideal 
of remission as an idealized, symptom-free state (Deshauer 2007). Speaking as if in 
one voice (the guideline does not tell us who has written its various sections), the 
guideline re-frames the concept of a personalized baseline, not in terms of a statement 
of self-norming (as it would have been in the 1950’s) but rather a state in which 
symptoms were entirely absent. “Remission …. should not be confused with 
substantial but incomplete improvement” (APA 2000). Rather, it means “a return to the 
patient’s baseline level of symptom severity and functioning”; if a person has never 
experienced life without symptoms, the guideline takes for granted that a new baseline 
will be created pharmacologically. That a person’s baseline must be a state without 
symptoms reflected a new professional expectation for what it meant to be healthy.  
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Figure 3.7 Treatment algorithm below from the American Psychiatric Association consensus 
guidelines for the treatment of depression. Remission is defined in terms of a “full return to 
baseline”, though the authors take for granted that their readers clearly understand what is meant 
by the term “baseline”. Drug consumers move from left to right in the central box, from orange 
to green (full recovery). This diagram detaches maintenance therapy from its older association 
with chronicity, and re-casts it as a term related to long-term symptom remission.  
 
 
Maintenance therapy was by the turn of the century, endorsed not only by the 
American Psychiatric Association Guidelines but by a range of professional 
associations, often with financial support from pharmaceutical marketers (Sismondo 
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2007). By 2000, the NIH was winding down its publication of consensus statements, 
leaving to professional associations and their private sources of funding, the job of 
translating new research for use by clinicians (Solomon 2015). In place of the NIH 
consensus statement program, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 
shifted its resources toward an open-access medical information portal known as the 
National Guideline Clearinghouse https://www.guideline.gov meant to provide a 
constantly updated library of all published guidelines. The role of the Department of 
Health Services is not to advocate for any interest group; rather than turning to 
government-funded consensus statements, medical practitioners would be free to 
choose their sources of expert consensus. The portal is operated by an independent 
non-profit organization known as the Emergency Care Research Institute, designated 
by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services as a Patient Safety Organization 
under the Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005 (ECRI)14. Here, an 
authoritative language of drug maintenance resides, preserved in a standardized form 
for doctors, ready to guide efficient prescribing everywhere.  
 
3.5  Discussion  
 
 
The standardization of psychiatric maintenance drugs in North America took place over several 
decades, involving a diverse network of professionals, both government and corporate, from 
clinical psychiatrists with experience working on the wards of mental hospitals, to government 
and corporate statisticians, who operated at the kind of distance necessary to imagine and 
crystalize new, more abstract ideas of mental health and illness.   
                                                        
14 The portal was de-funded by the Trump administration in June of 2018. 
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Between 1970 and 1990, psychiatric journals document a gradual fading of the personal baseline 
as a traditional clinical framework for assessing maintenance drugs. In its place, came a 
comparatively fragmented, de-contextualized vision of mental health. Fragmentation had to do 
not merely with well-described assumptions about the neurochemical causes of mental illness, or 
with a tendency for research in mental medicine to move away from narrative accounts 
(Danziger 1990, Rose 2003). This chapter shows that it was the fragmenting of the time element 
that made possible a new, efficient approach to psychiatric drug maintenance.  
 
This chapter has situated the 1970’s and early 1980’s as a period of transition, in which we can 
see not only the preference of psychiatrists like David Kupfer and Robert Prien, trained on the 
wards of mental hospitals, for assessing maintenance drugs in relation to their patients’ personal 
baseline. We also see the ambivalence of pharmaceutical companies to jump into the expensive 
and risky endeavor of long-term clinical trials. Consistent with a larger trend in the mid 20th 
century, in which government-funded science took on risky projects only to have corporations 
reap the benefits, pharmaceutical companies waited until a method for studying maintenance 
drugs had been proven in clinical trials, and accepted by the psychiatric profession (Mirowski 
2011).  
 
Yet even as a standardized way of thinking about psychiatric drug maintenance came together, it 
gave rise to questions of addiction, whose long roots stretched into the 19th century. Addiction 
had traditionally implied form of dependence linked to moral and biological weakness, but now 
the effects of drug withdrawal posed a threat to the validity of clinical trials. Indeed, if 
psychiatric maintenance drugs had become associated with a language of drug addiction, which 
included questions of tolerance and withdrawal, it is hard to imagine how the 1988 MacArthur 
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Foundation Research Network on the Psychobiology of Depression could have stabilized 
professional consensus around psychiatric drug maintenance. Had psychiatrists come to think 
more seriously about drug maintenance in the context of addiction, it is likely the profession 
would have debated not only the effects of drug withdrawal but also the implications of 
physiological tolerance. We can only guess how this might have affected the confidence with 
which physicians prescribed long-term mind-altering drugs.   
 
Running through this chapter is an interplay of interest groups -- professional, government, and 
corporate, which resulted in unforeseen reverberations, changing the very meaning of what 
exactly it was, that psychiatric drugs maintained. Change was not driven from any single quarter, 
but rather came about from a confluence of circumstances. Ironically, even consumer-protection 
rules, considered at the time important to prevent harms, stood in the way of knowledge that 
would have benefitted two generations of North Americans weighing the risks and benefits of 
long-term drugs. This is perhaps the subtler point to the standardization of maintenance drugs. 
As the concept of a personal baseline faded away by the 1990’s, a visit to the doctor for a mental 
health issue increasingly meant a visit to someone who thought of psychiatric drugs as a tool for 
optimizing mental health, following expert-approved prescribing protocols. Maintenance, it 
followed, no longer just meant holding on to a personal baseline, but it also meant maintaining 
an optimized state. In contrast, maintenance in the 1960’s had much more to do with one’s 
(unmedicated) baseline, whether that meant expected day-to-day fluctuations in well-being, or 
maintaining one’s place of residence in the community. For some, maintenance in the 1960’s 
could even have meant maintaining a temporary place of residence in the mental hospital, 
circulating in and out of short-term wards rather than settling into life-long custodial care.  
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As German Berrios has shown, the rise of asylums in the early 19th century as a place to house 
the insane created the circumstances in which mad doctors could organize the lives of their 
patients into cases, which in turn could be grouped into categories (Berrios 1996). Prior to the 
early 19th century, a diagnosis of insanity, once made, was regarded as permanent. Periods of 
recovery, known as “lucid intervals”, were not conceptually problematic, because madmen could 
temporarily “stifle their disorder”. In a sense, the standardization of drug maintenance, together 
with de-institutionalization, can be understood as mechanisms by which a two-century-old 
understanding of madness, was recalibrated.  
 
So far, this project has focused on maintenance drugs as they were understood in medical circles, 
at first in mental hospitals, then in an expanded orbit that included researchers and psychiatric 
field leaders, who jointly stabilized a new way of thinking over almost half a century. The next 
half of the project looks beyond the hospital, starting with how maintenance drugs affected the 
underwriting of life insurance policies in North America.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
Thinking Like A Businessman:  
The Association of Life Insurance Medical Directors of America and the problem of suicide  
 
 
4.1  Introduction 
 
 
Life insurance is a form of anxiety management that creates a perception of rationality, of long-
term order and stability in a world of the unexpected (Beck 2009). Work, save, and insure 
yourself today so your family will be financially protected tomorrow, a social contract that even 
an unexpected death will not entirely destroy (Levy 2012). But affordable insurance is not a 
birthright. Life insurance markets take for granted an exchange system in which each customer 
sells to a third party (an insurance company) their risk of premature death at an agreed upon 
price. Theoretically, every health risk can be sold if the price is right, but for people deemed 
‘substandard’, the cost of life insurance can nullify its anxiolytic allure (Porter 2000, Bouk 
2015).  
 
The pricing and sale of substandard life insurance policies had, since the late 19th century, fallen 
to a special kind of expert within the insurance industry; the medical director, a physician who 
specialized in adjudicating insurance risk (Porter 2000). Medical directors in Canada and the 
United States met annually in an organization known as the Association of Life Insurance 
Medical Directors of North America, keeping up to date on medical technology, especially as it 
affected mortality rates. Their goal was to pool knowledge of reduced mortality from new 
interventions ranging from heart valve replacements, to new drugs for cardiovascular disease, all 
in the service of pricing sub-standard life insurance applications. By the late 1960’s, the 
insurance industry had amassed such a trove of statistics, that for most insurance applications, 
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the expertise of medical directors was not necessary. Companies were exploring the advantages 
of “automated insurance”, made possible because standardized mortality tables, initially 
stabilized in the 19th century as a way of understanding average death rates, now allowed for 
more targeted underwriting. It would no longer require the expert judgement of a medical 
director to price insurance for people who were overweight, hypertensive, or who had a history 
of diabetes. Automated underwriting was part of a strategy toward the high-volume sales of low-
value policies.  
 
An emerging challenge for life insurers in the 1950’s and 1960’s was how to put a price on 
insurance policies for people who used maintenance psychiatric drugs. It was unclear whether 
each applicant would require expensive, expert evaluation, or whether the newer techniques of 
automated underwriting could be profitably applied. Physical health could be objectively 
quantified with metrics like blood pressure, cholesterol, cardiograms and enzyme studies. No 
such objective measures existed for the field of mental medicine however. The life insurance 
industry’s longstanding experience with suicide claims had led to a corporate culture of deep 
mistrust toward applicants marked by any sign of emotional instability. Signs of instability 
included psychiatric diagnoses, a history of alcoholism and the use of psychiatric drugs: if 
insurers in the 1950s and 60s aimed merely to play it safe, to keep the riskiest applicants off their 
books, anyone who bore one of these marks would have been painted with the same exclusionary 
brush, but with psychiatric drug use on the rise, such a conservative approach, it was felt, would 
seriously crimp the growth of profits. In the field of physical medicine, mega-studies provided 
insurance experts reliable numbers for calculating the risk of a customer’s death. The field of 
mental medicine was another story, as its authoritative knowledge-making framework relied on 
case-reports. While psychiatrists used a language that made sense within their expert community, 
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it did not add up for number crunchers in the insurance industry. The story of how ALIMDA 
developed methods for handling insurance applications with mental-health risks, unfolded 
between the mid 1950’s and the mid 1970’s. In fits and starts, it represented a movement away 
from using experts to assess suicide risk, and toward automated underwriting, a process in which 
maintenance psychiatric drugs became tools of surveillance15.  
 
4.2    Insurance Company Medical Directors as an Observational Community 
 
 
Between its inception in 1889 and its dissolution in 1991, the Association of Life Insurance 
Medical Directors of America (ALIMDA) fashioned itself as a sub-discipline of medicine, 
though it was not recognized as such by the American Medical Association until 1983. While 
ALIMDA likely survived progressive era concerns with monopolies because of its claim to 
status as a medical sub-specialty, its members felt mistrust, even derision, from their clinical 
colleagues due to their corporate allegiance (Brown 1989). Whatever the medical profession 
thought of insurance company medical directors, there is little doubt they had access to a unique 
perspective on medical data, combining public and proprietary data, pooled across multiple 
competing firms in the name of strengthening the industry as a whole. Working with company 
statisticians to make sense of data, medical directors arguably had access to more health 
information than even government statisticians (McAlister 1950, Brown 1989, MacKenzie 
2016). Typically, by the mid 20th century the medical director’s job was full-time, transplanting 
experts with clinical expertise out of hospitals and clinics into a role in which the health of others 
                                                        
15 This chapter draws on material from the estate of Richard Singer, archived at the Kathryn and 
Shellby Cullom Davis insurance library at St. John’s University, New York. “RSP” refers to the 
Richard Singer Papers.  
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was perceived at a distance, through insurance application forms or through the commissioned 
reports of medical experts (Hallam 1966, Jones 1966, Sexton 1966, Warner 1966). 
 
Figure 4.1 exemplifies ALIMDA’s ambitions as an authoritative body straddling two fields; 
medicine and business.  Over the next half century, efficient algorithms would largely displace 
medical experts within life insurance companies, and by the 1980’s, ALIMDA’s corporate 
influence gave way to actuaries and underwriters, as the organization eventually folded into the 
American Academy of Insurance Medicine in 1991 (1991, Brown 2004).  
 
 
Figure 4.1: This 1941 photo shows 115 members of ALIMDA dining in the Starlight Room of 
the Waldorf Astoria Hotel in New York City, to the music of a string quartet. ALIMDA’s choice 
of expensive meeting venue (the Waldorf hotel is representative) and the projection of authority 
in this image belies its members’ frequent sense of dislocation from the practice of clinical 
medicine and an ambivalent professional relationship with the American Medical Association 
(Singer 2010).  
 
 
Understanding health, not by the direct examination of people but rather through the 
interpretation of application forms, insurance company medical directors shared habits, 
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instruments and techniques, forming what the historian of science Lorraine Daston has called an 
‘observational community’ (Daston 2008). By deciding what kinds of data were required on life 
insurance medical examination forms, they influenced medical practice, making it necessary for 
doctors to keep weighing scales, stethoscopes and sphygmomanometers ready to hand (Bouk 
2015). Insurance company medical directors did not want the opinions of physicians on the 
insurability of their patients, fearing bias (Porter 2000). Rather, they developed ways of 
interpreting data, transported from the clinic in the form of numbers, checkmarks and prose, to 
company headquarters, where they were transcribed by clerks, and sorted using standardized 
criteria. Some forms, rated low risk, would be quickly converted by underwriters into insurance 
policies to be sold at a standard price, while others came under further scrutiny by medical 
directors, for possible underwriting at a more expensive, substandard price (McAlister 1950). 
Cards from excluded applicants went to a central insurance registry that had been in operation 
since 1902, the Medical Information Bureau, which served as a repository for health information 
gathered across the insurance industry (the Bureau still exists today and its website claims 
membership by over 430 insurance companies across America). Because information from the 
Medical Information Bureau was a permanent record, it became increasingly useful in the 
processing of new insurance applications. For consumers, once turned down for life insurance, it 
became difficult to qualify with competing firms. 
 
By the 1950’s, medical directors were expected to expand their role well past the adjudication of 
individual applications (Parker 1958). They were expected to “think as businessmen”, to not only 
protect corporate finances by keeping the riskiest applicants off the books but also to help 
expand insurance sales into the boundary zones of substandard policies (Warner 1966, Singer 
2011c). While clinical doctors understood innovation in terms of patient care, life insurance 
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medical directors read innovation as it might impact the bottom line. Health, if maintained, 
translated into a stream of monthly revenue while sickness and death, if insured, could either halt 
or reverse the flow of capital (Figure 4.2). Riskier customers would pay more for their policies, 
so the issue was defining acceptable corporate risk, and thereby discovering emerging markets in 
old categories of exclusion. By the mid 20th century, technologies ranging from anti-tubercular 
medications to implantable heart valves and anti-hypertensives were meaningfully prolonging 
life. People diagnosed with tuberculosis could, after treatment, qualify for standard insurance 
rates (Singer 2011a). Following surgical developments, those with valvular heart disease could at 
least be insured for an added premium, where they had in the past been uniformly denied (Singer 
2011c).  Applicants with very high blood pressure, if compliant with medication, could be 
underwritten.  
 
Mental health issues created a special problem for medical directors, as it raised concerns about 
suicide risk. Suicide was, in a sense, the ultimate form of ‘anti-selection’, a term applied to 
information kept secret by insurance applicants in order to qualify for a lower premium.  Figure 
4.2 shows that suicide was the fourth highest cause of life insurance payouts for the Metropolitan 
Life Insurance Company between 1952 and 1962, when it accounted for over 10 million dollars 
in payouts (Dewey 1963).  
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Figure 4.2: Table showing the amount paid out by Metropolitan Life for leading causes of death 
in selected years between 1952 and 1962 (Dewey 1963).  
 
 
The historian Johnathan Levy has used the term ‘actuarial communities’, to refer to customers 
who had nothing in common other than a set of characteristics that made their risks of premature 
death similar in a statistical model. The process of developing statistical communities often 
began with medical directors, in the continuous monitoring and screening of biomedical research 
(Levy 2012). Medical directors identified promising new categories that would be statistically 
modeled by actuaries, discussed by senior underwriters and executives and finally (if successful) 
entered into a process of experimental underwriting in which they would be test-marketed 
(Chambers 1981, Stephens 2002, Bouk 2015). Health categories passing through this process 
included forms of cardiovascular disease, endocrine disturbances including diabetes, kidney 
diseases and multiple forms of cancer. In part a result of experimental underwriting, life 
insurance was increasingly marketed to the public as personalized, tailored to the needs of the 
individual consumer (O'Malley 2000). As we will see later, for a time in the 1960’s, medical 
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directors weighed the possibility of making statistical communities based on psychiatric 
diagnoses.  
 
For applicants with physical ailments, standardized bodily measurements and diagnostic 
categories proved central to the pricing of life insurance. Inexpensive diagnostic screening could 
identify applicants at greater than average risk for death due to conditions like heart attacks, 
strokes and kidney disease. Applicants with a history of mental health problems on the other 
hand, proved more difficult to evaluate as the risk of premature death due to suicide evaded 
detection using the mass-screening methods that had been so effective in picking up physical 
problems (Denker 1953, 1956, Braceland 1958, Denker 1959, Johnson 1960, Bell 1962, Dewey 
1963, Johnson 1967, Houck 1981, Hector 1987).  
 
 
4.3   Richard Singer and the discipline of insurance medicine 
 
 
ALIMDA’s identity as an observational community came together around two main problems; 
the need to recalibrate insurance categories with emerging medical science, and the need to 
protect their companies from the riskiest applicants (Singer 2003, Singer 2010, MacKenzie 
2016). Both problems entangled big data with questions of human motivation. Unless proven 
otherwise, medical directors assumed that humans, especially when the exchange of money was 
involved, tended to conceal information. Not surprisingly, ALIMDA needed methods for reading 
human motivation into large numbers, and the person most consistently identified with 
developing and teaching these methods was Richard Singer (1939-2010), a medical director and 
corporate researcher based at the New England Life Insurance Company. 
Active in ALIMDA (and its successor, the American Association of Insurance Medicine) 
between 1952 and his death in 2010, Singer’s career can stand for the roughly 300 active 
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ALIMDA members representing North America’s largest insurance companies between 1950 
and 1990. Singer identified strongly with his corporate role, and with the actuaries he 
collaborated with, fashioning himself as an expert in mortality statistics. Because of his 
enthusiasm for statistics, which he learned largely on the job, Singer found acceptance by the 
actuarial community, which generally perceived medical directors as professional rivals 
(MacKenzie 2016). His statistics course was a regular part of ALIMDA’s professional training 
program. Figure 4.3 depicts Singer at his desk, where he appears to be editing a manuscript while 
surrounded by computer print-outs and files. Nothing visible in this photo identifies him with his 
earlier career as a practicing physician.  Singer’s articles on health, sickness and technology 
appeared across a wide swath of insurance journals in the late 20th century, including The 
Proceedings of the Association of Life Insurance Medical Directors of America, On the Risk (an 
underwriting publication), The Home Office Proceedings, the Journal of Insurance Medicine and 
the North American Actuarial Journal. He was interested in the relationship between psychiatric 
institutionalization and an elevated risk of death, but he held deep concerns about the limitations 
of psychiatric diagnoses as research categories (Singer 2001, Brown 2004).
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Figure 4.3: Richard singer at his office at the New England Mutual Life Insurance Company in 
the late 1960s. 
 
 
By all accounts, Richard Singer was a team player, the kind of person who found himself 
directing committees with the term ‘liaison’, ‘joint’ and ‘collaborative’ in their titles. Coming 
from a professional family, he had aspirations for a research career in biochemistry but like many 
of his peers, the Second World War changed his life trajectory. It was through a military 
connection that he landed a job at New England Mutual Life, where he found an environment 
accepting of his desire to create a hybrid career, part researcher, part medical director. At New 
England Mutual, Singer immersed himself in developing methods to view all forms of medical 
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statistics from corporate, university and government science through the lens of mortality 
statistics. Numbers for Singer could never be detached from their makers (Singer 1969). 
Corporate, university, and government science each expressed hidden motivations, which he felt 
could be profitably teased out, and his techniques for doing so were adopted across the insurance 
industry (Roudebush and Klein 2002, Singer 2011d). This was a world that looked to transmute 
big data into big profits. Singer left us no indication that he regretted his switch from clinical 
medicine to what he described as a ‘life of a number cruncher’, though he kept one clipping, an 
anonymous 1892 JAMA article called “The Life Insurance Sponge” without offering any 
commentary (his papers usually contained hand written notes explaining their relevance). For 
someone so meticulous about editing and preserving traces of his career, he left us wondering 
why this was important enough to preserve. Was it perhaps a cryptic warning to experts, from a 
man who had seen his corporate role all but replaced by efficient algorithms?  
 
A Life Insurance Company is a sponge. It belongs to the family of octopodo 
millipoda. It has a head-centre; grasping arms, which extend to immense 
distances; agents as suckers; and medicine men as tentacles or feelers. Through 
its agents it sucks into its colonial meshes such an enormous surplus of 
nutriment that it permits its chief sucker to retain fifty percent of the premium 
blood drawn from the veins of each newly captured victim (Singer 2011b). 
 
 
Quantifying: Filtering and calculating 
 
 
The metaphorical sponge referred to in Singer’s century-old JAMA clipping gathered all kinds of 
medical data, but medical directors had to learn how to identify and filter out the choicest 
nutrients. Not all medical data was of equal value to medical directors. Running through Singer’s 
papers is an admiration for the power of large numbers to instill confidence where isolated 
events created anxiety. Confidence in the insurance business was rarely if ever achieved by 
examining a single data set. Nor did it simply map onto the evidence hierarchy that was evolving 
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from reforms in clinical medicine (Marks 1997, Shadish, Cook et al. 2002, Timmermans 2003, 
Solomon 2015). ALIMDA directors were well versed in statistical confidence, as the term was 
used in medical publications; confidence referred to the likelihood (expressed as a confidence 
interval) that for a given study population, a measurement would fall between a certain range. 
But each confidence interval needed further interpretation. As he put it, … “clinical trials share 
many of the problems of other follow-up studies, and some students of mortality studies believe 
that a good observational study, of the historical prospective type, may provide information as 
useful and as statistically conclusive as that derived from a clinical trial” (RSP Box 2). All data 
had to be interpreted in context. 
 
Medical directors commonly used large-scale collaborations to create reference groups like the 
“Inter-company Ultimate Table” (the term appears for example in column 8 of figure 4.5 below). 
Each disease category became an occasion for large-scale collaboration, engaging multiple 
sources and coordinating multiple experts (Avery 1992). In 1965 for example, 40 ALIMDA 
member companies contracted Henry Baskt, the associate dean of Boston University School of 
Medicine at the impressive cost of $50,000 (approximately $400,000 in inflation-adjusted 
dollars) to develop a monograph on “Comparative Mortality and Survival by Medical 
Impairment”. The project, which also involved four medical directors and three prominent 
actuaries, used Singer’s methods to interpret data from all available sources, including insurance 
company databases, research articles in medical journals, government-sponsored epidemiological 
surveys as well as public, private and VA hospital data across dozens of health categories. A 
previous collaborative study, the 1959 Build and Blood Pressure Study, was based on inter-
company mortality data, which was then repeated in two separate studies, the 1979 “Build 
Study” and the 1979 “Blood Pressure” Study. Other collaborations conducted by ALIMDA in 
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the late 20th century included the “Atrial Fibrillation Study”, the “1983 Medical Impairment 
Study”, and finally “Medical Risks: Trends in Mortality by Age and Time”, which was published 
after the organization transitioned into the Academy of Insurance Medicine (Avery 1992).  
 
Through the 1960’s Singer’s reputation as a number cruncher won him a regular spot in 
ALIMDA’s statistical training program, which he taught for two decades. Figure 4.4 is adapted 
from a 1968 iteration of his ALIMDA lecture series on mortality data (RSP, Box 2). Juxtaposing 
the language of medical epidemiology with business logic, Singer used the term “relevance” as 
an umbrella concept referring to potential market size, the statistical stability of new categories 
across multiple markets, and the ability of new information to change current insurance 
practices. For Singer, only studies of a certain size could generate enough confidence to shape 
life-insurance practices, and size referred not only to the total number of people studied but to 
the total number of deaths observed in the study. “A clinical series of 2000 hypertension patients 
with over 100 deaths would add little unless the report included special aspects not found in 
existing Blood Pressure Studies, such as malignant hypertension, now a relatively rare disease. 
For any rare disease, with no known previous study, a series with fewer than 50 patients and only 
0-5 deaths might be of value” (RSP Box 2). In the field of psychiatry, most interventional studies 
could not even come close to qualifying for his definition of a ‘small study’, which required at 
least 25 observed deaths, a bare minimum before data could be considered powerful enough to 
change business practices. It is evident here that Singer was aiming at mass-marketed policies. 
 134 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Summary of Singer’s Selection Methods as he summarized them in a 1968 statistics 
lecture for ALIMDA members.  
 
Insurance company medical directors were, for Singer, purveyors of data, constantly revising 
risk categories to take into consideration changing technologies, which would be woven into new 
insurance products. This was the new field of “experimental underwriting”, where companies 
would launch new categories in test-markets then quickly cut their losses when initial forays 
turned against them. In a sense, one can look at experimental underwriting as one step along the 
way to the formation of “actuarial communities”, virtual groups of people formed by 
statisticians, holding in common little aside from a statistical category (Levy 2012). Singer saw 
medical directors as prospectors in search of the raw materials for experimental underwriting; 
 
 
1) Condition of interest  
a) Relevance to work of medical directors 
b) Prevalent or significant condition or new information 
c) Clarifies vague risks or differentiates classes of severity 
d) Contributes to knowledge about prognosis or outcome (treated or untreated, extends or 
refines risk knowledge) 
2) Utility of findings to risk classification 
a) Provides data on likelihood of condition leading to outcome per unit time 
b) Generalizable or not to insured populations 
c) Replicability of selection criteria to applicants 
d) Definitive or not in terms of results (ie. preliminary/interesting to conclusive/compelling) 
e) Quantifies a risk in terms of mortality rate, expected death rate 
3) Potential Value 
a) Highest if no current mortality data published, even a small study (ex. 25 deaths) is useful. 
b) If current mortality sources exist, look for at least 25-100 deaths in new data to change 
current opinion 
c) If current sources are abundant, require large data for new studies to be valuable (ex. 
mortality experience of over 1000 reported) 
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new insurance categories, especially in the field of substandard business. To profit from sub-
standard business, insurance companies would offer high-risk applicants a degree of certainty – 
cash payouts to heirs in exchange for much higher premiums, often triple the standard policy 
price.  
 
Medical directors discussed new risk categories of interest in consensus meetings for their 
relevance to experimental underwriting. The ideal was to discover a condition whose mortality 
was declining, before the industry as a whole caught on and lowered insurance rates. Novelty 
was important, but to become an object of further corporate research, data-sets had to be large 
enough to inform experimental underwriting, not merely ‘preliminary’ or ‘interesting’. Examples 
of the most statistically stable categories in the late 1960’s for which mortality data was available 
by the thousands included extreme obesity and hypertension. Mortality data was unsuitable if it 
came from retrospective reviews of medical files (a common source of medical data in the 
1950’s and 60’s) or, in prospectively conducted research, if more than 20% of research subjects 
had dropped out of a study over a minimum follow-up period of 5 years.  Singer’s approach to 
combining corporate data with published medical research was surprisingly straightforward but 
as it turned out decades later, durable to statistical re-analysis by actuaries using more 
sophisticated methods (Roudebush and Klein 2002).  
 
Singer modeled any health risk he could reliably measure. Even heavy drinking, once an 
automatic cause for exclusion, could be priced into the cost of life insurance. Because liver 
enzymes were routinely measured in insurance physical exams, by the late 1960’s it was possible 
to refine a risk threshold for ‘heavy drinking’ to 6 drinks per day, provided the applicant’s liver 
was not showing signs of damage (Singer 2011d). I will return to the question of heavy drinkers, 
as they bear some similarities to ALIMDA’s approach to psychiatric drug users. Even though 
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insurance applications would ask about alcohol intake, it was an applicant’s liver enzymes that 
were trusted. No such lab test however could be trusted to uncover the intentions of people who 
took psychiatric drugs, and the riskiest of hidden intentions for insurance companies, was 
suicide.  
 
Feeling confident with insurance decisions    
 
Life insurance policies are contracts representing an exchange of knowledge between a buyer 
and a seller at a particular point in time. In idealized market exchanges, parties come to an 
agreed price based on full disclosure of all available information (Akerlof 1970, Chiappori and 
Salanie 2000, Cardon and Hendel 2001). Insurance medical directors used the term ‘anti-
selection’ to refer to groups who, sensing they were at a higher than average risk of death, felt 
more motivated than the average person to apply for insurance. The effects of anti-selection took 
into account people who consciously or unconsciously withheld information, and Singer looked 
for its fingerprints in large numbers, which are shown in Figure 4.5, taken from a 1968  
ALIMDA lecture. His message is cautionary; people are more likely to buy life insurance when 
they sense their own mortality or when they fear that an insurance exam would lead to being 
declined, and these intuitions of mortality often turn out to be correct. Not shown in this table is 
Singer’s special category for “jumbo policies”, discussed later, for which he felt large numbers 
provided limited guidance.   
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Figure 4.5: Table used by Singer to illustrate the effects of anti-selection on mortality rates at a 
1968 ALIMDA lecture. It illustrates the privileged vantage point occupied by insurance 
companies, who could combine freely available government statistics, with proprietary data.  
 
Figure 4.5 looks at death rates in the first two years following the purchase of life insurance and 
compares it to two standards, the general US population of White males (the far right column) 
and the ‘intercompany male rates’ (the second column from the right) (Singer 1973). White 
males are described here as a “suitable comparison to men working at factories across the United 
States”, while the intercompany male rates are seen to reflect the effects of “higher average 
socioeconomic status”, since buyers of insurance were assumed to have a certain minimum level 
of financial stability, which was in itself a predictor of longevity. That insurance companies by 
the mid 20th century exploited personal credit ratings when pricing insurance policies has been 
described by the historian Dan Bouk (Bouk 2015). The second last column in figure 4.5 refers to 
the “ultimate mortality ratio”, which compared mortality rates among all U.S. white males 
(uninsured and insured combined, from government statistics) with pooled data from ALIMDA-
participating insurance companies. The column shows that un-insured white males over the age 
of 15 were much more likely to die from any cause in any given 2-year span (almost 3 times as 
likely for men over 60) than insured white males of the same age. This number actually 
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underestimates the survival advantage of insured white males, because the denominator of the 
mortality ratio contains both insured and un-insured men.  The reasons for improved survival 
among insured men reflects some combination of company screening policies and the self-
selection effects related to having enough money to afford life insurance. The third column, 
‘automatic issues’, represents policies issued automatically at the time an employee is hired. Not 
surprisingly, mortality is slightly higher among ‘automatic issues’ than among the screened and 
examined applicants. Mortality rates rise as we move right along the table to the ‘Group 
conversion’ cases, which shows a massive rise in mortality ratios to 5-10 times the average white 
male rates – from men who were allowed to switch from their group insurance policies to private 
policies without proof of health (a sales option discontinued by insurance companies after the 
1970’s). Singer used the latter as a ‘notorious’ example of anti-selection because it allowed 
people the option to convert from a group policy to an individual policy without any proof of 
health. The column signifying mortality linked to ‘Pension SD’ contracts on the other hand was a 
variant of the conversion policy. An example would be someone who had already survived a 
heart attack, then converted from a group policy to a private policy, albeit at a higher premium. 
Singer took pride in his work with this population at New England Life, where his mortality 
estimates proved stable enough to profitably underwrite such risky applicants. In the far-left 
column, Singer took the opportunity to promote to a national audience his screening methods, 
showing that mortality rates at his company between 1955 and 1964 were considerably lower 
than the average American insurance company. So high mortality risk, as long as it was well 
characterized, was not automatically a high financial risk to insurance companies.  Rather it was 
undetected risk (for example from people concealing a mortality risk) that posed a threat.  
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For an industry with national sales ambitions, converting numbers into profits meant 
understanding America as a tapestry of local markets and consumer motivations. While it had 
been possible to address the problem of anti-selection through bodily measurements since the 
early 20th century, a consumer tendency to conceal information about deep-seated emotional 
suffering exposed a blind spot in the insurance surveillance network. For physical medicine, data 
prospecting and experimental underwriting proved effective. Mental medicine however was 
another story; nowhere in the ALIMDA proceedings does a single psychiatric category enter the 
field of experimental underwriting (MacKenzie 2016). This raises a question. How did ALIMDA 
medical directors organize their thinking around the field of mental health and how did they 
approach a growing market of potential customers who used psychiatric drugs?  
 
 
4.4    Uncovering suicide risk in life insurance applications 
 
 
ALIMDA’s medical directors had to balance a healthy respect for the correlation between 
psychiatric labels and suicide, with a corporate mandate to expand into substandard insurance 
markets (MacKenzie 2016).  ALIMDA’s records show that medical directors for a decade and a 
half starting in the 50’s used two contrasting approaches in their estimation of suicide risk. Both 
approaches appear in the association’s proceedings side by side until the early 1970’s, when the 
insurance industry arrived at a stable template for thinking about applicants with mental health 
issues. One method prioritized the role of expert diagnosis in uncovering risky applicants. 
Enthusiastically promoted by paid consultants to the insurance industry, this approach was based 
on mental health experts making skilled diagnoses and thus uncovering applicants with 
“psychoneurosis”, “psychopathic personalities” and “psychosis”. Experts claimed they could 
save companies money, by using careful diagnosis to sort risk groups, thus minimizing payouts 
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due to premature death by suicide. A competing approach, antithetical to expert consultants, 
bypassed entirely the principle of diagnosis. The burgeoning field of “automated under-writing”, 
leveraged an army of low-cost paramedical workers using standardized telephone interviews to 
gather personal health information. This was, in turn, combined with general risk information 
linked to categories like income, postal codes, race, sex, employment history, as well as 
applicant-specific data from the Medical Information Bureau, to arrive at a price for insurance.  
 
Experts, Diagnoses, and the estimation of suicide risk: 
 
Shortly after the DSM categorization system came into being in 1952, ALMIDA invited the 
Cornell psychiatrist and researcher Peter Denker to talk about how psychiatry’s diagnostic 
reform could help predict which applicants were more likely to commit suicide  (Denker 1953). 
Denker was a trusted insurance company consultant and speaker at ALIMDA meetings, having 
analyzed data from the Equitable Life Insurance company in the 1940’s. While he was expected 
to talk on how diagnostic reform would make it possible for insurers to safely expand into a 
growing insurance market of North Americans who used psychiatric services ranging from 
psychoanalysis and valium to electroshock, lobotomy and lithium, Denker proposed that the 
DSM was too cumbersome to be of practical use by medical directors. Rather, he offered an 
alternative scheme based on his study of 1000 consecutive death claims made to the Equitable 
Life Insurance company. To be clear, he did not present a statistical comparison of his 
nosology’s predictive powers against the DSM. Rather, he emphasized his personal experience 
applying terms like “psychosis”, “pscyhoneurosis” and “psychopathic personalities” to insurance 
company data. In effect, Denker was offering ALIMDA a custom-made psychiatric nosology 
based on his personal expertise. His study, a retrospective analysis of company data, traced all 
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paid death benefits from the initial application forms used to apply for life insurance, to 
coroner’s reports, which included information not available to medical directors at the time of 
initial application.  
 
Denker argued that his approach to screening applications could have reduced payouts due to 
suicide by 30%. His main point was that people who should have been classified as “psychotic” 
(an automatic exclusion criterion across companies), had been mis-classified as 
“psychoneurotic”. As he put it, “hidden psychotics” had not been detected. Clinical psychiatrists 
associated the designation of “psychotic” with a high suicide risk, and Denker’s category 
included people diagnosed with “schizophrenia, manic depressive and involutional melancholia, 
senile and arteriosclerotic disease, toxic or infections reactions or trauma”. Psychiatrists 
associated relatively low suicide rates (though still slightly higher than rates among people 
without any psychiatric designation) with “psychoneurosis”, which included “anxiety reactions”, 
“neurasthenia”, “hysteria” and “obsessive compulsive neurosis” (Denker 1953). Denker backed 
up his prognostic distinction between psychosis and neurosis (and the tendency for inexperienced 
examiners to confuse them) with further data from the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 
arguing that careful examination of applicants by experienced physicians to rule out psychotic 
conditions would improve risk detection. That is, psychiatric diagnosis was useful but only in the 
hands of experts. “…Many cases of psychosis were erroneously included in this series, since 
suicide is of frequent occurrence in depressions, which may often simulate nervous prostration to 
the inexperienced eye, and conversely is rare in cases of psychoneurosis”. He does not tell us 
how the experienced eye can tell the difference. To further bolster the case for psychiatric 
experts in the processing of not only life insurance applications but also disability insurance, he 
warned that precise classification was key to profits. For example while insurance companies 
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“need not fear issuing standard life insurance to psychoneurotics, … they are unquestionably 
poor disability risks”. Here Denker introduced an inexpensive way of handling suicide risk that 
would later be picked up by researchers within the industry – an exclusion period. His 1953 
presentation showed that the vast majority of suicides, even among people he believed had been 
misclassified (ie. those he believed to be “true psychotics”), occurred within the first 5 years of 
issuing life insurance. After describing his analysis of mortality in 29,000 substandard policies, 
he confirmed that … “the greatest mortality [from suicide] occurred in substandard issues within 
the first five years.” If a medical director was uncomfortable with a specific diagnosis, better to 
play it safe and sell the policy with an exclusionary period built in. Borderline risks, for example 
those whose life problems were perceived as transient or mild, were often issued policies after 
further information gathering and processing by the medical director’s office. The question of 
psychiatric diagnosis came down to expert judgement, but the time and costs this entailed were 
considerable.  Exclusionary periods were a well-established approach to selling life insurance in 
people with physical ailments by the 1950’s, especially for cancer, where up to 10 years of 
recovery could be required before underwriting (Singer Box 2 on gastric cancer). Still, 
psychiatric underwriting was somewhat different because in the case of physical ailments like 
cancer, exclusion literally meant that no policy would be issued until a consumer had survived 
illness-free for a decade while in the case of suicide risk, policies would be issued immediately 
(and insurance companies could start collecting fees immediately), with suicide the only 
excluded cause of death.  
 
But exclusion periods were of secondary concern to Denker. His presentation can be understood 
as a promotion of expert consultants, as the possessors of unique skills needed to root out 
“hidden psychotics” and “hidden psychoneurotics”. Applicants with mental health issues were 
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tricky, and even people designated with “obsessive neurosis”, a tendency toward perfectionism, 
could be “hidden schizophrenics”. This logic of experts using their skills to unmasking concealed 
illness appears throughout psychiatric case reports in the 1950’s and 60’s (as the historian 
Andrew Scull has put it more critically, as part of a broad tendency within psychiatry toward 
post hoc ergo propter hoc reasoning) (Scull 2015).  
 
Understanding the effects of interventions was as important as diagnostic categories in screening 
risky applications. Writing before maintenance drugs were widely used, Denker encouraged 
medical directors to inquire about any history of shock therapy, which he saw as another reason 
for caution: shock therapy could mask manic depression, and thus mask a high-risk applicant. 
Even considering a lobotomy, a procedure once considered promising for people with 
psychoneurosis, was reason to deem an applicant un-insurable. The risk was not suicide, but 
rather death from complications of the procedure.  
 
As a paid consultant to the insurance industry, Denker was among the experts who stood to gain 
from the intensive investigation of insurance applications. Psychopathic personalities, which 
included “drug addicts, sexual perversions and alcoholics” were special cases for which he 
recommended “examination by a competent psychiatrist” because “your examiners are too often 
not now as well acquainted with the applicant as may have been the case years ago when family 
practitioners were more frequent in most communities”. Figure 4.6 summarizes some practical 
pointers for uncovering applicants with hidden cases of psychosis or psychopathic personality. 
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Figure 4.6: Suggestions for life insurance medical directors on how to uncover “the hidden 
psychotic” and “the hidden psychopathic personality” in processing life insurance applications 
(Denker 1953). 
  
The question of how to detect applicants with hidden “psychopathic personalities”, especially 
alcoholics, was answered in detail by Milton Clifford, a part-time medical director at the Union 
Central Life Insurance Company in Cincinnati and professor of medicine at the University of 
Cincinnati. Departing from Singer’s view of medical directors as number crunchers working at a 
distance from insurance applicants, Clifford saw medical directors as having a hands-on 
investigative role that went beyond even the traditional bounds of information gathering in 
medical practice. He believed that directors should “go the extra mile”, looking beyond the 
hidden alcoholic of today to discover the alcoholic of tomorrow.   
 
Final selection of borderline-insurance risks, when alcoholism is a possible hazard, 
and final selection of new employees, or of promotable executives, or of continuance 
of valuable employees, whenever present or future alcoholism may be a suspicioned 
factor, must be a selection judgment dependent on the width of professional 
1) Caution with vague or frequent illness, prolonged absence from work, if a trip was required 
for so-called ‘fatigue’ or ‘exhaustion’. In all such cases, obtain more information as to the 
actual symptoms sustained by the patient, the type of therapy (especially shock therapy) and 
hospital or sanitarium care.
2) Get family history from family doctors. Genetic factors are being increasingly stressed, 
especially with manic depression. 
3) Estimate the applicant’s ‘total personality’, job record, marriage and social life, military 
record, draft board rejection and reactions to adversity. If necessary, interview neighbors and 
fellow employees. 
4) Place more weight on personality data in your inspection reports. Has he been rejected by 
the Draft Board or discharged from the military for nervous illness? What do his neighbors 
think of him? Has he been stable in his job record?  
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experience of a physician and must be, therefore, the final decision of a medical 
director and not of his competent and helpful non-medical delegates (Clifford 1960). 
 
To find the future alcoholic, a full investigation involved getting information from those who 
saw him with his guard down. Each source of information had only one piece of the puzzle but 
together the truth would come out as Figure 4.7 shows (apartment janitors and priests were 
preferred informants) (Clifford 1960). The vague category ‘heritage’ (translated as race and 
creed) also played a role in Clifford’s knowledge-making process.  
 
[The] rarity of alcoholism among Orthodox Jews and in the pure civilizations of 
Arabs and Chinese. Frequency in Irish has been emphasized (eg. The proportion of 
Irish heritage among the alcoholics in Greater Boston is markedly higher than the 
proportion of Irish heritage in the whole population) (Clifford 1960). 
 
 
Clifford’s approach signifies the persistence of both expert judgement and case-report logic (as 
opposed to statistical logic) in life insurance underwriting in the early 1960’s.  
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Figure 4.7: Methods for detecting hidden alcoholics (Clifford 1960). Far from standardized 
criteria, this pragmatic logic offers a glimpse into the range of options available to medical 
directors to triangulate risk on an individual level.  
 
 
Alcohol and Psychiatric Drug Use grouped as Consumer Choices 
 
ALIMDA medical directors were not strictly committed to any single method for adjudicating 
applications, and just as they had the option of expensive investigative methods for uncovering 
hidden alcoholics, hidden psychotics and hidden psychopathic personalities, they could weave in 
new ways of perceiving risk. In the 1950’s and 60’s, enzymologists were invited to lecture on the 
use of new lab tests to uncover the liver damage caused by alcohol mis-use while psychiatrists 
specializing in drug therapy were brought in to talk about a logic of using psychiatric drugs to 
uncover the specific causes of mental illness through the process of pharmacological dissection 
Sources of Information about Habits:
1. Spouse (usually prejudiced)
2. Other relative or in-law, especially if same residence (possible distortion plus 
prejudice)
3. Neighbor (variable)
4. Family doctor (ideal source but claims us to be spies)
5. Fellow Worker (usually prejudiced or obstructing)
6. Domestic household servant
Valet (usually prejudiced)
Cook (questionable reliability and prejudice but can be excellent source)
Chauffeur (often prejudiced)
Cleaning lady (questionable prejudice or reliability, save concerning hidden 
bottles)
Yardman or handyman (questionable reliability)
1. *** Janitor (Apartment Superintendent) can be excellent source both of conduct 
and trash
2. Trash collector (number of bottles disposed of in trash exceed number expected)
3. Local liquor store – may represent only part of total weekly liquor bill. 
4. Social Club Servants (golf, college, city clubs)
5. Business secretary (rarely if ever unprejudiced)
6. *** Religious Contacts – priest, minister, deacon or parish secretary on parochial 
level. Can be most important course, especially in close knit parishes where any 
change of church going habits is important, such as wandering away from church 
ties due to inner embarrassment may be early clue. Most ministers welcome any 
legitimate investigation as a means to get at therapy in early phases of alcoholism 
and will prove highly cooperative to the identified investigator.
7. Police Records   When police records are positive, such findings must be 
interpreted intelligently and encourage further investigation and not blind 
condemnation.  
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(Wroblewski 1961)16. Thus, two themes around mind-altering substances dovetailed at 
ALMINDA meetings. The use of addictive substances like alcohol needed to be detected because 
of the health risk posed by the substance itself. Psychiatric drugs, on the other hand, were useful 
as signifiers of hidden risk 17 (Stapp 1958). Still, conflicting messages abounded. Dangerous 
thresholds for alcohol use could be objectively measured, psychiatric drugs signified risk, but 
there were also arguments that for some, the moderate use of alcohol, and the use of psychiatric 
drugs, might reduce the risk of suicide.  
 
Psychiatric drug therapy, especially when used as a long-term intervention, was part of a shift 
toward thinking about the body as hybridized with technology, but on the whole, ALIMDA’s 
enthusiasm for the effects of psychiatric drugs was muted. If anything, medical directors were 
more comfortable with the theme of “unmasking” hidden conditions; psychiatric drugs were 
easier to understand as masks rather than as prostheses. The theme of applicants using drugs of 
various kinds to deceive medical directors recurs in the ALIMDA proceedings of the 1950’s and 
60’s. Several insurance companies even screened the urine of applicants for anti-hypertensives, 
fearing a “hidden hypertensive”. (Hypertensives, if successfully treated, could qualify for a more 
expensive form of insurance, but they could not get the same rate offered to “true” non-
                                                        
16 David Healy has described pharmacological dissection in the 1960’s as a practice among 
psychiatrists by which the specific biochemical causes of mental illness were inferred by a 
patients’ clinical response to medications (Healy 1997).   
17 Medical directors read medicine across the grain, as we would expect given their priorities as 
businessmen. The case of psychiatric drugs is an example of how the interests of medical 
directors could be at cross-purposes with the interests of the consultants they invited to keep 
them abreast of cutting edge research. Conflicting messages on the future of technology in 
mental medicine came from many quarters, including a futuristic lecture by Colonel John Staff, 
the chief of Air Research and Development Command at the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, 
whose talk, Rocket Age Man , could have come out of a book on cybernetics. Staff does not 
appear to have been invited back. 
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hypertensives). In 1967, ALIMDA members proposed screening applicants’ blood for 
psychiatric drugs, but the proposal does not seem to have gained traction (Donauer 1967).  
 
Putting aside the enthusiastic views of invited experts, ALIMDA medical directors viewed any 
mind-altering substance, regulated or not, as a red flag for maladaptation; people who used 
maintenance drugs had something to hide. This put medical directors at odds with the emerging 
sub-field of biological psychiatry, in which, it was believed, psychiatric drugs would soon open a 
new world in which mental health could be achieved and maintained pharmacologically. The 
increasing use of psychiatric drugs among North Americans was, for medical directors, going to 
make mental illness more difficult to detect by literally changing the ‘look’, the signs and 
symptoms of mental illness; psychiatric categories could not be trusted in light of rapidly 
evolving technologies by which people were using drugs to change their minds (Johnson 1960).  
 
In 1969, the psychopharmacologist Heinz Lehman, whom we have met in chapter 3, laid out a 
framework for thinking about psychiatric drugs as tools of long-term self-maintenance. Lehman 
made it clear that psychiatric drugs were not curative, and like anti-hypertensives and anti-
diabetic drugs, symptoms, sometimes disabling, could return even with full compliance. 
Lehman’s guidance for insurance medical directors was to be cautious about psychiatric disease 
categories and the idealized concept of a ‘natural illness course’ in an era of high drug use. For 
example, the category ‘manic depression’ would be more usefully understood as ‘manic 
depression plus lithium’ (Lehmann 1969). Lehman saw an emerging society in which people 
adapted to a rapidly changing environment through pharmaceuticals ranging from anti-
depressants, lithium and anti-psychotics to minor tranquilizers, LSD, mescaline, cannabis, 
opiates and stimulants. He cautioned medical directors to be on the lookout for addiction to both 
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prescription and non-prescription drugs as mass-produced pharmaceuticals made their way out of 
mental hospitals and into the population at large. 
 
 … we know that about 3% of alcohol consumers become alcoholics, and it is 
pharmacologically reasonable and conservative to assume, that a similar proportion 
of people who take minor tranquilizers or stimulants will become dependent on them 
(Lehmann 1969).  
 
Lehman was non-committal on the effect of maintenance drugs on suicide. For those who 
received maintenance medications following discharge from the mental hospital, the most he 
could say was that “the death rate had not increased in response to massive drug therapy”. That 
of course was not saying much, given the well-known rates of suicide among the most seriously 
mentally ill, which were consistently in the range of 15% over thirty years. ALIMDA’s 
discussions on psychiatric drugs were clouded with a scepticism about the cash value of 
medication compliance, and the idea that successful responders to psychiatric drugs might be 
formally studied as an actuarial category does not appear in the association’s proceedings. This 
again points to the perception among ALIMDA members that mental illness and its various 
remedies needed a special form of risk management not covered by Richard Singer’s 
epidemiological methods.  
 
Psychiatrists, despite promises to standardize their language in the 1950’s and 60’s, tended to 
think in terms of individual cases, and as experts like Denker made clear, even the most severe 
psychiatric cases grouped under the term psychosis could be difficult to detect without special 
training. The involvement of psychiatric consultants increased the complexity and expense 
associated with processing life insurance applications and the push toward costly investigations 
was not only coming from consultants, but also from within the insurance industry, where 
medical directors like Milton Clifford would have deployed special investigators on a mission to 
 150 
keep future alcoholics off company ledgers. As the historian Dan Bouk puts it, … “making risks 
and numbering days became ends in themselves within their corporate homes”, and to this, one 
could add that the discovering of hidden truths had become another corporate activity with a 
costly and potentially inefficient life of its own. Not all medical directors understood their 
mandate to think as businessmen.  
 
Adding to the complexity of ferreting out mental health risks in the 1950s was the generous 
concept of “stress”, which seemed not only connected to mental health and suicide but to 
physical health and death from conditions ranging from heart attacks to bleeding gastric ulcers. 
Denker for example thought each customer’s life stress needed to be assessed on an individual 
basis even if some general trends could be seen. Women, he thought, had a tendency to resonate 
negatively with dysfunctional relationships, while men got stressed-out over economic adversity. 
The possibility that people under high stress died at a faster rate than people under lower stress 
extended the utility of psychiatric diagnosis beyond suicide to cardiovascular risks, accident-
proneness and substance use, all of which could lead to re-categorization of applicants as ‘sub-
standard’ to compensate for their increased mortality risk (Wheatley 1950).  As the editor in 
chief of the American Journal of Psychiatry put it in his 1958 ALIMDA lecture on the 
psychiatrist Adolph Meyer, “Man is a Psychobiological Unity. His body and his personality are 
interdependent … Unhealthy emotional attitudes are sometimes more of a threat to the organism 
than anything else…” (Braceland 1958). 
In 1954, the Montreal Physiologist and cybernetician Hans Selye brought his theory of a 
‘General Adaptation Syndrome’ to ALIMDA (Selye 1954). He argued that the stress of modern 
urban life, by stimulating cortisol secretion, was in itself a health risk. Cortisol, the body’s stress 
hormone, had become commercially available in 1949, though it had been purified and mass-
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produced by the U.S. military due to concerns that German bomber pilots and submariners were 
using the drug to optimize their battle performance (Glyn 1998). As Selye put it …  
 
… The concept of the Diseases of Adaptation [is that] the pathogenicity of many 
systemic and local stressor agents depends largely upon the function of the 
hypophysis-adreno-cortical system. The latter may either enhance or inhibit the 
body’s defense reactions against local stressors (Selye 1954). 
 
 
Using a series of diagrams, he argued that the insurance value of mental illness labels was as 
general markers for increased mortality from all causes, not just as markers for increased suicide 
risk.  Stress tied together what had earlier seemed separate; heart attacks, diabetes, depression 
and alcoholism: all could be seen as maladaptive responses to modern life.  
 
While stress hormones created a scientific way to think about mental and physical health as 
inter-related, the increasingly complex relationships between stress (seen as an external, social 
force pressing on the body) and health, it was clear to some medical directors that incorporating 
a personal assessment of stress into the sale of life insurance would eventually raise the costs of 
insurance to the point that it would become impossible to offer affordable life insurance to 
working people who purchased a majority of policies.  
 
Thinking like a businessman:  
 
Concerned about the rising costs of expert psychiatric evaluations, one medical director, Earl 
Dewey, based at the San Francisco office of Metropolitan Life argued in 1963 that instead of 
using psychiatric categories, suicide risk could be simply priced into standard policies based on 
age and sex, race and place of residence (Dewey 1963). Women’s policies (a minority of life 
insurance policies in the 60’s) could be priced lower because in general, housewives were 
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protected from “economic hardship” by their husbands, who were more likely to kill themselves 
in the line of protecting a vision of the American middle-class family.  
 
Dewey also saw a role for information on race, migration and geography in estimating suicide 
risks, as illustrated in figure 4.8. The “colored races”, he thought, seemed to be “protected” from 
the effects of suicide, at least if they stayed in the south. The reason for this finding, he 
speculated, was that “non-white males who migrate to the north apparently learn some of our 
ways of shuffling off our mortal coils”, though the same data were interpreted by 
epidemiologists not in terms of racial differences but in terms of economic and social pressures 
felt by migration. Although Dr. Dewey took the opportunity to make wild speculations about the 
effects of race on the psyche of black Americans (not necessarily representative of ALMDA’s 
views), his business argument was that expensive consultants may not be necessary to estimate 
suicide risk, provided enough epidemiological factors could be brought together on each 
application. The case example of colored men who moved from South Atlantic regions to the 
North Atlantic showed a large enough effect that migration (tracked by postal codes) could for 
example be explored as a statistical risk for suicide and thus as a potential factor in setting 
premiums.  
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Figure 4.8:  Suicide rates as a function of race and geography, North Atlantic States vs South 
Atlantic States in 1960. Lower suicide rates held in the south up until the age of 40, at which 
point the trend is reversed, and higher suicide rates are seen in the south than in the north  
(Dewey 1963). 
 
 
The John Hancock Study of Psychiatric Underwriting 
 
 
By the late 1960’s over 10% of life insurance applications were marked by a psychiatric 
diagnosis, the use of prescription psychiatric drugs or both. The combination of new psychiatric 
terminology (the DSM II was launched in 1968) and a constant stream of mass-produced 
pharmaceuticals challenged corporate budgets for expert evaluations and the result was a shift 
toward ‘automated underwriting’, in which trained office workers handled the majority of 
applications. Automated underwriting was part of a broader change in the insurance industry in 
which increasingly complex applications were handled without ever going through the medical 
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director’s office. While cost effective, the question remained; was automated underwriting as 
effective at anticipating premature deaths related to suicide as expert assessment? To answer this, 
the John Hancock Mutual company conducted an internal audit between 1968 and 1974, 
comparing the mortality experience in policies approved by underwriters versus those approved 
after expert medical evaluation. The results, which resulted in a major shift in the way insurance 
companies handled psychiatric risks, were discussed at the 1976 ALIMDA meeting (Garabedian, 
Gajewski et al. 1976).   
 
Auditors at John Hancock looked at mortality rates among 3400 policies issued between 1968 
and 1974 to people (69% men and 31% women) diagnosed with a psychiatric condition. Using a 
highly pragmatic logic, the auditors reckoned that the outcome of interest from a business 
perspective was a financial pay-out. Payouts happened when people died while holding a valid 
insurance policy, which meant that customers had to be making payments on their policies at the 
time of their death. Auditors at John Hancock wondered if customers who committed suicide 
especially men, did so because of economic hardship (ALIMDA medical directors often wrote of 
their belief that suicide among men was related to job loss or other economic losses). While 
medical directors had focused on the relationship between specific psychiatric categories and 
suicide, financial auditors were interested in the general category of death among people who 
held valid policies. Using a business logic in which death was a liability only among holders of 
valid policies, auditors looked at all-cause mortality including suicide. They then analyzed 
payouts to the heirs of valid policyholders. If, they reasoned, financial hardship not only 
triggered suicide but also led policyholders to default on their regular insurance payments before 
their deaths, it would be possible to re-think the relevance of psychiatric diagnoses to the 
corporate bottom line.  
 155 
 
Analyzing deaths occurring over 6 years, people categorized with schizophrenia and manic 
depression (generally considered by medical directors to be reasons for exclusion from life 
insurance) had a fatality rate of .5% while people with less severe forms of mental illness 
designated as ‘psychoneurosis’ had, as expected, a much lower fatality rate of .2% per year. 
Surprisingly for the auditors, those classified under ‘excessive drinking and drug use’ had the 
highest death rate at .6% per year.  
 
Figure 4.9, read from the perspective of a clinician would have been counterintuitive. How could 
people designated with psychoneurosis account for more deaths than people designated with 
excessive drinking and psychosis combined? From the perspective of financial auditors however, 
diagnosis was only a secondary concern; the vast majority of policyholders (and therefore the 
majority of risk exposure) was in the psychoneurosis group so it stood to reason that the greatest 
proportion of deaths would occur in this group. Furthermore, the study did not look at rejected 
applications for life insurance. From the vantage point of auditors, figure 4.9 merely showed that 
existing company policies for screening out people with psychosis were reasonably effective, 
and that screening for excessive drinking and drug abuse could be improved. The auditors also 
crunched the numbers to “…evaluate as many medical aspects contained in our applications as 
possible”. This included the effects of interventions such as psychotherapy, hospitalization and 
medications. Unfortunately, as they put it, there was not enough fine-grained information 
available to draw any useful conclusions. Their main outcome however was important enough to 
overshadow these limitations. The key question for the John Hancock auditors was “what 
proportion of deaths could be attributed to suicide, and of these, what proportion of polices were 
in default at the time of death”?  
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Fig 4.9 Summary of mortality causes from the John Hancock study. Existing screening 
techniques were effective for psychosis but less effective for identifying excessive drinking and 
drug abuse (Garabedian, Gajewski et al. 1976).  
 
 
Even though a high death rate was experienced among policyholders with psychiatric 
designations (10 times the general population suicide rate of 14/100,000), the company payout 
rate was the same as it was among policyholders who had no psychiatric designation. The 
reason was applicants with a psychiatric diagnosis defaulted on their premiums at double the 
company average rate (Figure 4.10). While companies could not count on the specificity of 
standardized screening forms to pick up the riskiest applicants, it was the applicants themselves 
who could be relied on to protect the company. Non-compliance with premium payments 
became an ironic form of corporate risk management by which the riskiest applicants could be 
trusted to self-eliminate without excess cost to the company. In figure 4.10, the acronym ‘PNO’ 
stands for Premium Notice Ordinary, a process by which policyholders approaching default have 
been notified by ordinary mail, the standard procedure at John Hancock for policies issued in the 
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1960’s and 70’s. Company mail rooms kept records of notifications sent by standard mail, and 
these records held up in court challenges even when it was argued that notifications were not 
received by policyholders prior to delinquency.   
 
This, coupled with the observation that suicide exclusion clauses written for a period of 3 years 
following recovery from a psychiatric condition cut 90% of suicide-related losses, argued against 
expending further resources to clarify psychiatric diagnosis (Garabedian, Gajewski et al. 1976). 
Business logic dictated that paramedical underwriters would screen the masses of insurance 
applicants for psychiatric symptoms while the value of individualized expert assessment would 
shift to highly selected cases, which primarily translated into policies over a certain dollar value 
(known as ‘jumbo policies’).  
 
 
 
Figure 4.10: Authors of the John Hancock audit used a simple bar diagram to emphasize the 
relevance of only 2 data points. People who died by suicide tended to default on their premiums 
well before their death.  
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The John Hancock psychiatric diagnosis study put into stark relief medical and business logic. In 
the hands of experts, disease categories coupled with knowledge about an individual’s treatment 
history, may have been somewhat more accurate than “automated underwriting” in weeding out 
high risk insurance applicants. But it was cost-efficiency that ruled the day in business18. While 
medical experts may have been better than algorithms at predicting death by suicide, for small 
policies, the high cost of experts could not be justified.   
 
Experts only for Jumbo Policies; Automated Underwriting for the Rest 
 
By the late 1960’s, ALIMDA had already set the stage for the John Hancock Study, and 
insurance companies were becoming more cautious about expending money on expert 
consultants. Was the expense of doctors justified? If so, when? Could similar or better returns be 
achieved by much less expensive ‘paramedical or automated methods or their combination’? 
(Blackburn 1969). Just as companies had decided on a standard medical form, (by 1970, half of 
the insurance companies operating in North America used a common medical form for insurance 
applications), medical experts were being priced out of the insurance business (Blackburn 1969). 
Figure 4.11, from the 1969 ALIMDA proceedings, shows a new way for medical directors to 
approach insurance applications. A monetary threshold would determine what method of risk 
estimation would be applied. For the 2% of applications deemed in Richard Singer’s words 
“Jumbo Policies”, clinical reason would prevail, exercised as usual by physicians on a case by 
case basis. For mental assessments, this included investigations ranging from clinical interviews, 
to the kind of work suggested by Milton Clifford in 1960 for the detection of hidden alcoholics. 
                                                        
18 The term automated underwriting can be understood as a commentary on how members of 
ALIMDA viewed paramedical staff, most of whom were women, applying standardized methods 
to displace more expensive men’s work. 
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Jumbo policies also got special treatment for physical assessments, including as figure 4.10 
alludes to an “amplified form”, which started with measurements of body circumferences, a 
resting 12-lead electrocardiogram and a test of respiration, all of which could be completed by a 
trained para-medical technician. This would be supplemented by physicians who conducted 
exercise electrocardiograms (stress tests), blood pressure re-checks, chest x-rays and “special 
questionnaires” (Blackburn 1969 p 122).  
 
 
 
Figure 4.11: A new form of classification in which the kind of logic used to assess risk would 
depended on the size of the policy applied for. Of note, only policies worth over 75,000 in 1969 
warranted a physician’s exam (Richard Singer called these “Jumbo Policies”) (Blackburn 1969).  
 
 
 
For buyers of low-value policies who had been designated with a psychiatric label, this 
arrangement cut both ways. As the John Hancock study showed, many people who may have 
 160 
been excluded by a more intense evaluation process were able to get affordable insurance (even 
if the company counted on those at highest risk to default on their policies). For those excluded 
however, appeal would have been particularly difficult. First, declined applications were 
recorded at the Medical Information Bureau, which meant that knowledge of a failed application 
was available to all insurance companies: once turned down by one company, acceptance by a 
second became less likely at any cost, but almost certainly a failed application would increase the 
cost of subsequent insurance (Singer papers, box 1 file 5). Second, the process of appeal would 
have meant moving the file up the corporate chain, a potentially costly process for buyers of 
policies too small to motivate either sales agents or medical directors to invest further company 
time. The best strategy for most consumers of low-cost insurance would have been to learn 
strategies of selective secrecy, disclosing just barely enough health information to avoid being 
disqualified later if such information came to light. Insurance companies did not fear this 
strategy and in fact as the John Hancock study showed, they were banking on it.   
 
4.5  Discussion: Thinking of Suicide as Consumer Self-Selection  
 
 
Faced with a need to advise insurance companies on mental health risk, American life insurance 
company medical directors between the mid 1950’s and mid 70’s explored competing ways of 
understanding suicide risk, one rooted in the logic of case reports, psychiatry’s authoritative 
knowledge-making framework, and the other in the logic of big business, with its reliance on 
large numbers and probabilities. ALIMDA’s members like Richard Singer were hired for their 
dual abilities, straddling fields of epidemiology and clinical medicine. While directors like 
Richard Singer made a career out of crunching large numbers, ALIMDA’s proceedings show 
that the logic of clinical medicine strongly influenced medical directors’ approaches to suicide 
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risk in the 1950’s and 60s. ALIMDA members and their invited consultants used a working 
model of suicide as a disease outcome, a final manifestation of hidden pathology. That pathology 
was communicated at a distance on insurance application forms, through psychiatric diagnosis or 
inferred through applicants’ disclosure of psychiatric treatments, including medications, shock 
therapy, lobotomy or psychoanalysis. Excessive alcohol use or drug abuse also reflected hidden 
psychiatric problems and thus hidden suicide risks. Medical directors, resonating with clinical 
logic, used the tools at their disposal to uncover hidden psychotics, psychopathic personalities, 
alcoholics and drug abusers. Viewing suicide as the end expression of hidden mental pathology 
meant that suicide was to a psychiatric diagnosis what heart attacks and strokes were to high 
blood pressure. Suicide was a disease to be prevented by rooting out its causes, and for some 
members of ALIMDA, uncovering hidden pathology became an end in itself. In this framework, 
users of psychiatric drugs might have been understood as having lowered their suicide risk, and it 
is plausible that for the sale of some jumbo policies, such was the logic.   
 
While it is plausible that ALIMDA members anticipated reforms in mental medicine to align 
with reforms well underway in physical medicine by the 1950’s, it is important to consider a 
current of dissent throughout this period (Marks 1997, Timmermans 2003, Greene 2007, Horwitz 
2007, Horwitz 2011). Richard Singer for one, remained uncharacteristically silent on the topic of 
mental health and suicide, likely as discussed earlier because its reliance on case reports and 
small studies did not fit within his methods (though curiously, late in his life, in the 1990’s after 
his retirement and after ALIMDA had folded, Singer spent time analyzing the use of life table 
methodology in mid 19th century lunatic asylums) (Singer 2001). More telling are sub-currents 
among even enthusiastic proponents of accurate psychiatric diagnosis like Peter Denker. Just as 
Denker promoted psychiatric diagnosis (which was in his best financial interests given his 
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relationship with the insurance industry), he was concerned about the stability of psychiatric 
diagnosis and the idea of a “stable” personality type, which he referred to as a “myth” (a decade 
before the psychiatrist Thomas Szasz used the term in his best-selling book The Myth of Mental 
Illness) (Szasz 1961).  His concern was that the experience of the Second World War provided 
evidence that “… given pressures great enough, any of us are vulnerable and that our end points 
are distinctly finite.” (Denker 1953 p. 53). Trauma and stress, terms that linked individual bodies 
to society, were in the 1950’s highly disruptive to the idea that ALIMDA could transplant screen 
and intervene methods directly from physical medicine to mental medicine. Hans Selye’s lecture 
gave ALIMDA members reason to question not only the stability of psychiatric diagnosis but the 
rationality of separating mental and physical health risks at all. Further evidence that ALIMDA 
was looking away from psychiatric diagnosis to root out suicide risk appeared in Earl Dewey’s 
1960 lecture showing suicide rates could be predicted by migration between states, as quantified 
by a change in postal code along the U.S. eastern seaboard, at least for “coloured men”.   
 
The period between 1950 and the mid 1970’s was a period of transition in the way insurance 
company medical directors thought about suicide risk. The question of whether psychiatric 
diagnosis could be refined to screen for suicide risk and whether interventions, for example drug 
therapies, could reduce the risk of suicide was never settled. Rather, the question of suicide was 
for the most part de-medicalized. The 1976 John Hancock study offered the industry a novel way 
to de-couple from a dependence on medical science that Singer’s number-crunching approach 
had fostered. By trusting consumers at risk for suicide to sort themselves out, to literally take 
themselves off the company books by defaulting on their policies, an inexpensive solution to 
processing psychiatric risk had been found. Companies would not support the further refinement 
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of psychiatric risk categories for their own sake, and medical directors after the mid 70’s could 
direct their efforts elsewhere (MacKenzie 2016).  
 
Outside the pricing of life insurance policies, psychiatric diagnosis and psychiatric drug use 
remained from the 1960’s, important risk markers in the pricing of disability insurance in 
America (MacKenzie 2016). With few exceptions, the use of psychiatric drugs translated into 
increased disability insurance premiums or special exclusionary clauses (Shannon 1993, Gold 
1998). For consumers of insurance products, it would become trickier to discern the risks and 
benefits of withholding personal health information.  
 
The present chapter represents one episode in a complex interaction between competing 
knowledge-making systems of medicine and business. Two decades of discussion and debate 
among life insurance medical directors had shown that suicide could at once be rationalized as a 
medical problem, an expression of extreme personal suffering, and as a consumer choice that 
could be pressed into the service of corporate America.   
 
The role of psychiatric drug use in insurance risk calculations shows a sharp disconnect between 
psychiatry’s knowledge-making system and the kind of knowledge trusted by the North 
American life insurance industry. The next chapter will explore a case where successful 
consumers of psychiatric drugs, working as medical doctors, faced a collision between 
psychiatric epistemology, especially related to the use of maintenance drugs, and the risk-averse 
tendencies of professional governance.    
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Governing With Prozac:  
Medical Licensing Reform and the “Impaired Physician” in Ontario (1975-2016) 
 
 
 
5.1   
 
Introduction 
 
This dissertation looks at the movement of drug maintenance out of mental hospitals as an 
ambitious intervention meant to alter the trajectory of mental illness among drug responders, to 
measurably influence individual lives and the functioning of society. As the last chapter showed, 
this project was rejected by the insurance industry, which was not willing to bank on the 
promises of mental medicine to manage the risk of suicide pharmacologically. This chapter turns 
to an analogous rejection of drug maintenance in the area of occupational risk management. It 
looks at how it became possible for psychiatric drug maintenance to become a tool of 
surveillance in the licensing of physicians in the province of Ontario just as a shift toward more 
proactive professional governance consolidated a network of institutions around the oversight of 
physicians. Ontario’s medical regulator came to use information about physicians who used any 
type of mind-altering substance as a marker of potential occupational risk to be investigated and 
managed.  
 
The College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario (CPSO) issues all licenses to practice 
medicine in Ontario. Like other regulatory bodies, the CPSO can be understood within its 
framework of accountability, which includes government, legal and media expectations (Jasanoff 
1998). The CPSO is expected to monitor and maintain standards of practice through a 
combination of techniques, including random peer assessment and remediation, as well as 
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through screening of health impairments that could impact the way doctors provide medical care. 
It is also expected to investigate complaints about doctors on behalf of the public, and it conducts 
disciplinary hearings around professional misconduct and incompetence (CPSO 2018). I start by 
showing how a crisis of public confidence in the provincial medical system, extending from 
1986 to the mid 1990’s led to a broad-based institutional response toward increasing 
accountability and transparency among doctors. Accountability eventually extended to 
physicians’ personal health, and in this context, it became possible for psychiatric maintenance 
drugs to become tools of occupational health surveillance.  Policies meant to bolster the public’s 
trust in what went on behind closed doors seem to have been effective in restoring public 
confidence. But these same policies had unintended consequences. The problem of assessing 
occupational risk among physicians who used maintenance drugs not only exposed the practical 
problems in certifying a durable recovery from mental illness, but it exposed an enduring level of 
mistrust in the medical profession toward users of mind-altering substances.  
 
Changes in Ontario’s medical licensing policies occurred on several levels, sometimes 
simultaneously, sometimes sequentially. The schematic diagrams in figures 5.1 and 5.2 
summarize how, over four decades, medical licensing shifted from a one-time certification of 
physicians’ knowledge and skills with health defined as an absence of impairment, to a dynamic 
process in which doctors became accountable for updating their skills and knowledge as well as 
for updating the provincial regulator on their personal health. By the early 21st century, a medical 
license was a document of participation in a multi-institutional surveillance network.  
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Figure 5.1: Schematic diagram showing medical licensing in Ontario prior to 1990 as a relatively 
static document, in which knowledge and skills, once obtained, were assumed adequate for life. 
Health, for the purposes of licensing, was taken for granted.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2: By the early 21st century, medical licenses in Ontario signified compliance with the 
policies of a dynamic surveillance network. Physicians’ personal health information played a 
role in this network, going beyond impairment to include reporting of blood-born pathogens, and 
any potentially impairing condition, including mental health issues.  
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5.2  
 
The impaired physician as an administrative category  
 
 
In the late 1960’s and 70’s, the CPSO was criticized in media reports for propagating a 
‘conspiracy of silence’ about doctors who worked while impaired by alcohol or drugs. The term 
‘conspiracy of silence’ can be understood within a North-America wide consumer movement in 
which consumers demanded increased transparency and accountability from the medical 
profession (Tomes 2006). In Ontario, as elsewhere in North America, media reports highlighted 
doctors who practiced medicine while impaired with alcohol, or who used their easy access to 
opiates and stimulants to fuel a personal addiction. If one could point to any single study that 
changed medical regulation in Ontario, it would be the Harvard Study of Adult Development, 
conducted in Boston under the direction of psychiatrist George Vaillant. Vaillant’s research team 
won the trust of participants, who had become comfortable disclosing their secret habits and 
preferences (Vaillant, Brighton et al. 1970). As of February 2017, The Harvard Study of Adult 
Development was in its second generation with over 700 participants 
http://www.adultdevelopmentstudy.org. The original 1930 cohort was only men, and this was 
rectified in the mid 60’s, when female Harvard students were included. The study later included 
an inner-city comparator group to study the effects of socioeconomic disparities on an array of 
health outcomes19.  
                                                        
19 Personal change over the course of a lifetime was also objectified by the Stanford University 
psychologist Lewis Terman (1877 – 1956) who followed over four decades starting in 1921 a 
cohort of 1,528 mostly white grade-school who had scored at least 135 on his standardized IQ 
test Terman, L. M. and M. H. Oden (1959). Genetic studies of genius, V. the gifted group at mid-
life: thirty-five years' follow-up. Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press. 
 Research subjects in Terman’s study had similar alcohol use rates as Vaillant’s 
professional group, but Terman did not inquire about drug use.    
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Vaillant learned by the late 1960’s that tranquilizer use among physicians was twice as high as it 
was among non-physicians (15-18% of physicians in his study said they regularly used sedatives 
or tranquilizers compared with only 4-7% of non-physicians) (Vaillant, Brighton et al. 1970). 
Like other professionals, roughly 10% of physicians went through periods of sustained heavy 
drinking over the course of two decades. Among physicians in the study, these habits included 
the use of opiates and cocaine that could have, if disclosed to medical regulators, led to 
disciplinary hearings and possible suspension.  
 
In the 1970’s, Vaillant understood drugs and alcohol as technologies of adaptation (or mal-
adaptation) and he was uncomfortable in the early 1970’s describing drug use in binary 
categories of abuse vs abstinence. Rather, he created five categories to reflect the way his study 
participants used mood altering substances. Most study participants tended to move between 
categories. At one extreme were those who never used tranquilizers, and at the other were those 
whose drug-use was related to “prolonged social and occupational impairment”. He gave an 
example of a physician who regularly injected himself with the narcotic meperidine (Demerol) in 
the thigh while driving down the highway. His three moderate-use categories (two “occasional 
use” and one “regular use”) reflect a view of drugs as flexible tools. “Occasional use” could be 
transient (reported in only one bi-annual interview cycle), or it could be continuous (over more 
than one cycle). “Regular use” referred to the daily use of prescription tranquilizers for more 
than a month across all interview cycles. Later in his career, Vaillant modified his views of 
alcohol as a form of adaptation, instead emphasizing its potential to harm through “prolonged 
social and occupational impairment” (Vaillant 2012).  
 
Trained as a psychoanalyst, Vaillant interpreted the use of alcohol, tobacco, sedatives and 
tranquilizers as part of a dynamic system linked to the mind’s psychological defences and the 
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body’s neuroendocrine glands (Selye 1956, Vaillant 1977). Drugs and alcohol were in his view a 
more “primitive” form of adaptation that would become un-necessary as people developed more 
“mature” defences (Vaillant 1977). Physicians who used mood altering drugs, he thought, had “a 
tendency to use the profession vicariously to give solace to others rather than themselves”. For 
some, this need was met by self-prescribing.” … “[Their] willingness to care for others may 
conceal a greater than average need to be given to”. … “Thus, after giving of himself to others, 
the physician may feel more than ordinarily entitled to prescribe drugs secretly for himself when 
he gets home”. This psychoanalytic belief about physicians who used substances to self-regulate 
was reflected in Vaillant’s ambivalence toward prescription psychiatric drugs, for example the 
use of antidepressants like imipramine, and the anti-psychotic medication chlorpromazine. A 
similar ambivalence toward prescription psychiatric drugs appeared a decade earlier in Narcotics 
Addictions in Physicians, published the American Journal of Psychiatry (Modlin and Montes 
1964). The authors lumped together antidepressants and opiates.  
 
While Vaillant used his 1969 report as an occasion to show how a person’s occupational choice 
could account for differences in alcohol and drug use over the course of a lifetime, North 
American medical associations understood his report as a statement of professional risk, using it 
to support regulatory reform. In the 1970’s, impairment due to mental illness implied for medical 
regulators drug or alcohol addiction. These categories would later extend to physicians 
diagnosed with a broad range mental health issues (Canavan 1982).  
 
In Ontario, the administrative category of “impaired physician” came into being in the Health 
Disciplines Act of 1975, enacted under the conservative government of premier Bill Davis. 
Coming less than a decade after the 1966 Federal Medical Care Act had empowered provincial 
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ministries of health (not doctors’ associations) to set physicians’ fees, the Ontario Health 
Disciplines Act of 1975 mandated the CPSO to create a Fitness to Practice Committee to 
adjudicate and manage impaired physicians. The Fitness to Practice Committee was 
“…composed of twelve persons, of whom at least four shall be members of the Council and 
eight may be members of the College who are not members of the Council”. All decisions of the 
Fitness to Practice Committee were to require the vote of “a majority of the members presiding 
at the hearing”. The Committee was expected to “require a mental and/or physical examination 
of a physician with respect to fitness to practise medicine, with immediate suspension if such 
examination is refused” (Ontario Health Disciplines Act of 1975, Chapter 47 sections 61 and 
62)20.  One Canadian national health reporter who asked in a provocative headline “does the 
medical profession turn a blind eye to drinking doctors”, followed up in another article 
suggesting that Canadian medical regulators should look to the U.S. for ways to manage its 
impaired physicians (Gifford-Jones 1978, Gifford-Jones 1978).  
 
Prior to 1975, all cases of professional misconduct among Ontario’s physicians were handled by 
the CPSO Discipline Committee. On the matter of governing addicted doctors, it was necessary 
for a practitioner to first commit misconduct before the regulator could intervene. The Ontario 
Health Disciplines Act of 1975 had, on the surface, the markings of developments in the United 
States that shifted toward empowering regulators and other professional organizations to act pro-
actively in the interests of public safety. In the United States, pro-active intervention was 
described under the “sick doctor statute”, which meant that it was no longer necessary for 
                                                        
20 Canadian medical regulators kept abreast of developments in other states and provinces 
through meetings and through the Federation Bulletin, a journal for medical regulators that had 
been in circulation since 1913. Its name was changed in 1999 to the Journal of Medical 
Licensure and Discipline and again in 2010 to the Journal of Medical Regulation.  
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doctors to bring harms to a patient before regulators intervened. Sickness meant the “inability of 
a physician to practice medicine with reasonable skill and safety to his patients, because of one 
or more illnesses” (Stimson 1985). Physicians were protected from harassment by the stipulation 
that “there must be probable cause of his inability to practice medicine”. The American Council 
on Mental Health framed physicians with mental health issues as weakening the public’s trust in 
the profession, and it proposed a solution based on peer-to-peer intervention, local medical 
associations, and local hospital boards who were to take into consideration the context of a 
doctors’ workplace expectations. Intervention by a centrally administered (state-run) program 
was reserved as a last resort where these local measures had failed. Only if … “a physician is not 
a member of a hospital staff [or local medical society], or if the staff [or medical society] is 
unable or unwilling to act” … would state regulators investigate. As a back-up plan, the Council 
directed state licencing bodies to have a committee for the purposes of investigating impairment 
and overseeing recovery and a safe return to work (AMA 1973). Ontario’s approach to managing 
impaired physicians on the other hand was operated as a centralized program from the outset, 
though it was not developed into a large-scale program until 1990, in response to Ontario’s crisis 
of confidence in physicians. Starting in 1975, the Ontario College of Physicians and Surgeons set 
up a small program called the “project for doctors on chemicals”, operated personally by the 
deputy registrar, Dr. Harold Henderson (Henderson 1921-1996). Doctors were encouraged to 
come forward for rehab without fear of discipline. A small proportion of the province’s doctors 
came forward, roughly 30 doctors per year (0.2 % of the province’s licensed doctors), half with 
alcohol problems and half with drug issues. These doctors were encouraged to attend a 1-month 
rehab program, followed by a period of correspondence with Dr. Henderson, who made a 
personal judgement about the durability of each doctor’s recovery.  It was a system based on 
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professional trust, though in selected cases the College would restrict a physician’s prescribing to 
exclude sedatives or stimulants.  
 
The Ontario Medical Association interpreted Ontario’s Health Disciplines Act of 1975 as an 
occasion for the provincial government to insert itself more aggressively into the affairs of 
doctors. When Ontario’s Health Disciplines Act was proclaimed law on July 14, 1975, an 
editorial in the Canadian Medical Association Journal lamented that … “it is obvious that the 
profession of medicine is no longer a self-governing profession but is subject directly to political 
decision” (Geekie 1975). The Ontario Medical Association saw professional autonomy heading 
down; governments, both provincial and federal, were creating an “inefficient medical civil 
service in which physicians would be unable to choose specialties, the location of their practice, 
their hours of work or the numbers of patients they could see” (Meslin 1987).  
 
5.3    
Ontario’s Medical Regulator and a Crisis of Confidence: 1986-1993  
 
Physicians in Ontario had fewer reasons to change their level of accountability in the mid 1970’s 
than their counterparts in the United States. According to medical historian Thomas Johnson, in 
the United States, … “medical practitioners, [the beneficiaries of medical reforms] had by the 
late 1960’s achieved an unparalleled position of professional pre-eminence, with a position of 
almost complete autonomy and power in medical matters and high esteem from the American 
public” (Johnson 1988). This changed in the early 1970’s when a period of economic recession, 
high inflation, unrestrained medical costs, and a consumer movement that was reluctant to take 
experts at their word, led to a “stunning loss of confidence” in physicians (Tomes 2006). In the 
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United States, “the huge success of for-profit hospital corporations heralded the fact that health 
care had truly become big business”. … “The laity began to see in physicians a power to be 
challenged rather than respected. Not only were personal wealth differentials between most 
physicians and their patients disturbing but there was also a growing realization that the medical 
profession was unable to respond to chronic disease problems, which were growing increasingly 
prevalent, with the same dramatic cures that characterized the control of infectious diseases” 
(Johnson 1988).  
 
The historian Rosemary Stevens identified in the late 20th century a decline in political influence 
of physicians, but she sees as the mechanism of change the commodification of medical labour 
by managed care, and the splintering of physicians along the lines of professional specialty 
organizations (Stevens 2001). Stevens argued that single payer health systems such as Canada’s 
tend to create the groundwork for stronger medical input into the design of healthcare systems, 
and to a higher political status for physicians. In Ontario, the phrase “stunning loss of 
confidence” is perhaps better reserved for the decade between 1986 and the mid 1990’s, in which 
the province’s medical regulator, as well as the Ontario Medical Association, faced a confluence 
of media, legal, political pressures. A month-long province-wide doctors’ strike was followed in 
four years by a year-long public inquiry into physician’s sexual abuse of patients, which was 
followed by a national inquiry into the contamination of Canada’s blood supply system.  
Together, this loss of confidence set the stage for a more intensive system of surveillance that 
would eventually extend to physicians’ personal health, which would include an expectation of 
self-disclose around their use of maintenance psychiatric drugs.  
 
The 1986 Doctors’ Strike 
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Media coverage during and after Ontario’s month-long doctor’s strike in 1986 was relentlessly 
negative, with doctors’ greed blamed for deaths due to emergency-room closures. Physicians 
argued that the Canada Health Act, which forbade physicians from billing patients directly 
violated the Charter of Rights and Freedoms of Canada. Citizens of Ontario had been aware of 
disputes over billing patients outside the government health-insurance system for more than half 
a decade (Makin 1981, Makin 1981, Oziewicz 1981, Oziewicz 1981, Ellson and Hollobon 1981, 
February 2, Hoch 1982, Stead 1982, February 8, Doublas 1986, McMonagle 1986, Meslin 1987). 
But the strike exposed a downside to Canada’s single-payer medical system; by organizing 
against the government as a labour unit, physicians in effect were organizing against the public, 
leveraging their monopoly of access to the provincial health insurance system to extract higher 
fees.  
 
Following the strike, the need to repair the image of physicians was not lost on the Ontario 
Medical Association president Richard Railton, who felt medicine’s “place in society has 
changed. After the strike, some people will be disillusioned and disappointed especially those 
who have put doctors on an impossible pedestal” (Douglas 1986).  
 
The strike set in motion efforts to restore professional prestige. In 1988, Donald Wilson, director 
of the Associated Medical Services, an Ontario-based philanthropic supporter of medical 
education, expressed his concern that … “doctors looked like money-grubbers … they came out 
of the strike looking poorly and without much sympathy from people” (Crawford 1993). In 
response, Wilson, in partnership with medical schools and Canada’s national speciality 
organization, the Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons, provided financial support to 
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developing a national set of professional ideals, which was integrated in to a national medical 
curriculum after 1996 (Anonymous 1996). Physicians would become accountable for 
participation in ongoing medical education through a nationally monitored program (Anonymous 
1996).  Across these institutions, information about physicians’ personal health played a role in 
professional governance (Figure 5.2).   
 
 
The 1990 Task Force on the Sexual Abuse of Patients 
 
 
Figure 5.3 illustrates the total number of public complaints filed with the CPSO against Ontario 
doctors for any reason between 1985 and 1988. Over the four-year period, roughly 3,000 
complaints were received and of these 150 were related to sexual misconduct by physicians 
(1991 Task Force p. 58). To put this into perspective, assuming only one complaint was received 
per offending physician, with approximately 15,000 physicians licenced in the province, the 
college estimated the rate of sexual abuse against patients at 2.5 cases per thousand doctors. 
Regulatory complaints received were not however a reliable indicator of offences but only a 
reflection of the proportion of patients (mostly women) willing to come forward. 
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Figure 5.3: Number of complaints against Ontario physicians received by the College of 
physicians and surgeons, 1985-1988. Of these, 5% (roughly 40 per year by 1988) were related to 
physicians’ sexual abuse (CPSO 1988). 
 
 
In January 1990, Dr. Michael Dixon, the CPSO registrar approved funding for an independent 
task force to examine the CPSO’s handling of complaints about physicians accused of sexually 
abusing patients (CPSO 1990). Administrative titles at the CPSO were deceptive, and while the 
CPSO president tended to receive more public and professional visibility, it was the registrar 
who held the most organizational power. CPSO presidents were 12-month elected positions held 
by practicing physicians taking a year away from their clinical duties, while college registrars 
were full time employees, career administrators with no fixed term. Coming 20 years after the 
national Royal Commission on the Status of Women, commissioned by the Pearson government 
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in 1967 and completed in 1971, the CPSO initiative had the backing of the provincial NDP 
government under the leadership of Bob Rae. The 1990 Task Force was chaired by Marylou 
McPhedran, a constitutional lawyer and women’s rights activist who identified a personal 
interest in the practice of “evidence-based advocacy” (McPhedran, Armstrong et al. 1991, 
Canada 2017). In keeping with a form of advocacy based on quantitative data, McPhedran hired 
the accounting firm Price Waterhouse to conduct province-wide surveys regarding sexual 
misconduct by physicians against their patients. Unlike the CPSO’s data, which was based only 
on complaints registered against physicians, the Task Force proactively sought information.  
 
McPhedran borrowed the term “social contract”, which the Rae government had popularized in 
its election campaign to denote expectations of an exchange between the citizens of Ontario and 
its government. For McPhedran, the phrase implied a Parsonian exchange between Ontario’s 
citizens and its doctors. Citing Ontario’s Regulated Health Professions Act of 1991, McPhredran 
argued that in exchange for “the exclusive right to determine who may have the privilege to 
practice medicine in Ontario, … society expects [the CPSO to protect its interests] above the 
[interests of the medical procession]. When this does not happen, McPhedron wrote, it is an 
institutional breach of trust (Task force p. 11). As part of the Task Force’s frame of reference (p. 
12), she wanted to establish that sexual contact between a physician and a patient was a breech of 
fiduciary trust, and that by failing to shine light on the problem of sexual abuse by physicians, 
the CPSO had failed to achieve its role as a public guardian.  
 
McPhedran argued that any sexual relationship in the context of a physician-patient relationship 
violated a fiduciary agreement. Patients are vulnerable at the time they seek help from a 
physician and “… they are uncertain about what needs to be done.” It was uncertainty over what 
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to do about one’s health, she argued, that set up the fiduciary relationship. Citing an Ontario 
High Court decision that … “A fiduciary cannot permit a conflict between the interest of his 
beneficiary and any other interest, especially his own. A fiduciary may not obtain a profit, 
benefit, or advantage as a result of his position” she concluded that an “ … unequal distribution 
of power in the physician-patient relationship makes opportunities for sexual exploitation more 
possible than in other relationships. This vulnerability gives physicians the power to exact sexual 
compliance” (p 11). Quoting a 1977 psychiatric paper "Four Taboos That May Limit the Success 
of Psychotherapy" (p 12), McPhedran wrote “There are good and ancient reasons for a sex taboo 
in therapy. It is not a relationship of equals. There is a carryover of the incest taboo. Exploitation 
of the patient is a real possibility. Therapy – not sex – is the business of the therapist. … I remain 
unconvinced that any therapist has ever produced an erection for therapeutic reasons”(Older 
1977, McPhedran, Armstrong et al. 1991). This reference to a psychoanalytic document recalls 
longstanding debates around the effects of sexual relations between psychotherapists and their 
patients, though McPhedran took a uniformly hard line, extending taboos around sex between 
psychotherapists to sex between all physicians and their patients.  
 
The legal scholar Leonard Riskin, in a 1979 review of the question of sex between 
psychotherapists and their patients, concluded that professional organizations uniformly 
condemned such activities on the basis that a sexual relationship irrevocably altered a therapist’s 
objectivity, while creating the possibility of harming patients (Riskin 1979). A literature review 
commissioned by the Ontario Health Professions Regulatory Advisory Council to study sexual 
relationships between healthcare professionals and patients (not restricted to psychotherapists) 
was more nuanced than McPhedran’s Task Force, finding that professional attitudes varied 
according to the kind of professional service provided. For example, half of family physicians, 
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especially those working in rural areas, were accepting of sexual relationships with patients after 
a therapeutic relationships was terminated (Perry, Harron et al. 2011). Outside the field of 
healthcare, sexual relationships between professionals and clients have also been considered 
ethically problematic. For example, the American Bar Association issued a formal opinion in 
1992 (no. 92-364) that an attorney’s sexual relationship with a current client “may involve unfair 
exploitation of the lawyer’s fiduciary position, and presents a significant danger that the lawyer’s 
ability to represent the client adequately will be impaired” (Awad 1998). Based on similar 
concerns over power differentials, sexual relationships between university faculty and students 
have generally been discouraged, though not as strongly, for example, as relationships between 
psychotherapists and patients. Universities can be exposed to lawsuits in cases of faculty-student 
sexual relations (Newman 1998). 
 
McPhedran implicated a third actor in the relationship between physicians and patients; drugs. 
To strengthen the link between sexual transgressions and drugs, she cited disciplinary hearings 
conducted by the CPSO as well as the opinions of practicing physicians like Dr. Elaine Borins of 
Toronto, who wrote in a letter to the task force that “Most women become addicted through the 
medical prescription drug route and I would suggest that victims of sexual abuse are particularly 
vulnerable to this disturbing problem of sexual enslavement” (McPhedran, Armstrong et al. 
1991).  
 
It was, for McPhedran, the therapeutic situation that differentiated medical relationships from 
other professional exchanges. Still, her Task Force did not differentiate between kinds of 
physician-patient encounters. For the Task Force, all interactions were treated as expressions of 
equally asymmetrical power relations; all visits to the doctor, whether for emergency services, 
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immunization, or psychotherapy, were assumed to take place in a “vulnerable situation”. Nor did 
McPhedran’s rhetoric depicting women as victims “sexually enslaved” take into consideration a 
language of survivorship evolving in the 1980’s that, rather than presenting women as trapped, 
depicted survivors of abuse as making choices, thus placing them “at opposite poles of an agency 
continuum” (Dunn 2005). Moreover, just as the task force tended to lump all forms of medical 
encounters together as producing equal power imbalances between physicians and patients, it 
also lumped together all women as equally vulnerable, failing to take into consideration 
important power differentials within the gender category itself. At the time the report was 
written, the legal scholar Kimberlé Crenshaw for example had already been using the term 
“intersectionality” to describe the interaction of gender, race and social class in experiences of 
oppression (Crenshaw 1989). McPhedran’s analytic categories would later put the Task Force’s 
conclusions at odds with a ruling from the Supreme Court of Canada on the question of whether 
a doctor-patient sexual relationship automatically breeches a fiduciary relationship.  
 
A working definition of sexual abuse was agreed upon by task force members including 
McPhedran, Pat Marshall, the Executive Director of the Metropolitan Action Committee on 
Violence Against Women and Children, Rachel Edney, a family physician and board member of 
the College of Physicians and Surgeons, Roz Roach, a psychotherapist, and Harvey Armstrong, a 
psychiatrist. Once a definition of abuse was agreed upon, Price Waterhouse used the framework 
to conduct its research across the province. Sexual abuse, for the purposes of the task force 
investigation, was defined as “rape and forced violations of breasts and genitals. It can involve 
the physician using his position or power to gain sexual access to a patient by representing sex as 
part of treatment. It can involve the development of personal sexual relationships to meet the 
needs of the physician” (McPhedran, Armstrong et al. 1991). 
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Confidently aligning with a view of power in which physicians who had sexual relationship with 
their patients were always predators, McPhedran published the Task Force report in advance of a 
ruling working its way through the Supreme Court of Canada, taking for granted in print that the 
ruling would support her argument. The Task Force report had a definite shock value. The 
message resonating through media outlets to a public that had just witnessed Canada’s longest 
doctors strike was not only that doctors were out for themselves but that doctors could not be 
trusted behind closed doors (Gray 1991, Lachapelle 1993, Macki 1993, Mackie 1993, Priest 
1993, Priest 1993, Slinger 1993, Elash 1993, January 26).  
 
In their commissioned survey of Ontario residents who had sought medical help of any sort, 
Price Waterhouse reported that “8% of Ontario women surveyed reported sexual harassment or 
abuse by doctors. The survey was expected to be accurate within plus or minus 2.7% 19 times 
out of 20”. (McPhedran, Armstrong et al. 1991). The Task Force focused on women who had 
been abused by physicians, even though it was aware that the omission of males who had been 
abused would lead to an under-estimate of the problem21. Even with this methodological flaw, 
the upshot was that the CSPO has grossly under-appreciated the extent of physicians’ sexual 
misconduct. Adding credibility to the report, four studies from the United States based on self-
report surveys had estimated the perception of “sexual or erotic contact of physicians with 
patients at 7-13% of physicians” (McPhedran, Armstrong et al. 1991).  
                                                        
21 A 1983 report by Lapiere and Valiquete, cited by McPhedran, found that one of ten sexual 
abuse cases investigated in the province of Quebec involved male patients Lapiere, J. and H. 
Valiquette (1983). J'ai Fait L'amour Avec Mon Thérapeute. Montreal Saint-Martin. 
 . 
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In response to the Task Force, the conservative member of parliament Mr Ernie Eves, on 
December 12, 1991 put forward a resolution:  
recognizing that sexual abuse of patients by health professionals is a serious problem 
as evidenced by the fact that the Task Force on Sexual Abuse of Patients 
commissioned by the College of Physicians and Surgeons heard 303 reports of sexual 
abuse by physicians and others, that the essence of the relationship between a health 
professional and a patient is based on trust, and further recognizing that patients are 
vulnerable, and must be protected, the government of Ontario should pass legislation 
which would: (a) Amend the Regulated Health Professions Act to include two levels 
of the offence of sexual abuse of patients: (i) sexual impropriety and (ii) sexual 
violation as defined in the final report of the Task Force on Sexual Abuse of Patients 
commissioned by the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario (Eves 1991). 
 
In the mean-time, a subtler consideration of sexual relations between doctors and patients was 
working its way through the Supreme Court, and it had relevance to the provincial regulator. If, 
as McPhedran argued, physicians were breeching a fiduciary relationship with the public, it 
followed that the CPSO had failed in its duty to protect the public, and that it should be 
overhauled or replaced by a governmental organization.  The case, referred to as Norberg v 
Wynrib , involved an elderly physician and a young woman who had become addicted to an 
opiate drug, Fiorinal. The case is summarized in the Supreme Court of Canada decision (La 
Forest 1992).  It involved a woman in her late teens, who began in 1978 to experience severe 
headaches and pains in her jaw. She sought help from doctors and dentists, and received various 
painkillers. In addition, her sister, a long-term user of street drugs, gave her an opiate, Fiorinal. 
Finally, a dentist diagnosed a tooth abscess, and her problems were relieved with a tooth 
extraction. Following a period of using prescribed opiates, however, the young woman 
developed drug cravings for painkillers. When she broke her ankle in 1981, she found a doctor 
who was willing to prescribe Fiorinal for her, and she continued taking the drug until her doctor 
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retired in 1982. She eventually found Dr. Wynrib, a physician in his seventies who, after a period 
of about a year, began demanding sex in exchange for drugs.   
 
Norberg v Wynrib began in provincial court and was appealed twice as a test case sponsored by 
the Women's Legal Education and Action Fund before reaching the Supreme Court. (The 
Women’s Legal Education and Action Fund was co-founded in 1985 by the same Mary Lou 
MacPhedron who chaired the CPSO Task Force on the sexual abuse of patients. The Fund is a 
national, charitable, non-profit organization that intervenes to “advance the substantive equality 
rights of women and girls in Canada through litigation, law reform and public education using 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms” (LEAF , Canada 2017)) 
 
Judge La Forest, in a 27 page ruling, awarded damages to Norberg on the basis of battery, not on 
the basis of a breech of a fiduciary relationship, as MacPherson had assumed in the Task Force 
report. The Court ruled that while “the relationship of physician to patient also falls into that 
special category of relationships which the law calls fiduciary” … “the majority does not believe 
that sex is a power that can be transferred” … “in common with all members of society, the 
doctor owes the patient a duty not to touch him or her without his or her consent; if the doctor 
breaches this duty, he or she will have committed the tort of battery”. The claim of breech of 
fiduciary relationship … “would appear to give rise to difficulties that would not arise in the 
ordinary doctor-client case.  In particular, the appellant here did not come to the doctor for 
treatment.  Rather she intended to use him to obtain drugs.”  
 
The Supreme Court ruling took a view that exchanges of sex for drugs between doctors and 
patients aligned more closely with a commodity exchange that involved bilateral consent (and in 
this case there was no such explicit consent). It did not however view sex between a doctor and a 
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patient as an automatic breech of fiduciary trust, a view that differed from MacPhedran’s 
understanding. The ruling does not appear to have received coverage in the mass media, but it 
weakened MacPhedran’s argument that a special government agency should be set up to oversee 
aspects of medical governance related to sex between doctors and patients.   
 
The Royal Commission of Inquiry on the Blood System in Canada (1993-1997) 
 
Another threat to the public confidence in Ontario’s medical system was the well-publicized 
1993 Royal Commission of Inquiry on the Blood System in Canada (also known as the Krever 
Inquiry after its chairman Justice Horace Krever). The inquiry found that the Canadian Red 
Cross Society, the charitable organization that supplied the majority of blood products to 
Canadian hospitals, had inadequately screened blood products so that thousands of citizens were 
infected with HIV and Hepatitis C (Kennedy 2002, Moore 2004, Duffin 2005, Bonnell 2008). 
This threat to public confidence encompassed not only the governance of physicians (the risk of 
infection was bi-directional, from patients to doctors and vice-versa) but the governance of 
hospitals, and all facilities in which procedures in which viruses could enter the blood were 
carried out. As I will show later, the Krever inquiry helped drive professional governance toward 
expectations that physicians disclose more personal health information to the CPSO in their 
annual licensing forms. 
 
5.4   
 
Bolstering Confidence in the Medical System and Setting the Stage for Further Reforms  
       
 
Amendments to the Medicine Act of 1991 became law by a parliamentary vote on Feb 2, 1995 
under the NDP government of Bob Rae. The amendments helped tighten an administrative net 
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meant to capture physicians who had, prior to 1995, argued in court that communication, 
including information about disciplinary actions, between professional organizations (for 
example between hospitals and the CPSO or between out-of-province medical regulators), 
without their consent, violated their personal rights to privacy under the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms (Gerace, Faulkner et al. 2007). Prior to 1995, the CPSO relied on the 
investigation of complaints (private citizens, professional or institutional) and on the results of its 
random practice audit program to trigger formal investigations. Random practice audits, in place 
since 1981, seemed inadequate to ensure acceptable levels of professional competence and 
ethical behavior  (MacLeod 1981). Random audits were, to an extent, a stimulus to adhere to 
basic practice norms, since they entailed at relatively short notice the inspection by a CPSO 
examiner a physician’s’ records by an expert in his or her field. But physicians who failed to 
meet professional standards could go undetected for years of decades, moving between hospitals 
or avoiding detection in solo private practice.  
 
Section 34 (subsections 3 and 4) of the Medicine Act of 1991 was worded not only to allow 
communication between professional bodies without the consent of physicians, but to allow the 
Ontario College of Physicians and Surgeons to apply without delay the findings of medical 
regulators regardless of their geographical location. In 1999, medical licensure in Ontario 
became contingent on allowing the College of Physicians and Surgeons unrestricted access to all 
out-of-province regulatory reports (CPSO 2000). Physicians entering the province from another 
medical jurisdiction could gain a licence only if they allowed the CPSO access to all relevant 
workplace and regulatory information. Ontario hospitals were also linked in 1995 to the 
surveillance network through an agreement to automatically report physicians to the CPSO when 
they relinquished their hospital affiliations during an ongoing investigation or when hospital 
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admitting privileges were suspended due to a prolonged absence or illness (CPSO 2000). To help 
motivate physicians toward personal disclosure, licencing forms after 1999 included a reminder 
at the signature line that to knowingly provide false information was “an offence under s. 92 of 
the Ontario Health Professions Procedural Code”.  
 
An integrated system of professional surveillance had been discussed by administrators at the 
CPSO at least as early as 1980, when the CPSO president James Ballantyne outlined a proposal 
to co-locate in a single office building, located a few blocks from the provincial legislature in 
downtown Toronto, “related medical organizations and colleges” to create a “medical-business 
complex” to centrally administer key aspects of Ontario’s medical system; decisions about the 
provincial medical curriculum, hospital governance and physician’s fee negotiations would have 
taken place under one roof. Co-location he argued, would encourage “mutual communications” 
enhanced by an “in-house computer for efficient, accurate and instantaneous communication” 
(Ballantyne 1980). Although his plan never materialized, in part because the elected term of 
CPSO presidents was only a year, the theme of integrated professional monitoring and 
surveillance gained traction through agreements between the CPSO and medical colleges, the 
Ontario Medical Association, the Ontario Hospitals Association and through a network of 
provincial and state medical regulators. The historian Rosemary Stevens has shown that cross-
agency agreements of this kind were being made across North America in the 1980’s and 90’s, 
laying the groundwork for the educational monitoring programs that would become central to 
medical licensing (Stevens 2001). That said, when the CPSO finally began rolling out its 
licensing reforms in 1999, it made no reference to broader changes across North America, but 
rather presented itself to doctors as an independent organization complying reluctantly with 
government-mandated regulations (see for example the top line in Appendix C, Figure 1a). This 
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reflects a tension between medicine presenting itself as an independently governed profession 
and medicine as a branch of the civil service.  
 
Amendments to the Medicine Act in 1995 reflected ethical and economic drivers linked to 
regulatory reform (Appendix C figure 4). The amendments included strict limitations on the 
kinds of fees that could be charged to patients, and a prohibition on making medical care 
contingent on pre-payment by a patient. They also laid out definitions of professional 
misconduct, which included verbal, physical or sexual abuse of a patient, practicing medicine 
while impaired and prescribing drugs for an improper purpose.  Importantly, the Act effectively 
removed geographical boundaries from the surveillance of physicians licensed in Ontario. 
Professional discipline enacted by regulatory authorities outside the province would be 
automatically applied to physicians applying for licenses in Ontario. That is, “findings of 
incompetence or professional misconduct [in a jurisdiction other than Ontario] would, in the 
opinion of the CPSO, be grounds for a finding of incompetence [in Ontario] as defined in section 
52 of the Code” (Amendments to the Medicine Act of Ontario, 1995).  
 
Within an intensifying surveillance network, it became possible for administrators to see 
physicians whose potential health problems were unknown to authorities, as targets of proactive 
oversight. Normalizing self-disclosure to licensing authorities, educational changes in Ontario by 
the end of the 1990’s, encouraged physicians to look inward, to reflect on their personal 
vulnerabilities, and to share what they saw.  
 
5.5      
 
Self-examination and Confession in Medical Governance 
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Introducing a set of practices meant to open for medical doctors a professionally authorized way 
to think about sickness and health outside of statistical categories, the internist Rita Charon 
promoted the phrase Narrative Medicine in a programmatic JAMA essay called Narrative 
Medicine: A Model for Empathy, Reflection, Profession and Trust (Charon 2001). In Narrative 
Medicine, experiences of sickness and recovery are woven into “stories with a teller, a listener, a 
time course a plot and a point”. Charon felt that “the body will not bend to ministrations from 
someone who cannot recognize the self within it”. Narrative medicine can be understood as a 
response to criticism that evidence-based medicine lacked the human element, … “reducing 
patients to passive recipients of doctor-centered communications” (Mykhalovskiy and Weir 
2004).  Narrative medicine valued knowledge based on individual experience, that operated 
alongside medicine’s statistically-based forms of knowledge (Mol 2006). It acknowledged 
differences between people rather than trying to work within binary categories of normality and 
pathology. For medical educators and administrators, it also promised to be good for the business 
of medicine; narrative medicine promised to enhance doctors’ empathy and communication 
skills.   
 
The practices of narrative medicine are linked to self-knowledge, asking physicians to 
understand “whatever way the patient chooses to communicate about their situation” (Solomon 
2015). “Emotional engagement uses the self, making engagement of the physician doubly 
intimate in that it requires both empathy and the sensitive construction of narrative. … A strong 
physician-patient relationship is often essential to patient care, since it can contribute to finding a 
diagnosis, choice of treatment, compliance and effectiveness of treatment” (Solomon 2015). 
Making meaning implies a degree of reframing in a way that empowers healing through writing 
and telling stories. What does this have to do with governing physicians?  
 189 
 
 A survey of widely circulated biomedical journals shows that Canadian doctors had been 
publishing short essays with their personal reflections since at least the early 1990’s, along with a 
cornucopia of book and film reviews, poems and brief historical articles that fell under the 
heading of ‘medical humanities’ (Figure 5.4) 
  
Publication Narrative Book reviews Film 
reviews 
Visual art 
reviews 
Poems 
fiction 
History 
Canadian Medical 
Association Journal 
(CMAJ) 
X X X* X* X X* 
American Journal of 
Public Health 
      X*   X 
Annals of Internal 
Med 
X X       X* 
British Journal of 
General Practice 
X X* X*       
British Medical 
Journal (BMJ) 
X X X* X*   X 
Canadian Family 
Physician 
X X*         
Health Affairs X X         
Journal of the 
American Medical 
Association 
(JAMA) 
X X X* X X X 
J Palliative Care X* X* X*       
The Lancet   X X* X*   X 
Medical Journal of 
Australia 
  X*         
National Review of 
Medicine 
  X         
New England Journal 
of Medicine 
  X         
 
Figure 5.4: Summary of biomedical journal survey (1990-2010) sampling four issues per year for 
non-biomedical articles. Journal names in bold are national general medical journals. JAMA 
featured personal narratives by physicians since 1980 under the heading “a piece of my mind”. In 
1999, the BMJ publishing group started a journal called Medical Humanities, which came out 
twice yearly. Categories marked by an asterix are not in every issue. 
  
 
A study by medical educators from Ontario and Nova Scotia analyzed 158 narrative reflections 
published in JAMA, the New England Journal of Medicine and Annals of Internal Medicine 
between 2011 and 2013 (Monitz, Lingard et al. 2017). The authors grouped narratives into 11 
themes including “testimony”, “rediscovery”, “quest”, “hero story”, “awakening”, “lament”, 
“physicians are fallible”, “patients are vulnerable”, “practicing medicine is a privilege”, “the 
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system is flawed” and “humanity matters”. A re-reading of these brief essays, which average 
approximately 1000 words, shows another side to narrative medicine. As the summary in 
Appendix D shows, more than half of published narratives by physicians contain self-disclosure 
or self-confession. Confession is often about an ethical issue, an inner conflict for example 
experienced by a military physician treating enemy combatants, a sense of embarrassment for 
having chosen a career in medicine for financial security, or a confession of personal illness 
including struggles with emotional exhaustion.  
 
Physicians in Ontario were, by the early 21st century conditioned by medical educators to look 
inward to increase their empathy, to optimize their ability to communicate. But they were also 
encouraged (even rewarded with continuing medical education credits) for publicizing their most 
private anxieties and vulnerabilities. As an extension, medical journals sponsored blog sites, 
which offered physicians opportunities to make public their inner experiences. The Canadian 
Medical Association Journal (https://cmajblogs.com), British Medical Journal 
(http://blogs.bmj.com) and the New England Journal of Medicine (http://blogs.nejm.org/now/) 
are examples. When new graduates encountered Ontario’s new licencing forms in 2009, they 
were primed to think about self-examination and self-disclosure as part of their professional 
identity.  
 
As an example of how personal confession had become commonplace in medical publications by 
the early 21st century, Shane Neilson, an emergency room physician working in Guelph, Ontario 
put his experiences with mental illness into public view (Neilson 2012). Writing about his 
personal five-month experience on a psychiatric ward, Neilson described how difficult it was for 
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him to sense his own decline, yet he says “at some point I knew I was going mad”. He wrote this 
poem after working in the emergency room, not long before jumping from a balcony:   
A drop to jump and hit the floor – 
In this, a real freedom. The plunge, 
a dive towards a bottoming, 
and the freefall, descent in pure vertical axis, 
a moment in suspension, and the bliss 
of stepping off, before the consequence; 
 
Recalling the last few patients he saw in the emergency-room prior to his suicide attempt … 
“… the fellow who had a self-inflicted gash across his wrist because he just couldn’t 
take it anymore, the guy who took a puck to the throat while watching a hockey 
game and who I had to intubate, … As I treated these patients, I felt like I was 
wearing a rapidly fraying disguise. Before the start of every shift I would take a 
minute, inhale deeply and mentally try to draw tight, to focus, to try to put on a mask 
that announced, I’m here, I’m able. To everyone but especially to myself. … When 
really what I was saying to myself was something quite different: as long as I’m 
working, I’m fine. I held on to that, it was part of my identity, my doctorhood. And 
for a time, the disguise held.”  
 
He writes, “I began to suffer. Work began to suffer, I slowed down, I became 
critically unconfident. I repeated myself. I lost the thread of what patients were 
saying to me. Toward the end, patients were asking me, Are you all right?, having 
picked up on the fact that there was something wrong with their doctor.” (Neilson 
2012) 
 
Neilson describes trying “various drugs until one was found that was effective”. His experience 
of mental illness was more than a temporary state of symptoms and functional impairment, and 
recovery for him seemed at times fragile. “The thing illness robs us of, mental illness most of all, 
is perspective: we never really apprehend how sick we are until it’s either too late or until we get 
well again and realize just how powerfully rendered we were, how vulnerable we were, how near 
death. At my sickest I wrote poems presaging death, as death wishes, and ultimately they became 
a death act. Its been many years since that jump from the balcony.” He summarized his “career 
with major mental illness” as follows … “I got very sick, alienating everyone around me. I 
almost died, and almost died again. I struggled to apprehend what I was sick with, and how sick I 
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was. And by happy accident of pharmacology or ordained plan of my doctors or the random 
whim of the universe, I got better and returned to the ‘hoods of physicianhood, fatherhood, and 
(orchestral oration please, maestro) personhood.” (Neilson 2017) 
 
Licencing applications from physicians like Neilson, who self-identified with a mental illness, 
made their way through the administrative labyrinth at the College of Physicians and Surgeons 
and, after review by clerical staff, would be flagged for further scrutiny.  
 
Normalizing Personal Confession: Reformed Addicts in Medical Education and Governance    
 
 
The Ontario Medical Association Physician Health Program was from its inception in 1995 a 
centralized response to impaired physicians, a role it took over from the CPSO’s “Project for 
Doctors on Chemicals”. The Ontario Medical Association hired a medical director with lived-
experience overcoming a drug addiction. Michael Kaufman, who directed the Ontario Physician 
Health Program between 1995 and 2017, self-identified as a recovered opiate addict (Kaufmann 
2017). The practice of hiring physicians who self-identified as rehabilitated addicts and who 
were willing to “have a high profile within the medical community” went hand in hand with a 
professional ideal of self-examination and a willingness to self-disclose personal health issues. 
Kaufman’s seminars, modelling self-disclosure became a regular for Ontario’s five medical 
schools by the late 1990’s, harmonizing with the emergence of narrative medicine seminars 
meant to improve students’ empathy.  
 
Kaufman divided his time between managing impaired physicians, speaking to medical students 
and appearing at doctors’ meetings, where he promoted a professional ideal of transparency 
around drug use coupled with the virtues of rehabilitation. Kaufman would tell his personal story 
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of recovery from intravenous drug addiction dozens of times each year, recounting how he 
started by experimenting with opiate tablets made available through pharmaceutical company 
samples then moved on to secretly injecting himself with intravenous opiates stolen from the 
hospital until his impairment became obvious to friends, family and colleagues. Even decades 
after quitting, he spoke of missing the “feel for the steel”, mistrusting himself to take opiates 
even for pain relief after dental surgery (Joiners 2007, White 2007, Kaufmann 2016).  
 
 Verifiable abstinence from alcohol and drugs was only part of certifying recovery. Participants 
were expected to comply with group and individual therapy. Kaufman’s personal fear of opiate 
overdose went hand in hand with his conviction that drug and alcohol addictions were chronic 
diseases, a view shared by Rocco Gerase at the College of Physicians and Surgeons. In Ontario, 
physicians who had a history of drug or alcohol problems would have to demonstrate the ability 
to alter their behaviour through 5 consecutive years of monitoring, or face losing their medical 
licences. Information gathered by the Physician Health Program extended past biological 
samples to include a … “clinical  assessment, evaluation and review of treatment records, 
monitoring agreements, past toxicology and other laboratory reports, monitoring/compliance 
reports, workplace reports, group therapy reports, expert consultations, self-reports, meeting 
attendance logs, medication logs; pertinent medical records, correspondence and progress notes” 
(Kaufmann and Albuquerque 2002).  
 
The Ontario PHP mandated close workplace oversight, which translated into at least one co-
worker providing on-the-job feedback to the monitoring program. Workplace monitors were 
typically physicians, but occasionally, for example in the oversight of doctors in solo practice 
returning to work following recovery from impairment, other regulated health professionals (for 
 194 
example nurses, physiotherapists or occupational therapists) provided a connection to the 
monitoring program in the form of phone calls and forms. Workplace monitors received in-
person training to ensure they understood their role. As summarized in the Ontario Physician 
Health Program policies … “the role of the work site monitor should be to evaluate the 
individual’s performance, NOT their illness; otherwise this blurs boundaries and creates dual 
relationships. By providing general performance information (punctuality, professional 
demeanor to patients and staff, record keeping), work site monitors may identify behavioral 
changes, which may indicate relapse behavior (Kaufmann and Albuquerque 2002).” Evidence of 
impairment at work severely undermined the PHP’s confidence in a physician and could lead to 
more intensive interventions and discipline.  Monitoring also included visits from a program 
case-worker as well as … “status reports from program consultants, therapists, psychiatrists or 
other health care providers.”  
 
Physicians entering the substance monitoring program had to sign on for a minimum 2 years of 
monitoring though most participants continued for 5 years. Shorter monitoring terms were used 
for physicians who had for example already completed rehabilitation and who could document a 
period of abstinence prior to coming to regulatory attention. During a monitoring period, 
physicians were contractually bound to disclose to “… all treating physicians (and dentists) their 
addiction and their relationship with the Physician Health Program and their duty to provide a 
release of information to communicate freely with the Physician Health Program.” Participants 
also signed an … “agreement to attend self-help groups such as AA/NA. Those with strong 
objections [were] responsible for providing recovery focused alternatives with appropriate 
availability and intensity.” Kaufmann mapped his expectations of physicians onto his personal 
experience of recovery in Narcotics Anonymous, which followed 12 steps. He required that they 
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acknowledge a systematic methodology for self-management, which included a commitment to 
self-awareness, a willingness to disclose their personal weaknesses to others, to implement and 
monitor personal behavior change, and to repair relationships where possible. To certify a 
physicians’ recovery, Kaufman looked to verify what he called “self-maintenance”, which went 
beyond merely abstaining from drugs or alcohol. Self-maintenance was for Kaufman a way of 
life that included a long-term commitment to what he called a ‘daily inventory’, to receiving and 
responding to feedback from others ranging from co-workers to family and friends, as well as 
having a daily meditative practice of some sort (Kaufmann 2017).  
 
 
5.6    
 
Administering an Ideal of Professional Transparency:  
Changes in Ontario’s Medical Licencing Forms: 1998-2009  
 
 
In April 1998, annual medical licence renewal forms were mailed from the College of Physicians 
and Surgeons (CPSO), the provincial medical regulator located in downtown Toronto to over 
19,000 physicians across the province of Ontario. With the convenience of a credit card and a 
postage-paid, pre-addressed envelope, renewing a medical licence in Ontario took only a few 
minutes; doctors were asked only to confirm to the medical regulator on a one-page mailer their 
address, hospital affiliations and specialty. In exchange, they were allowed privileged access to 
the province’s single-payer health system (Appendix C, Figure 1a and 1b). A year later, 
licencing forms including screening questions about regulatory actions outside the province and 
criminal offences, though licence renewal still could be completed in a matter of minutes 
(Appendix C, Figure 2).  
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Between 2007 and 2009, doctors across the province saw a qualitative change in medical 
licensing forms, which had expanded from a 4 to 22 pages, reflecting a shift toward increased 
accountability in the form of compliance with a national program of continuing medical 
education and consent to information-sharing agreements across multiple professional 
organizations. Accountability also extended to an expectation that physicians reflect on their 
personal health and disclose any perceived occupational risks, which included perceived risks 
due to symptoms of mental illness. Examples included recovery from a drug addiction and a 
psychiatric designation such as clinical depression or bipolar disorder, both of which were 
believed to increase the risk of doctors making mistakes at work. Expectations of personal 
disclosure extended to physical health, including disclosure of infection by HIV and hepatitis 
(Appendix C, figure 3). Figure 5.5 shows how in 2009 the CPSO further modified licencing 
forms in 2009 to create an open-ended question, “do you have any medical condition that could 
affect your ability to practice medicine”, reflecting a new Canada-wide professional expectation 
that physicians maintain their health in the interests of public safety (Richardson, Oswald et al. 
2015).  
 
Do you currently have any medical condition that affects or could affect your ability to 
practise medicine? 
Yes □ No □ 
 (ii) Have you ever had any medical condition that has affected or could affect your ability to 
practise medicine? 
Yes □ No □ 
 (iii) Have you ever taken a medical leave of absence, of any duration, from a medical school, a 
postgraduate medical training program or any professional position or employment? Please 
take note that all medical leaves of absence must be disclosed, even those less than six 
months in duration. 
 
Figure 5.5: Physician licencing form for new applicants in Ontario, 2009. Medical leaves of 
absence were most often for mental-health reasons, and mental health issues were linked to 
medical errors. (College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, 2009) (CPSO Archives)  
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The province’s new licensing forms were constructed with input from stakeholders including the 
CSPO, and representatives from the Ontario Medical Association, as well as representatives from 
the Canadian Medical Protective Association, the national malpractice insurer. Still, the CPSO 
had the last word. In a memo to the CPSO general council, the College registrar Rocco Gerase 
described changes to Ontario’s medical licencing forms as a response to the Ontario Health 
Systems Improvement Act of 2007, implemented in 2009 under the provincial conservative 
government of Mike Harris, which amended the Regulated Health Professions Act of 1991 
(Gerace, Faulkner et al. 2007). The Ontario Health Systems Improvement Act required the CPSO 
to oversee a province-wide quality assurance program, which the Act defined as “a program to 
assure the quality of the practice of the profession and to promote continuing evaluation, 
competence and improvement among the members” (Section 17, subsection 4). By 2009, the 
College was already the central node in an information gathering network, and the Health 
Systems Improvement Act served to further clarify expectations between stakeholders in the 
province’s medical system. The Act classified professional deviance into three categories and 
required the development of corresponding risk management programs. Section 61 spelled out as 
deviant physicians deemed “incompetent, incapacitated, or having sexually abused a patient”, 
with all three categories carrying mandatory reporting requirements. Physicians who failed to 
report suspicions of professional deviance became subject to penalties, as did institutions who 
failed to file reports to the CPSO about suspected professional deviance.   
 85.2  (1)  A person who operates a facility where one or more members practise shall file a report in accordance 
with section 85.3 if the person has reasonable grounds to believe that a member who practises at the facility is 
incompetent, incapacitated, or has sexually abused a patient.  1993, c. 37, s. 23; 2007, c. 10, Sched. M, s. 61. 
 
 
In addition, the Act expected the College to investigate physicians who had been convicted of 
any civil or criminal offence, an expectation deemed unrealistic by the CPSO (discussed below). 
As shown above in figure 5.5, first-time applicants for medical licences in Ontario, making up 
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approximately 10% of all medical licences issued in 2009, were asked to declare any health 
condition that might potentially affect their ability to practice medicine.  
 
From the perspective of the CPSO registrar, Rocco Gerase, the Health Systems Improvement Act 
was going to be expensive to implement. Each “yes” answer offered by physicians would need to 
be followed up, and it was necessary to budget not only for clerical staff but for higher-cost 
investigators and expert committees to adjudicate and write summaries on each case. Figure 5.6 
is a managerial flow diagram guiding decision making from the time a licencing form was 
opened in the College mail room to its transformation into a case to be investigated.  
Gerase engaged stakeholders to meet in the spring of 2007 at the CPSO head office in Toronto to 
hear concerns about proposed revisions to the province’s medical licence forms. The 
arrangement was predictably confrontational. Representatives of specialty organizations were 
also in attendance. To make the new surveillance program cost-effective, it would be important 
to avoid duplicating managerial tasks across institutions, and to find efficiencies in the existing 
information collection system, by coordinating the CPSO, the Ontario Hospital Association, the 
Ontario Medical Association, medical colleges and the two organizations overseeing ongoing 
medical education programs across Canada (the Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons and 
the College of Family Physicians).  
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Figure 5.6: Managerial block diagram used by office administrators to process approximately 
22,000 medical licences in the province of Ontario in 2009 (Gerace, Faulkner et al. 2007). 
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Transparency on civil and criminal charges: 
 
The CPSO expressed concerns that monitoring physicians for any civil proceedings as required 
by the Act was impractical, since civil cases ranged from speeding tickets to divorce proceedings. 
That said, knowledge of ongoing lawsuits might serve as a proxy measure for the quality of 
medical care provided by physicians. The College’s protocol for investigating “yes” answers to 
legal charges differed according to the kind of risk identified, and the kind of information already 
possessed through information sharing agreements. For example … “civil and criminal charges 
should be triaged against criteria which would include whether the College was aware of any 
outstanding concerns about the physician as well as against a high threshold for public safety. … 
In the instances where there were no concerns about the physician known to the College, and 
where the charges did not suggest imminent risk to patient safety, then the information would be 
retained, but no investigation would ensue unless further information was obtained by the 
College (for example a criminal conviction, a public compliant or issues arising in the quality 
assurance context)” (Gerace, Faulkner et al. 2007). 
 
In his cost-modeling exercise, Gerase considered two categories of offence, criminal charges and 
malpractice lawsuits. Criminal charges would, in his view, be relatively inexpensive to 
investigate; basing his estimate on conviction rates in the general Canadian population, Gerase 
reckoned that “…we might expect to learn of between 20 and 140 new convictions [among 
Ontario physicians] per year”. At an estimated cost of $2,430 per investigation (based on past 
experience), this could lead to an added expense of roughly $300,000 per year, which translated 
into only $15.00 per licence issued. The more difficult question was investigating malpractice 
suits, of which Gerase estimated up to 7-10% of physicians were dealing with at any given time 
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(assuming lawsuits can take up to a decade to settle). This was a much greater expense, and for 
the first year of increased surveillance, Gerase estimated 5 million dollars (roughly $250.00 per 
licence issued) then $300,000 per year for subsequent surveillance.  
 
Admittedly, asking physicians to self-disclose ongoing lawsuits was a flawed mode of 
surveillance, and physicians seeking to avoid detection had little to fear. As Gerase pointed out, 
comprehensive surveillance would involve hiring staff to monitor the Ontario court system for 
all lawsuits and criminal charges filed against physicians. But this would be a costly endeavor. 
As he explained, while criminal charges were relatively easy to monitor from one central point of 
data collection, Ontario did not have a centralized office for civil actions. … “Accordingly, to 
determine what civil actions have been filed against a particular individual, a search must be 
conducted of all jurisdictions where the suit could potentially have been filed. For example the 
plaintiff may have started an action in the courthouse where he or she lives, where the treatment 
occurred or where the defendant lives. We could conduct our own searches across several likely 
jurisdictions but there would be no way to capture all actions. The cost of conducting such 
searches annually for all physicians would be approximately $2 million”. The result was 
predictable; based on the cost of added surveillance, no legal monitoring program was 
implemented and the College opted to count on self-reporting.  
 
Representing the Ontario Medical Association, the professional body that acts on behalf of 
physicians in the province of Ontario, Barbara LeBlanc argued that the College had no right to 
go beyond self-report forms, expressing concerns that proactively tracing all legal cases filed 
against physicians would wrongly assume guilt, that lawsuits implied a “failure to meet the 
appropriate standard of practice”, regardless of the legal outcome. The Canadian Medical 
Protective Association and the Canadian Medical Association, the physicians’ malpractice 
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insurance corporation representing 97% of Canada’s doctors, argued that “organizations must 
collect the least amount of personal information necessary”. The wording of questions 2-6 in the 
2009 licence form ended up reflecting a compromise. Stakeholders agreed that all criminal 
charges should be reported regardless of outcome, but that when it came to malpractice suits, 
only those with findings against a physician or those settled out of court need be declared 
(Gerace, Faulkner et al. 2007).  
 
Transparency on HIV and Hepatitis status: 
 
 
HIV and Hepatitis introduced a bi-directional risk into the field of healthcare regulation, because 
healthcare workers could infect their patients, and vice versa. By 2009, Ontario hospitals, 
following a consensus guideline produced by the Ontario Hospital Association, routinely ordered 
HIV and Hepatitis serology for all healthcare workers as a pre-condition of employment (Suh 
and Poole 2008). Because the Ontario Hospital Association already had standard policies in 
place to mitigate risks for “exposure prone procedures” the College of Physicians and Surgeons 
did not anticipate high expenses in relation to item 8 on the licencing form, which requested 
disclosure by physicians who had tested positive for HIV or hepatits. Information-sharing 
agreements covered most cases. Exposure prone procedures included most forms of surgery 
(including oral surgery) and emergency medicine (CPSO 1998). Gerase estimated that 15.5% of 
Ontario doctors were involved in such procedures. Citing U.S. hospital-based data, he noted that 
375 patients had been infected with Hepatitis B from their surgeon since 1970. Infection rates per 
million procedures were 240-2,400 for Hepatitis B, 50-500 for Hepatits C and  2.4-24 for HIV 
(Gerace, Faulkner et al. 2007). Gerase wrote that “the purpose of the question is to reduce risk 
for patients by identifying physicians whose health status might put patients at risk and by 
ensuring that they practice safely under the appropriate restrictions where indicated” (p. 15). 
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Based on the perception of risk reduction, he argued that public knowledge that physicians’ 
health was being monitored would “improve patient confidence in the medical system and the 
College.”  
 
One member of the Ontario Medical Association asked why, given that Ontario hospitals used 
universal precautions, there was any need to include a physician’s personal health information in 
the licencing process, but for Gerase, it was about meeting public expectations …  “although the 
risk to patients is very low, the effect of infection is potentially devastating. Furthermore, 
patients expect that the College would have this information. Ensuring their confidence in our 
regulatory capabilities may, in part, depend on our meeting such expectations”. Bolstering 
confidence in the medical profession around its handing of blood-born pathogens would have 
been front and center in the minds of many following the Krever Inquiry, which documented that 
approximately 2000 Canadians had been infected with HIV and approximately 30,000 with 
hepatitis C (Canada 1997, Duffin 2005). Even so, legal counsel for the Ontario Medical 
Association pointed out that there had been no documented transmissions of HIV or Hepatitis C 
from Canadian physicians to patients, and only one case of hepatitis B transmission from an 
orthopedic surgeon. The most dramatic case of transmission from a Canadian healthcare worker 
to multiple patients was related to an electroencephalogram technologist who transmitted 
hepatitis B through improperly cleaned electrodes (Johnson 2000). Despite further opposition 
from the Ontario Medical Association sections of Obstetrics and Dermatology, that questions 
about infection status were an unacceptable invasion of privacy, the CPSO board followed 
Gerase’s guidance, and voted to accept the screening questions on blood-born pathogens 
(Gerace, Faulkner et al. 2007).  The political stakes of a perceived failure in oversight were too 
high for the CPSO.   
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From a cost perspective, asking physicians to disclose their HIV and Hepatitis status to the 
College of Physicians and Surgeons was easy to justify to the CPSO board. Not only did Ontario 
hospitals already screen and investigate surgeons, but according to the Health Systems 
Improvement Act, they would now be mandated to share this information with the College. As a 
result, only a small handful of physicians (Gerase estimated it at 5 per year) would fall outside 
the automatic hospital surveillance system. The estimated cost to follow up five new cases per 
year was $46,000 and the cost associated with arranging testing for physicians who had not 
completed their serology every 3 years as requested was $23,400 per year.    
 
 
Transparency regarding Mental Health: 
 
 
When the CPSO licencing committee discussed the topic of mental health questions with 
stakeholders in 2008, representatives from the Ontario and Canadian Medical Associations both 
argued that the regulator should “focus on whether a physician has adequate self-control of any 
impairment that affects skill, attitude or judgement” (italics added) (Gerace, Faulkner et al. 2007) 
(p.16). The Ontario Medical Association also registered concerns that the College’s  …. 
“collection of health information might prevent physicians from seeking care that they needed 
(in the case of mental health and addictions) and that the College would use the information 
collected to remove physicians from practice, or otherwise subject them to workplace 
discrimination”(Gerace, Faulkner et al. 2007). In their view, the policy of asking physicians to 
come forward for more intensive investigations and possibly monitoring would only motivate 
physicians with mental health issues to evade detection. One physician in attendance thought it 
would be better to teach “physicians whose health status makes them incapable of safe practice 
to withdraw from practice voluntarily” (Gerace, Faulkner et al. 2007). Rocco Gerace took for 
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granted that for the most part, mental health issues among physicians referred mostly to opiate 
and alcohol addiction. The CPSO had since 1995 modeled their handling of impaired physicians 
on the U.S. system, offloading the management of physicians deemed “impaired due to a 
medical problem” to the Ontario Medical Association’s Physician Health Program. It was under 
the administrative umbrella of the Physician Health Program that the durability of a physician’s 
recovery from a mental health issue was adjudicated.  
 
As will be discussed below, the Ontario Medical Association took administrative guidance from 
the Federation of State Physician Health Programs, that had for two decades developed 
techniques for encouraging physicians with addiction issues to come forward without fear of 
retribution. This meant that in exchange for coming forward to the Ontario Medical Association 
(rather than the regulator), physicians would not have to disclose their health issues to the CPSO. 
In effect, by 2007 the CPSO had fully offloaded its investigation and management of physicians 
deemed “impaired” or “potentially impaired” to the Ontario Medical Association Physician 
Health Program. Even though there was no precedent in Canada to estimate the number of 
physicians who would come forward on medical licensing forms with a potential mental-health 
problem, Gerase modeled the number of “yes” answers based on consultation with 
Saskatchewan’s medical regulator, which had implemented a similar screening question the year 
before. Gerase put his estimate at 110 “yes” responses, but as became evident, his estimate did 
not capture practical issues facing administrators at the Physician Health Program, whose job it 
was to certify recovery. 
5.7 
Potential Mental-Health Impairment as a Managerial Problem   
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As this section will argue, Ontario’s administrative category of potential impairment, when 
applied to perceptions of mental illness, exposed the limits and legal risks of a licensing strategy 
that tried to single out individuals as ‘risky’. Beginning in 2009, licencing applications with a 
“yes” beside the question about potential impairment were funneled into a special assessment 
process. The problem for administrators was that the concept of the “impaired physician”, an 
administrative category developed in the 1970’s to deal with doctors who practiced medicine 
while drinking or using drugs, had changed. The knowledge framework in which impairment 
was defined had shifted from behaviour that could be observed by others and whose cause could 
be objectively measured, to feelings and intuitions based on self-reflection. How could 
knowledge based on self-reflection be trusted and what institutional function did it serve?  
 
 
By the time the Ontario Medical Association Physician Health Program started operations in 
1995, the U.S. Federation of State Physician Health Programs had already extended its 
definitions of impaired physicians to include not only doctors with drug and alcohol addictions, 
but also to those who had recovered from conditions like DSM-IV recurrent major depressive 
disorder, bipolar disorder and Post Traumatic Stress disorder to name a few (McCall, Carr et al. 
2005).  
The Ontario Physician Health Program tried at first to restrict itself to managing physicians who 
identified with alcohol and drug addiction, as Kaufman was uncomfortable certifying recovery 
when people didn’t fit his model of abstaining from drugs and attending support groups 
(Kaufmann 2016, Kaufmann 2017).  
 
By the early 2000’s, the Ontario Physician Health Program began encountering an unanticipated 
problem. Physicians entered the program because of an addiction issue but the same physicians 
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often used maintenance psychiatric drugs. By 2004 a third of physicians monitored for a 
substance use problem had also received a DSM-IV diagnosis of bipolar disorder or recurrent 
major depressive disorder for which maintenance drugs were prescribed (Brewster, Kaufmann et 
al. 2008).  
 
In 2005 the Ontario Physician Health Program formally extended its mandate to the investigation 
and management of doctors whose psychiatric designations went beyond addictions. Without 
exception this group of physicians used long-term maintenance psychiatric drugs like Lithium, 
Epival and Prozac. Occupational monitoring was similar to the protocol for doctors recovering 
from drug addiction. A workplace monitor would provide monthly written reports and in 
addition, agreed to provide more urgent reports as required. Monitoring also included visits with 
a caseworker from the PHP as well as reports from treating psychiatrists, to provide added 
reassurance around a participant’s frame of mind. Monitoring contracts would continue for 2-5 
years, but in many cases monitoring became a career-long safety net, especially if requested by 
the CPSO.  
 
Prior to 2009, physicians referred to the PHP program with mental health issues (not addictions) 
entered through a complaints investigation, initiated by the CPSO, or from hospitals concerned 
about a physician’s mental stability. With Ontario’s revised medical licence forms in 2009, risk-
assessors at the Physician Health Program encountered a new kind of mental health problem. 
New applicants for medical licences, mostly new graduates for whom self-reflection exercises 
had been encouraged as part of professional development, had looked inward, and had felt 
comfortable disclosing what they saw as a potential risk; many new licencing applicants were 
aware of a tendency toward mild (but not incapacitating) forms of emotional distress.   
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Complicating the adjudication of new applicants with self-declared risks for future impairment 
was the emergence of the term “burnout” in medical communications. Although not an official 
DSM category, the syndrome of “burnout” had been statistically validated by the American 
psychologist Christina Maslach in 1996 to describe a syndrome of work-related fatigue linked to 
increased medical errors. According to Maslach, burnout referred to “emotional exhaustion in 
which overwhelming work demands depleted an individual’s energy. Symptoms included 
depersonalization and cynicism, in which people detached emotionally from their work, and 
feelings of inefficacy, in which they perceived a lack of personal achievement” (Maslach, 
Jackson et al. 1997, Maslach, Schaufeli et al. 2003). Maslach developed a standardized 22-item 
scale called the “Maslach Burnout Inventory” that was applied by occupational psychologists to 
hospital staff (Thomas 2004). She had adapted the term “burnout” from a 1961 novel called A 
Burnt Out Case, which described, in her words, a “spiritually tormented and disillusioned 
architect who quits his job and withdraws into the African jungle” (Greene 1961, Maslach, 
Schaufeli et al. 2003). The syndrome was presented in medical journals as an occupational 
problem endemic to hospitals where physicians worked long shifts contributing to medical errors 
(Schernhammer and Colditz 2004, Thomas 2004, Dyrbye, Thomas et al. 2006, Braun, 
Schönfeldt-Lecuona et al. 2007, Fahrenkopf, Sectish et al. 2007, Keeton, Fenner et al. 2007, 
Balch, Freischlag et al. 2009, Goebert, Thompson et al. 2009, Zwack and Schweitzer 2013).  By 
the early 21st century, multiple studies had shown that the term burnout seemed applicable to 
roughly half of medical residents working in hospitals at any given time, and to roughly 20% of 
fully qualified physicians in North America (Thomas 2004, Fahrenkopf, Sectish et al. 2007). 
Burnout also became a topic in the popular press, warning of sleep-starved doctors that were as 
“impaired as a drunk” (Picard 2005). 
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The syndrome of burnout created problems for the assessment of on new licencing applicants 
who self-identified as potentially impaired. At issue was that mental health risk assessments had 
been calibrated to people who had experienced debilitating symptoms, and for whom mild 
symptoms of mental distress could signify an impending relapse (Katon and al. 1997, Judd and 
al. 1998, Zimmerman, Posternak et al. 2004, Zimmerman, Posternak et al. 2006). The same 
correlation however did not apply to people who had not experienced debilitating psychiatric 
symptoms. Burnout was a matter of personal exhaustion, developed in the context of 
occupational health.  
 
Assuming there was no record of workplace complaints, applicants believed to be reporting 
symptoms of burnout were likely be approved for full licensure by the CPSO, and no further 
contact with the Physician Health Program was needed. Some assessments however were not so 
straightforward. Examples included applicants who had taken a month away from work because 
of mental health issues, and upon returning, experienced problems with concentration, energy 
and mood. If such an applicant used a long-term maintenance antidepressant, monitoring was, 
more often than not, recommended (Kaufmann 2017). Similarly, risk assessors at the PHP were 
more likely to recommend a more intensive assessment and possible monitoring for those who 
had a workplace complaint. Still, much was left up to the discretion of the assessor, as outlined in 
the Ontario Medical Association policy on monitoring: 
Final determination of the eligibility for enrollment in the Psychiatric Monitoring 
Program is at the discretion of the Medical Director or Associate Medical Director. 
The Psychiatric Monitoring Contract will detail the monitoring conditions and will 
be explained to each participant prior to enrolling in the monitoring program. 
Monitoring conditions will be reviewed by the Medical Director, Associate Medical 
Director or his/her designate on at least an annual basis and any changes to the 
monitoring program and contract thought to be appropriate by the Medical Director 
or Associate Medical Director may be made at that time (Kaufmann and 
Albuquerque 2002). 
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Risk assessors also took into consideration the kinds of medications used when deciding whether 
workplace monitoring was required. Using a form of logic described by the anthropologist 
Andrew Lakoff as “pharmacological reason”, assessors assumed a relationship between the 
severity of a physician’s mental disability and the kind of psychiatric drugs they used (Lakoff 
2006). For example, between 2009 and 2017, only one physician had been enrolled in the 
monitoring program who did not use a maintenance medication. On the other hand, physicians 
monitored for 5 or more years tended to use drugs like lithium and anti-psychotics, while those 
more likely to qualify for the minimum monitoring of 2 years used only a single antidepressant 
(for example Prozac). The Physician Health Program monitoring policy required that physicians 
accept a psychiatric diagnosis so one can infer that doctors who saw their mood swings or fatigue 
as non-medical would not have come to official attention barring a formal regulatory complaint.  
 
The duration of the Psychiatric Monitoring Contract will be individually determined 
based upon the needs of the participant, the recommendations of the attending mental 
health clinician and the evaluation by the Medical Director or Associate Medical 
Director. The minimum duration will be two years.  The maximum duration will be 
five years.  When the participant is a student or resident in training the duration of 
the monitoring may be linked to the duration of the training program. The final 
determination will be left to the discretion of the Medical Director or Associate 
Medical Director (Kaufmann and Albuquerque 2002). 
 
Criteria to be considered for minimum duration of 2 years: 
 
1. The participant has an illness that is well-controlled or completely remitted with 
treatment  
2. The participant exhibits acceptance and ongoing insight into his/her illness. 
3. The participant has a history suggestive of a low risk for recurrence.22  
4. The participant has a good program developed in the event of a recurrence of his/her 
illness. 
 
Criteria to be considered for maximum duration of 5 years: 
 
1. The participant has an illness that was difficult to stabilize or the individual continues 
to have some ongoing symptoms despite treatment. 
                                                        
22 Low risk of recurrence may be defined as ≤ 2 previous recurrences with good inter-episode 
recovery or treatment response(6, 9). 
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2. The participant’s illness contributes at times to difficulty with insight into his/her 
illness and compliance with treatment. 
3. The participant’s history is suggestive of a moderate to high risk of recurrence 
despite adequate treatment.23 
4. The participant does not have a satisfactory contingency plan in place to manage an 
exacerbation of symptoms or recurrence of their illness. 
5. The participant has a comorbid illness or a poorly controlled comorbid illness that 
can trigger or exacerbate their psychiatric condition. Longstanding, stable comorbid 
disorders do not necessarily require a longer duration of contract. 
 
 
The decision to escalate a licence application to further investigation would at the very least be 
financially costly to the applicant, most likely a medical graduate already in debt from their 
studies. The financial cost of a comprehensive expert assessment was up to 10,000 U.S. Dollars 
in 2009 (usually paid by the physician being assessed). Setting aside the financial cost, there was 
a social cost of such investigations; regardless of the outcome, an official investigation could 
raise the suspicion of colleagues, with a potential impact on a physician’s future career 
development. The PHP relied on a compilation of assessments that usually took about 6 months 
to complete. Because time away from work led to lost income, some physicians elected to pay 
out of pocket to have their assessments completed quickly at specialized assessment centers in 
the United States, where a profitable industry had grown around disability assessments for 
Physician Health Programs. Outsourcing of professional assessments to the United States, is one 
example of how integrated medical surveillance had become across North America.  
 
Deciding which licencing applicants required more intensive investigations and oversight was 
complicated by the very administrative structure that brought borderline cases to attention in the 
first place. On the one hand, the PHP had calibrated its assessment processes around physicians 
                                                        
23 Moderate risk of recurrence would refer to at least 2 previous relapses (with ongoing 
treatment) and /or presence of unremitting symptoms. High risk of relapse would refer to ≥3 
previous recurrences (with ongoing treatment) and /or the presence of unremitting symptoms 
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whose level of disability had been severe and incapacitating, and it had calibrated its oversight to 
manage roughly 200 monitoring contracts at any given time. On the other hand, the CPSO’s new 
licencing policies in 2009 introduced a new kind of risk assessment requiring even subtler and 
more expensive testing including psychometrics along with clinical interviews, reviews of past 
medical and workplace reports, and interviews with co-workers and supervisors. At the same 
time, institutional accountability was increasing, which meant that for each decision “not to 
monitor” a licencing applicant, risk assessors were talking on more risk than they had in the past. 
Prior to the development of an integrated surveillance network, physicians who had behaved 
unprofessionally could bear the full brunt of responsibility for their actions. With the 
entanglement of institutions in a surveillance network however, institutions in the network 
became legally accountable when surveillance broke down. This increased accountability in turn 
fed back on decisions when handling licencing applications.   
 
In 2009, a lawsuit involving the Ontario PHP was still working its way through the courts. The 
case represented a new level of legal accountability for the province’s integrated professional 
surveillance network. No longer would it be possible for institutions to wash their hands of 
physicians who stepped out of line. The case began on November 6, 2004, when Marc Daniel, a 
34-year-old doctor, walked into the emergency room of the Grace Hospital in Windsor, Ontario 
and murdered a nurse, Laurie Dupont, before ending his own life. Daniel had been off work and 
had come to the attention of the PHP for mental health reasons (both a substance use disorder 
and psychiatric designations including bipolar disorder and a personality disorder). His problems 
were also known to hospital administrators, physicians at his hospital, nurses and the CPSO, and 
thus all involved organizations were exposed to civil litigation surrounding the murder. Daniel 
was about to start back to work after health clearance from the Ontario Physician Health 
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Program. Based on the information available to the PHP weeks before the incident, he was 
emotionally well enough to navigate the complexities of work as an anesthetist. He was showing 
up for appointments with his psychiatrist, who said he was ‘responding’ to his maintenance 
medications. While the hospital eventually settled out of court after a decade of litigation for not 
providing adequate protection for Dupont, the coroner’s inquest following the murder identified 
failures across the medical surveillance system, including the hospital for failing to protect its 
employees, the CPSO for failing to suspend Daniel’s license, the Physician Health Program for 
failing to fact-check its information prior to certifying a return to work, the Nurses Association 
for failing to advocate for the deceased, and the clinicians treating Dr. Daniel for failing to detect 
his murderous intentions (McCallum 2008) (Appendix E). For risk managers at the PHP, the case 
meant that certifying an acceptable level of health among applicants who had never, to their 
knowledge, experienced a debilitating condition in the first place, exposed the program to 
liability.  
 
Physicians who came forward with concerns about potential future impairment, were therefore 
more likely than not to be asked to undergo an expensive, time-consuming assessment prior to 
being allowed to practice medicine in Ontario.  
 
Unintended effects of using maintenance drugs as tools of surveillance  
 
While records of assessments remain confidential at an individual level, aggregate numbers 
provide some context to the changing meaning of the impaired physician category in Ontario. 
Over a two-year period between 2011 and 2013, of 82 applicants coming forward with a self-
declared mental-health risk that was not a drug or alcohol addiction, 42 went on to formal 
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monitoring, and all but one of these were users of maintenance psychiatric drugs. On the other 
hand, almost all applicants for medical licenses who did not use maintenance psychiatric drugs 
were deemed “low risk” and no monitoring was required. Put another way, by using a 
maintenance psychiatric drug, first-time applicants for medical licenses in Ontario marked 
themselves as potentially impaired while applicants with psychiatric designations, if not treated 
with drugs, were less likely to be considered in need of monitoring. An exception, reminiscent of 
risk adjudication by life insurers discussed in chapter 4, was a designation of bipolar disorder, 
which itself signified potential impairment, regardless of an applicant’s medication use.  
Applicants for medical licenses in Ontario who self-identified with a health risk made 
themselves vulnerable, especially if they used maintenance psychiatric drugs to prevent future 
symptoms of mental illness. Their livelihood depended on passing through a stringent (and 
expensive) risk assessment that could lead to workplace monitoring, with implications for career 
advancement. Even as medical educators were shaping the identity of Ontario physicians to 
include attention to personal health and increased self-reflection, physicians who used 
maintenance psychiatric drugs were faced with anxieties about stigma at work. Had Ontario’s 
professional surveillance network pushed the boundaries of personal disclosure, and would 
physicians resist aspects of health surveillance? Because Ontario’s PHP was modeled on U.S. 
Programs, it is possible to draw some inferences from recent research.  
 
Investigating physicians’ attitude toward policies of self-disclosure on medical licencing forms 
in the United States, researchers at the University of Michigan used a confidential online tool to 
collect feedback on the collection of personal health information by state licencing bodies from 
over 2000 female physicians across 50 states (Gold, Andrew et al. 2016). Most of the women in 
the study were under the age of 40 and half had received treatment for a mental health condition 
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including medication and talk therapy. A third had received a psychiatric diagnosis and most 
were aware of state licencing requirements to report this diagnosis to their medical regulator, yet 
only 6% of women (2% of the total survey group) self-disclosed. Of the 2% who self-disclosed, a 
third were investigated by a state Physician Health Program for workplace monitoring. Three 
quarters of those surveyed believed “it was not the business of the state medical board” to look 
into personal mental health issues as long as those issues did not raise workplace concerns. The 
study did not identify how many women were monitored by state PHP’s as a result of self-
disclosure. It did however identify the personal impact of pro-active risk management policies, 
that required physicians to report mental health issues on their medical licences. One woman 
said: 
“My mental health issues are directly related to chronic illness. I was required to do a 
face to face interview with a board member and almost six months of 
‘retraining/supervision’ because I had been off work for 2 years. This was imposed 
by the board, despite NO adverse actions in my past and active licensure in another 
state” 
 
Another woman left medical practice because of her experience after disclosing a mental illness 
on her medical licence application:   
“All of my fears were realized when I did report it. I was placed in a very strict and 
punitive Physician Health Program that didn’t allow me to take meds written by my 
doctor for anxiety and insomnia. I am now not practicing at all because of this.”  
 
Gold et al also investigated the effects of licencing policies on the likelihood that women would 
seek help for problems with a mental health issue. More than two thirds of women respondents 
said that licencing policies made it much less likely that they would seek help for mental health 
issues, for fear that their medical record would be used against them. … 
“This is a huge problem for physicians. I directly know of MDs that could qualify for 
DSM criteria for depression and anxiety that refuse to get help and cite board 
reprimand and punitive intervention as the primary cause of not seeking professional 
help”.  
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“I heard horror stories from other physicians that got identified by the medical board 
physician health program and were required to pay >10,000 out-of-pocket for 
evaluation and had daily random drug and alcohol tests – for a diagnosis of 
postpartum depression”.  
 
One physician commented:  
 
“I thought that no matter what health system (my own or other), or what state, 
treatment would never really truly be private in the setting of my career path as a 
physician”.  
 
These comments point to a lack of confidence in licencing reforms, or at least to a perception by 
physicians that any disclosure of mental health issues to medical regulators in the interests of 
preventing future harms to the public will exact a significant personal cost. There is good reason 
to think that Ontario’s physicians had similar attitudes toward self-disclosure of mental health 
issues to their counterparts in the U.S. In 2015, there were over 28,000 physicians licenced in 
Ontario24. Licencing reforms in Ontario screening for mental health issues targeted first-time 
applicants in 2009, and first-time applicants included a combination of new graduates and 
physicians entering the province from elsewhere. Approximately 10% of the total number of 
medical licences issued each year in Ontario are new licences, meaning that between 2009 and 
2015, roughly 17,500 new licences would have been issued (assuming 2,500 per year) in which 
applicants were asked to disclose potential health issues. If Ontario’s doctors used maintenance 
psychiatric drugs to prevent future psychiatric symptoms at even half the general population rate 
of 10%, one would have expected 125 referrals to the PHP risk screening process each year. 
Instead, over a two-year period, the PHP assessed only 41 applicants per year, or 0.8% of new 
applicants. Ontario’s doctors appear to have learned that remaining silent is in their best interest.  
 
                                                        
24 Number of practicing physicians in 2015 according to the Ontario Physician Human Resource 
Data Centre http://www.ophrdc.org. 
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5.8  
Discussion  
 
The CPSO’s proactive mode of governance using self-declared “potential impairment” as a risk 
category, should not be mistaken for other forms of corporate risk management based on 
identifying risky workers, and re-deploying them to less risky work environments, or using 
standardized testing criteria to guide hiring practices. The example of ‘accident proneness’, 
which operated between about 1920 and 1960 serves as an example. For almost half a century, 
industrial psychologists sought to standardize a medical syndrome called “accident proneness” 
that would screen out accident prone workers before they were hired (Burnham 2009). 
Identifying accident prone workers was a priority for railway and factory owners, who sought to 
avoid damage to their equipment, expensive production delays, and lawsuits due to human error. 
Ideally, workers diagnosed with the condition would be screened out before they were hired, but 
if the condition was discovered among long-time employees it might be manageable with special 
remediation. Citing the philosopher Robert Campbell, Burnham historicized accidents as threats 
to contractual expectations (for example as codified in laws and policies) (Campbell 1997). 
Impetus to identify a syndrome of accident-prone-ness faded as the legal responsibility for 
industrial accidents shifted toward corporations, and toward expectations about workplace design 
(for example ergonomics) and management strategies (for example maximum allowable working 
hours). Occupational risk was re-contextualized within an assemblage of workers, industrial 
engineers, machinery and management techniques. The syndrome of accident prone-ness thrived 
in the first half of the 20th century then faded into obscurity by the 1960’s. 
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Similar to the rise of engineering solutions for industrial safety, the management of medical 
safety has gone well beyond attempts to single out risky workers, toward organizational solutions 
(Gawande 2010). Examples of medical workplace reform have included standardized checklists 
for intensive care units, computerized tracking of operating-room equipment, and universal 
precautions to prevent the spread of infection. Canadian medical residents now have mandatory 
maximum hours, and organizational experts are working to design more tolerable working 
conditions in hospitals and clinics. At least in the case of large health organizations, having a 
large labor pool to draw upon, may make it possible to accommodate physicians whose health 
(and quality of work) is particularly vulnerable to shiftwork. Such managerial innovations have 
been published in professional journals with names like The Journal of Patient Safety and 
Infection Control, since the 1990’s, creating authorities on public protection. On the surface, the 
development of safety policies based on the use of institutional checks and balances seems to 
closely follow the rise of engineered safety solutions described in the 1950’s and 60’s as the 
syndrome of accident prone-ness faded away. Understood as an echo of accident-proneness, 
Ontario’s use of self-declared “potential impairment” as a tool of occupational risk management 
is a puzzling, even regressive move, in a direction away from designing safer workplaces.   
 
The category of potential impairment in Ontario’s medical licensing system connected 
maintenance psychiatric drugs to questions of professional autonomy, public safety, as well as 
personal and institutional accountability. On the surface, using psychiatric drugs as markers of 
potential impairment seems no different than any screen-and-intervene form of risk management. 
But there is little evidence that the CPSO had major concerns that doctors who used psychiatric 
maintenance drugs represented a clear danger to the public. Rather, it seems more plausible that 
increasing surveillance for potential impairment served to demonstrate the potential reach of 
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professional oversight. The methods used by Ontario’s Physician Health Program, especially the 
combination of workplace monitors and onsite visits by case-managers ensured visibility of the 
monitoring program across the province, offering clear evidence to legislators, hospital 
administrators and to members of the public, that the CPSO was promoting province-wide 
proactive surveillance. This was a major administrative feat that required the cooperation of local 
hospital administrators and medical leadership across a geographical area twice the size of 
France. Whether or Ontario continues to use psychiatric drug maintenance as a marker of 
occupational risk among physicians, the case illustrates the limits to applying psychiatric 
knowledge outside the clinic. Administrators currently weighing the use of even more intrusive 
personal health information such as cognitive screening and genetic screening for dementia risk 
in the name of achieving competitive advantage in the medical marketplace may find these limits 
worth considering (Laguado 2017). 
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CHAPTER 6  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
“If suicide becomes a confession of failure we are left with only successful survivors.”  
William Gaddis  (Gaddis 2002). 
 
 
This dissertation began within the confines of mental medicine as psychiatrists embraced the 
promise of pharmacotherapy to change the trajectory of mental illness, while drawing on an 
anticipatory grammar of maintenance shock and coma therapy. I have tried to say close to the 
language of drug maintenance as it morphed through reciprocal interactions with worlds beyond 
the locked institutional wards from which it emerged. Ultimately, maintenance drugs became an 
interface between worlds with different methodological and substantive concerns (Star and 
Griesmer 1989, Fujimura 1992). Figure 6.1 pictures psychiatric drug maintenance as it was 
stabilized by the late 20th century. It comes into focus as a probe for neuroscience and genetic 
research, a tool of efficient mental healthcare, an object of government regulation, a path to 
annuitizing drug sales, a tool of professionalization, a form of surveillance and also a tool of self-
optimization. The survival of psychiatric drug maintenance considered in this context becomes 
remarkable in an environment that both supported and undermined its existence.  
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Figure 6.1: Drug maintenance and its product, the drug responder, as they were understood in the 
late 20th century at the interface of multiple social worlds, sometimes with very different 
methodological, economic, and political agendas.  
 
Figure 6.1 creates a very different picture than we get from hewing close to a biomedical 
framework, where drug maintenance becomes a sign that people have learned to think about their 
mental suffering in terms of brain abnormalities (Healy 2008, Rose and Abi-Rached 2013, 
Shorter 2015). In such a framework, government policies and even laws will eventually, it is 
proposed, align with the logic of brain science (Rose and Abi-Rached 2013). The problem of 
drug maintenance would from this perspective be reduced to questions of the following type: is 
psychiatry’s confidence in maintenance drugs based on true knowledge that some people achieve 
an enduring recovery because of a drug or is it based on a probabilistic picture of successful 
disease modification (Forrester 1996, Horwitz 2011)? This logic discounts not only the multiple 
intersecting roles played by psychiatric drugs beyond the individual patient, but it tends to focus 
toward a less complex, futuristic solution to the problem of mental illness. Perhaps even more 
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insidious is that it can hide behind critiques of current psychiatric research and its 
overwhelmingly commercial funding. An underlying message is that psychiatric research as 
currently conducted has failed to solve the problem of mental illness because there is little 
corporate incentive to ask questions that might lead to unprofitable answers. Current ways of 
knowing about psychiatric drug maintenance can thus be understood as an instance of the 
intentional production of ignorance, the shaping of an authoritative world view to suit the 
commercial and professional interests of those who stand to benefit most from leaving key 
questions unasked25. Few would argue that pharmaceutical companies don’t foster the production 
of ignorance and again few would argue that physicians have not benefitted from their monopoly 
on the drug prescribing; these are well-worn problems in the history of medicine. This project 
has instead tried to go beyond a framework that takes for granted mental illness as a problem of 
disordered brain chemistry to understand drug maintenance in a more nuanced way.  
 
As chapters four and five have outlined, psychiatric drugs have for the past half century raised 
serious concerns for institutions whose mandates were far from therapeutic. In fields like 
insurance and licensing, maintenance drugs, as tools of surveillance, rivaled and even 
undermined the authority of mental illness labels. Here, the presence of a maintenance drug was 
not greeted as an assurance of stability and well-being. Rather, it served as a flag that began with 
more questions and could end with exclusion or sanctions. While psychiatric labels can be 
disputed and revisited by experts, compliance with maintenance drugs can be understood as 
revealing a consumer’s deepest anxieties and beliefs about their future prospects. It is a form of 
                                                        
25 The neologism “agnatology” has been proposed as the study of  … “how ignorance is produced or maintained in 
diverse settings, through mechanisms such as deliberate or inadvertent neglect, secrecy and suppression” Proctor, R. 
and L. Schiebinger, Eds. (2008). Agnotology: The Making and Unmaking of Ignorance. Stanford, California 
Stanford University Press. 
 .  
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surveillance connected to beliefs about consumer self-selection, not dis-similar to today’s 
marketing techniques in which consumers’ preferences are gathered up from their internet 
browsing patterns. The American novelist William Gaddis had in mind this kind of brutally 
pragmatic logic of self-selection when he wrote in his essay The Rush For Second Place … “if 
suicide becomes a confession of failure we are left with only successful survivors”(Gaddis 
2002). Knowledge of maintenance drug use has become an efficient way for risk managers to 
overcome the old problem of anti-selection. Life insurance is perhaps the most obvious example, 
since insurers protect themselves by collecting fees on all approved applications while paying 
out only after confirming facts against medical records in a post-mortem investigation. Deciding 
to withhold information about drug use in the hopes of securing a lower premium puts the 
consumer’s heirs at risk. As for the surveillance functioning in licensing, this dissertation was 
constrained by the available sources. Given the passage of enough time, it will likely become 
possible for example to review the role of psychiatric drugs in safety sensitive areas such as 
personnel selection for airlines and railways, as well in their use by the military for screening 
recruits and by law enforcement agencies for gun licensing. At least one current project is 
developing along these lines, exploring the adjudication of drivers licence applications among 
people who used anti-seizure medications in the 1950’s (Elder 2015).  
 
The use of drug maintenance as a tool of surveillance reflects in part a long-standing mistrust in 
the medical profession and among North American policymakers toward anyone who admits to 
using mind-altering substances (Herzberg 2017). Concerns about physiological dependence to 
psychiatric drugs are scattered throughout psychiatric journals in the 1950’s and 60’s, and as 
chapter 3 points out, statisticians by the early 1990’s routinely analyzed drug maintenance trials 
for the effects of drug withdrawal in study participants. Thinking at the level of drug policies, the 
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historian David Herzberg has framed psychiatric drug consumption in America from the 
perspective of market formation, with prescription drugs serving as a counterpoint to mind-
altering drugs sold on the black market such as cocaine, heroin and a whole range of synthetic 
opiates. Thinking about drug use at the level of market formation helps bring to light a 
connection between patterns of drug consumption and race, gender and social class (Herzberg 
2017). His approach helps us see as permeable the boundary between addiction on the one hand 
and compliance with psychiatric drug maintenance on the other. If public perceptions of this 
boundary becomes more permeable, perhaps it would be only a small step to seeing how the 
promise of mind-altering drugs more generally can be used to stabilize structural violence by de-
emphasizing the importance of factors like safe, stable housing, relationships and work as 
fundamental to each person’s mental health.  Concerns in the popular press about physiological 
dependence on maintenance drugs like antidepressants have been a more recent phenomenon, 
and it is too early to tell if these reports will translate into either increased drug sales for those 
seeking altered states or reduced drug sales among those fearing addiction (Whitaker 2010, 
Carey and Gebeloff 2018). 
 
Thinking about psychiatric drugs at the boundary of illegal drugs is evolving, particularly with 
renewed scientific interest in LSD, and other hallucinogens such as Ketamine as potentially 
mainstream medical interventions (Dyck 2008). For drug regulators and for psychiatric 
epidemiologists, hallucinogens, like maintenance drugs raise questions about objectivity and the 
creation of generalizable knowledge. Is it possible to quantify a mystical or transcendent feeling? 
Must that feeling endure to count as a response? Erica Dyck shows us how hallucinogens have 
operated (and likely will continue to operate) as boundary objects between the world of 
addiction, the world of brain research, and the world of drug regulation. Current debates over the 
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legalization or at least decriminalization of marijuana are reviving questions asked in the 1960’s 
about the place of mind-altering drugs in our society as aids to self-optimization and as tools of 
surveillance. It is tempting to speculate that marijuana will soon compete in clinical trials with 
SSRI’s and other approved drugs for a place in North American formularies. Will statisticians at 
law enforcement databases stratify people according to their drug consumption patterns as ways 
of identifying risk groups?  
 
Thinking about psychiatric drugs necessarily allows us to reflect on how we have come to think 
about the causes and cures of mental suffering. Drug maintenance, by evoking the time element, 
allows us to ask what it is to maintain one’s mental health and in what framework we might be 
satisfied to assess it. While psychiatric epidemiology and the tradition of brain science will 
continue to add valuable information about how drugs exert their effects, it is hard to imagine 
without applying a broader lens a satisfying way to understand the limits of surveillance, the 
need for personal privacy, the desire for self-optimization, and the continual recalibration of 
psychiatry’s language over time.  
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Appendix A:  
Epidemiology and Naming Conventions for Psychiatric Drugs 
 
 
Epidemiology and Naming Conventions of Psychiatric Drugs  
 
 
According to two epidemiological studies, psychiatric medications are among the most 
commonly used prescriptions drugs in North America. Among North Americans between the 
ages of 18 and 44 for example, antidepressants are the third most common prescription, 
increasing in use by 400% between 1988 and 2008. Slightly over a third of Americans with 
moderate to severe depressive symptoms use antidepressants and 8% of users report no 
symptoms. Among users, women have consistently outnumbered men by a ratio of 2:1. Between 
2005 and 2008, 11% of North Americans filled a prescription for a daily antidepressant 
medication and 7% had received a monthly antidepressant prescription for two or more 
consecutive years. 14% of people who use antidepressants have done so for 10 years or longer. 
25% of American women between the ages of 40 and 59 use antidepressants. International 
comparisons in psychiatric drug usage are difficult to make because methods differ across 
studies. That said, limited data suggest that Canadian antidepressant use may be slightly higher 
and antipsychotic use lower than in the United States (Beck, Williams et al. 2005, Pratt 2011). 
 
The language of late 20th century American psychiatry is deeply entangled with drug naming 
conventions. illustrates. According to World Health Organization naming standards, each drug 
has a chemical name, a generic name and a trade name (referred to here in brackets), but 
chemical names are almost never used by physicians. Rather trade names, the product of 
pharmaceutical marketing departments are integrated to the grammar of medical discourse. For 
example (+)-(S)-1-[3-(Dimetylamino)propyl]-1-(p-fluorophenyl)-5-phtalancarbonitrile is the 
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World Health Organization chemical name for the world’s top selling antidepressant known by 
its generic name “escitalopram” in North America and by the brand names Cipralex or Lexapro 
in North America. Internationally, over 100 brand names have been assigned to the same 
chemical, ranging from “Recita” in India and “Zebnix” in Romania. 
 
In North American clinical practice, drugs are often organized pragmatically into families 
according to the symptoms they are used to relieve. If a drug alleviates symptoms of depression 
for example, it is referred clinically as an anti-depressant, if it manages the symptoms of 
psychosis it is called an anti-psychotic and so on. Table 1 illustrates this pragmatic naming 
approach.  
 
Antidepressants Anti-Anxiety Agents 
(Anxiolytics) 
Anti-Psychotics Mood Stabilizers 
Prozac (fluoxetine) Prozac Risperdal (risperidone) Lithium  
Zoloft  (sertraline) Zoloft Zyprexa  Epival (divalproex) 
Effexor (venlafaxine) Effexor Abilify  Lamictal (lamotrigine) 
Seroquel (quetiapine)  Seroquel Seroquel 
Abilify* (aripirazole) Valium  (diazepam) Clozaril (clozapine)  
Zyprexa* 
(olanzapine) 
Ativan    (lorazepam)   
 Buspar  (buspirone)   
*FDA approved for combination treatment for treatment-resistant depression 
 
Table 1.1: Commonly used psychiatric drugs organized according to symptom-families they 
alleviate. U.S. brand names are followed by generic names in brackets. Brand names in red have 
official FDA approval across multiple categories. Some, like Abilify and Zyprexa also have 
official approval for use in combination with other drugs.  
 
 
Other ways of organizing psychiatric drugs are according to their chemical structure or according 
to the neuro-receptors they interact with. Examples of drugs named according to their structure 
include benzodiazepines, a group of drugs that includes diazepam (Valium) and lorazepam 
(Ativan). Another is the group of tricyclic antidepressants, which includes imipramine (Tofranil) 
and amitriptyline (Elavil). Drugs named according to their neuro-receptor targets include 
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Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors (SSRI’s) like fluoxetine (Prozac) and sertraline (Zolft). 
Dual reuptake inhibitors (also known as  Serotonin-Norepinepherine Reuptake Inhibitors) 
include drugs like venlafaxine (Effexor) and duloxetine (Cymbalta).  
 
Naming traditions for drugs used to manage psychosis (anti-psychotics) also include reference to 
neurochemical mechanisms, for example the tendency of a drug to act on dopamine receptors 
like the drugs haloperidol (Haldol) and flupenthixol (Fluanxol), which are sometimes referred to 
as D2 blockers. Anti-psychotic medications produced in the 1950’s and 60’s are also called 
“typical antipsychotics”. Those produced toward the end of the 20th century, for example 
olanzapine (Zyprexa) quetiapine (Seroquel) and aripiprazole (Abilify) act differently on neuro-
receptors, and are often referred to as “atypical antipsychotics”.  
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Appendix B 
 
 Journal Survey: 
Graphical images representing mental health: 1955-1990 
 
 
Rationale and Methods 
 
In the April 1921 edition of the American Journal of Insanity (known after July 1921 as the 
American Journal of Psychiatry) , an article called ‘Plots in Psychiatry’ appeared, and although 
the paper itself is obscure, its publication marked a growing tendency among psychiatrists to 
‘call attention to the use of diagrammatic means for illustrating some of the ideas [the 
profession] deals with … both to those to whom an explanation is being made and to the one 
who is attempting the explanation (p517)’ (Gregg 1921). This was followed in the journal over 
the next century by an array of graphics intended to represent individual patients’ mental health 
over time, their responses to treatments and the duration of their recoveries. Graphics have been 
seen in the history of science as a way of making visible the internal workings of machines and 
of bodies, and it is in this sense that graphics offer insights to how psychiatrists understood the 
relationship between mental health and physiology, heredity and a range of interventions. 
Graphics can be understood as a discourse unto itself, supplementing prose  (Chadarevian 1993, 
Brain and Wise 1999, Chadarevian 2003, Dumit 2004, Wise 2006). 
 
This appendix summarizes a survey of graphical images used to model changes in mental health 
as a function of physiologic change and various interventions in six general psychiatric journals 
published between 1955 and 1990; the American Journal of Psychiatry (1955-1990), the British 
Journal of Psychiatry (1955-1990), Archives of General Psychiatry (1959-1990 following its 
change from the American Medical Association Archives of Neurology and Psychiatry), 
Comprehensive Psychiatry , the Journal of Clinical Psychiatry (1978-1990, after its change from 
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Diseases of the Nervous System) and Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica (1955-1990). Because I am 
interested in historicizing the use of biotech products in the maintenance of mental health, I 
focused on visual representations of mental health over a minimum period of six months. The 
choice of 6 months was pragmatic, based on the need to hand search the 6 journals of interest. 
The search strategy was both qualitative and quantitative. To identify general image types, I 
hand-searched full journal runs to create a database of images for further analysis. To provide 
general context for experiments on maintenance drugs, I hand searched every fifth year of the 
American Journal of Psychiatry between 1955 and 1990 to summarize topics and durations of 
studies. I divided papers into four broad categories: psychophysiology, psychopharmacology, 
administrative and hereditary. A study counted as psychophysiology if it measured changes in 
any biological system over time. The term psychophysiology included electrophysiology, sleep 
studies, endocrine and blood pressure monitoring. As the historian Kenton Kroker has shown in 
his history of sleep research, psychophysiology was a term of the mid 1950’s to the mid 1970’s. 
It “focused on the use of ‘filed surveillance’ to make the behavior of entire organisms subject to 
scientific investigation.” [It was meant as a way to record] the covert proceedings of the 
organism relevant to a psychic state or process … with minimal disturbance to the natural 
functions involved” (Kroker 329)(Kroker 2007).  
 
The category ‘administrative studies’ included both descriptions of mental hospital admission 
and discharge rates and large epidemiological studies such as case-control and retrospective 
cohort studies. Any study that mapped mental illness as a trans-generational (if telegraphic) 
category across multiple generations was counted under the heading ‘hereditary’, for example 
pedigree diagrams. Individual case reports were included. The survey did not systematically 
identify graphics used in pharmaceutical advertising, even though advertisers often appropriated 
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graphics directly from research articles. The conflicted relationship between the pharmaceutical 
industry and psychiatry has already been well described elsewhere (Healy 2003, Matheson 2008, 
Shorter 2013, Shorter 2015).  
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 Survey Results 
 
Quantitative overview (American Journal of Psychiatry) 
 
Narrative description was consistently the most common way of communicating in the American 
Journal of Psychiatry between 1955 and 1990. Even while the total number of annual research 
reports almost tripled from 180 in 1955 to 488 in 1990, the proportion containing any form of 
table or graph remained roughly the same, a third. Over the survey period, just under half of all 
research publications contained some form of graphics (Figure 1). Figure 2 shows that only a 
tiny fraction of graphics, approximately 15 per 1,000 articles published in the American Journal 
of Psychiatry between 1955 and 1990, contained images intended to describe processes lasting 
longer than 3 months.  
 
 
Figure 1: Use of graphics in the American Journal of Psychiatry 1955-1990. Only 15% of 
articles contained non-tabular graphics, a clear majority of which represented time frames of less 
than 3 months.   
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Figure 2: Proportion of graphics (including tables) published in the American Journal of 
Psychiatry intended to represent a time frame of more than 3 months. Across the eight sample 
years, the average was approximately 5%.   
 
 
Figure 3 shows the distribution of topics published between 1955 and 1990 in the American 
Journal of Psychiatry. Within my classification system, the single largest category across all 
years was ‘interventions lasting less than 6 months’, with a majority being pharmaceutical 
interventions. One category, ‘psychophysiology > 6 months’, contained only a handful of papers. 
Taken together, images represented mental health and mental illness as part of a system 
amenable to regulation (and dys-regulation) at multiple levels.  
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Figure 3: Number of article types per year showing a predominance of short-term intervention 
studies.  
 
 
 
Pychophysiological studies included EEG and sleep measurements, sometimes in conjunction 
with hormone testing, sometimes in conjunction with drug interventions. These resource-
intensive studies extended for a few days or weeks and rarely, for months. EEG studies could 
include as many as a thousand research subjects (Colony and Willis 1956). While some 
psychophysiological studies included an experimental component, the term ‘interventional study’ 
refers mostly to clinical trials for testing drugs. Most interventional studies lasted less than a 
year. Administrative and hereditary studies took a longer view of mental illness as a problem 
spanning decades and sometimes multiple generations (Figure 3).  
 
Taxonomy of Images  
 
The cornucopia of images published between 1955 and 1990 contains relatively few signifying 
time periods greater than 6 months; Mental hospital graphics depicted major tranquilizers as an 
institutional filter capable of reducing hospital costs. Psychophysiograms integrated bodily 
surveillance and interventions, but it was their pastiche as calendar diagrams that offered a 
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practical tool with which psychiatrists and their patients could co-create a personalized visual 
metaphor of change over a period of years in relation to various interventions. Survival curves, 
while introduced in the early 1960’s, became the dominant symbol of drug maintenance in 
research journals by the 1980’s, taking as their object of study a human/biotech hybrid created by 
a clinical experiment called a ‘responder trial’. As psychophysiograms and calendar diagrams 
began to fade from psychiatric journals in the mid 70’s, a new logic based on reading survival 
curves into functional flow block diagrams emerged.  
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 Mental-Hospital  
Graphics 
Psycho-Physiograms  Calendar Diagrams 
Example 
 
  
Years 
Appearin
g 
1955-1970 1955-1975 1955-1975 
Unit of 
Analysis  
Hospital and Catchment Area Individual Bodies Individual Bodies 
Purpose Institutional Budget Planning 
 
 
 
 
Multiple body functions 
monitored over long periods of 
time. Described “natural illness 
course” plus or minus an 
intervention.   
Individual experienced graphed in relation to 
interventions   
Time 
frame 
illustrated  
Years to decades Months Months to years 
 
 
Table 1: Taxonomy of graphics modeling mental health for period of 6 or more months in psychiatric journals published between 
1955 and 1975. 
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 Survival Curves  Functional Flow Block Diagrams  
Example  
 
 
 
 
Years Appearing 1970- 1980 - 
Unit of Analysis Medication Responders  Healthcare System as a whole 
Purpose Time to relapse analyzed statistically, 
represented standardized experiments 
Healthcare processes broken down into  
discrete units to optimize organizational  
efficiency 
Time Frame Measured Months Indeterminate 
 
 
Table 2: Taxonomy of graphics modeling mental health for period of 6 or more months in psychiatric journals published between 
1970 and 1990. 
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Appendix C:   
 
Medical Licensing Reform in Ontario  
 
 
 
 
Appendix C, Figure 1a: Ontario medical license renewal form for 1998 shown in its entirety 
(administrative codes on the back page shown below). (CPSO Archive, Toronto) 
 264 
 
Appendix C, Figure 1b: Ontario medical license renewal form for 1998, administrative codes. 
(CPSO Archive, Toronto) 
 265 
 
 
 
 
Appendix C, Figure 2: Ontario Medical Licence, 1999 showing added mandatory questions (for 
comparison see the 1998 version above in Appendix C, figures 1a and 1b). (CPSO Archive, 
Toronto) 
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Appendix C, Figure 3: Excerpt from medical licence renewal form, province of Ontario 2009, 
section dealing with personal health risks. Item 7 singles out physicians with “an addiction or 
substance use problem” not already known to the Ontario Medical Association Physician Health 
Program (the professional body in charge of monitoring recovery from various forms of mental 
illness including addictions) while item 8 identifies physicians who have been infected with HIV 
or hepatitis. (CPSO Archive, Toronto) 
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Appendix C, Figure 4: Excerpts from the 1975 Ontario Health Disciplines Act.  
 
 268 
Last amendment:  O. Reg. 53/95. 
 1.  (1)  The following are acts of professional misconduct for the purposes of clause 51 (1) (c) of the Health 
Professions Procedural Code: 
 1. Contravening a term, condition or limitation on the member’s certificate of registration. 
 2. Failing to maintain the standard of practice of the profession. 
 3. Abusing a patient verbally or physically. 
 4. Practising the profession while the member’s ability is impaired. 
 4.1 Practising the profession while the member knows that he or she has deficient clinical ability, as defined in 
section 26 of Ontario Regulation 114/94 (General) made under the Act. 
 4.2 Practising the profession during the period after the member is notified by the College that he or she has 
deficient clinical ability, as defined in section 26 of Ontario Regulation 114/94 (General) made under the Act, 
and before the member is notified by the College that he or she no longer has deficient clinical ability. 
 5. Having a conflict of interest. 
 6. Prescribing, dispensing or selling drugs for an improper purpose. 
 7. Discontinuing professional services that are needed unless, 
 i. the patient requests the discontinuation, 
 ii. alternative services are arranged, or 
 iii. the patient is given a reasonable opportunity to arrange alternative services. 
 8. Failing to fulfil the terms of an agreement for professional services. 
 9. Performing a professional service for which consent is required by law without consent. 
 10. Giving information concerning the condition of a patient or any services rendered to a patient to a person other 
than the patient or his or her authorized representative except with the consent of the patient or his or her 
authorized representative or as required by law. 
 11. Sharing fees with a person who has referred a patient or receiving fees from any person to whom a member has 
referred a patient or requesting or accepting a rebate or commission for the referral of a patient. 
 12. Failing to reveal the exact nature of a secret remedy or treatment used by the member following a proper request 
to do so. 
 13. Making a misrepresentation respecting a remedy, treatment or device. 
 14. Making a claim respecting the utility of a remedy, treatment, device or procedure other than a claim which can 
be supported as reasonable professional opinion. 
 15. Using a name other than the member’s name as set out in the register in the course of providing or offering to 
provide services within the scope of practice of the profession. 
 16. Falsifying a record relating to the member’s practice. 
 17. Failing without reasonable cause to provide a report or certificate relating to an examination or treatment 
performed by the member to the patient or his or her authorized representative within a reasonable time after 
the patient or his or her authorized representative has requested such a report or certificate. 
 18. Signing or issuing, in the member’s professional capacity, a document that the member knows or ought to know 
is false or misleading. 
 19. Refusing to perform a medically necessary service unless all or part of the fee is paid before the service is 
performed. 
 20. Charging a fee for services not performed, but a member may charge for the cancellation of an appointment 
less than twenty–four hours before the appointment time or, in psychotherapy practice, in accordance with any 
reasonable written agreement with the patient. 
 21. Charging a fee that is excessive in relation to the services performed. 
 22. Charging a fee for a service that exceeds the fee set out in the then current schedule of fees published by the 
Ontario Medical Association without informing the patient, before the service is performed, of the excess 
amount that will be charged. 
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 23. Charging a block or annual fee, which is a fee charged for services that are not insured services as defined in 
section 1 of the Health Insurance Act and is a set fee regardless of how many services are rendered to a patient. 
 23.1 Charging a fee for an undertaking not to charge for a service or class of services. 
 23.2 Charging a fee for an undertaking to be available to provide services to a patient. 
 24. Failing to itemize an account for professional services, 
 i. if requested to do so by the patient or the person or agency who is to pay, in whole or in part, for the 
services, or 
 ii. if the account includes a commercial laboratory fee. 
 25. Failing to issue a statement or receipt when requested by a patient or his or her authorized representative. 
 26. Selling or assigning any debt owed to the member for professional services, but a member may accept a credit 
card to pay for professional services and may make a general assignment of debts as collateral for a loan to 
finance his or her medical practice. 
 26.1 Pledging, mortgaging or in any other way encumbering or granting security in the member’s interest in a 
medical record required to be kept under the Act. 
 27. Contravening the Act, the Regulated Health Professions Act, 1991 or the regulations under either of those Acts. 
 28. Contravening a federal, provincial or territorial law, a municipal by-law or a by-law or rule of a public hospital 
if, 
 i. the purpose of the law, by-law or rule is to protect public health, or 
 ii. the contravention is relevant to the member’s suitability to practise. 
 29. Permitting, counselling or assisting a person who is not a member of the College to perform acts which should 
be performed by a member. 
 30. Failing to respond appropriately or within a reasonable time to a written inquiry from the College. 
 31. Influencing a patient to change his or her will or other testamentary instrument in favour of a member. 
 32. Being subjected to the withdrawal or restriction of rights or privileges under the Narcotic Control Act (Canada) 
or the Food and Drugs Act (Canada) or the regulations under either of those Acts, unless by the member’s own 
request. 
 33. An act or omission relevant to the practice of medicine that, having regard to all the circumstances, would 
reasonably be regarded by members as disgraceful, dishonourable or unprofessional. 
 34. Conduct unbecoming a physician.  O. Reg. 856/93, s. 1 (1); O. Reg. 857/93, s. 1 (1); O. Reg. 115/94, s. 1; 
O. Reg. 53/95, s. 1. 
 (2)  Despite paragraph 10 of subsection (1), it is not professional misconduct for a member to give information 
about a patient, including access to the patient’s records, 
 (a) to a practitioner of a health profession for the purpose of providing care to the patient; or 
 (b) to a person for the purpose of research or health administration or planning if the member reasonably believes 
that the person will take reasonable steps to protect the identity of the patient.  O. Reg. 856/93, s. 1 (2). 
 (2.1)  Paragraphs 23, 23.1 and 23.2 of subsection (1) do not apply in a case where a member charges a fee to a third 
party for a third party service under the Health Insurance Act.  O. Reg. 857/93, s. 1 (2). 
 (3)  A member shall be deemed to have committed an act of professional misconduct if the governing body of a 
health profession in a jurisdiction other than Ontario has made a finding of incompetence or professional misconduct 
or a similar finding against the member, and the finding is based on facts which would, in the opinion of the College, 
be grounds for a finding of incompetence as defined in section 52 of the Code or would be an act of professional 
misconduct as defined in subsection (1).  O. Reg. 856/93, s. 1 (3). 
 (4)  A member shall be deemed to have committed an act of professional misconduct if, 
 (a) the governing body of a health profession in a jurisdiction other than Ontario has provided records to the College 
evidencing that an allegation of professional misconduct or incompetence or a similar allegation has been made 
against the member and he or she has entered into an agreement or compromise with the governing body in 
order to settle the matter without a finding of misconduct or incompetence or a similar finding being made; 
 (b) the College is satisfied that the records are authentic, accurate and complete; and 
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 (c) the act or omission that is the subject of the allegation would, in the opinion of the College, be an act of 
professional misconduct as defined in subsection (1), or would constitute incompetence as defined in section 
52 of the Code.  O. Reg. 856/93, s. 1 (4). 
 
Appendix C, Figure 5: Amendments to the Medicine Act, 1995.  
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Appendix D: 
 
Narrative Medicine Journal Survey  
 
 
 
 
This survey re-analyzes  40 of the 158 articles identified by Monitz, Lingard and Watling in their 
analysis of narratives published in JAMA, the New England Journal of Medicine and the Annals 
of Internal Medicine between May 2011 and July 2013 (Monitz, Lingard et al. 2017). This 
sample is restricted to narratives published in JAMA, which are representative of the article type. 
While Monitz, Lingard and Watling analyzed narratives according to narrative strategies such as 
“a lament, a hero story, a quest, an awakening, a rediscovery, and a testimony”, this re-analysis 
focuses on a confessional aspect to narratives, identifying themes such as personal feelings of 
inadequacy, drug use, psychiatric diagnosis or personal conflicts. Merely inserting oneself in a 
narrative as an idealized trope for a professional does not count as self-confession.     
 
JAMA 
Title, Year Personal 
Confession, 
disclosure?  
Summary, representative quote from confession 
Sleepless  
(Alley 2011) 
Yes. 
Moral/ethical 
issues 
U.S. Military Surgeon (Afghanistan), describes mixed 
feelings using resources on enemy combatants “Unspoken in 
my mind, and probably in the minds of others with me, are 
the thoughts, Wouldn't it be easier to let nature take its 
course and let this enemy combatant die of his severe 
injuries? He would certainly die if he was in a local hospital 
or insurgent aid station. Or could I just let him writhe in pain 
for a little longer? He wouldn't hesitate to slit my throat if he 
could. Why am I busting my butt to save his? Why am I 
losing sleep over this guy? 
 
Cancer 
Survivorship 
and Beyond  
(Astrow 2012) 
Yes, personal 
anxiety of 
relapse, 
disclosure of 
cancer 
“Fear of relapse is inescapable”  
Lists personal vulnerabilities related to prostate cancer 
surgery, loss of bladder control, sexual functioning affected. 
Offers increased insights, things its improved his 
communication with suffering people.  
The Proud 
Paratrooper 
Yes, feelings 
of guilt about 
Story of an encounter with a homeless military veteran. 
“Maybe it was to make myself feel like I had done 
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(Baggett 
2013) 
class 
inequality 
something more than give him a plastic bag”. … “A pang of 
guilt gripped my stomach”. 
A Great Case 
(Barker 2011) 
Yes, self 
disclosure of 
childhood 
tumor 
“My daughter has just turned 13, which prompts me to 
reminisce about it now”.  
Had a rare tumor diagnosed and removed at age 13. Now an 
internist in full remission 
To Isaiah 
(Berwick 
2012) 
No, medicine 
as triumph 
Moral advice about a physician’s duty to care. 
Considering 
Life Before 
Lifestyle 
(Blumberg 
2012) 
Confession 
about being 
drawn to 
higher income 
work 
Contemplation about the commodification of medical work.  
“Its embarrassing to admit, but I do remember sitting with a 
group of classmates … looking at a website that ranked 
medical specialties by average income”. Advice to medical 
residents.  
A Physician 
Goes to 
Washington 
2012 
(Blumenthal 
2012) 
No, advice 
given 
No self disclosure. Advice given based on experience while 
in government  
What Would 
Patsy Mink 
Think? 
(Carnes 2012) 
No, 
editorializes  
Refers to herself as a woman, but does not disclose beyond 
this. Cites data on unequal pay for women in academic 
medicine.  
The Quiet 
Epidemic 
(Chang and 
Liang 2011) 
No Editorializes on problems with healthcare system, proposes 
ways to use data to improve care.  
Mind The Gap 
(Clarfield 
2013) 
Yes, fear of 
aging 
Explores his changing perception of age differences between 
himself and others. “But as with my granddad, the age gap 
between me and my soldier-patients was still very wide. 
With the arrogance of youth, I could not really imagine it 
ever narrowing”. 
 
No More 
Apologies 
(Clark 2012) 
Yes, living 
with disability, 
brain damage 
Survived head injury, lives with disability “Things that had 
come so easily to me my whole life were now indescribably 
difficult” … “I’m sorry I had my accident” 
 
Miles 
Together 
(Denniston 
2011) 
Yes, need for 
emotional 
connection 
with patient  
Describes deep sense of loss of a long-term relationship at 
patient’s death.  
“I needed to be there too. I needed the intimacy that came 
from being with 
him, in his own home, on his turf”. 
 
Understanding 
the Value of 
Reassurance 
(Detsky 2012) 
Yes. Fears of 
cancer, 
reassurance 
from tests  
Describes tension between logic of statistics and emotion of 
personal experience … “whenever something was troubling 
me I fell back on the memory of that e-mail and said to 
myself, At least I don’t have prostate cancer.” 
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Status Update: 
Whose Photo 
is That? 
(Devon 2013) 
No. 
Editorializes 
about consent 
Talks about medical missions, photos on social media and 
ethical issues posting without informed consent.  
The 
Mechanics of 
Reasoning 
(Dhaliwal 
2011) 
No. 
Comments on 
ways of 
teaching  
No personal insight. 
Cyanosis (Ely 
2011) 
Yes. Feelings 
of inadequacy 
“My shortcomings seemed so transparent that I was sure I’d 
added my name to the list of physicians who had failed this 
hopeful couple” 
 
The Leopard-
Skin Bra (Ely 
2011) 
Yes. Personal 
connection to 
patient. 
Struggles with having a “favorite patient” 
A House Built 
out of 
Madness 
(Farrell 2011) 
No.  No personal insight. It is sometimes difficult to “live” in a 
“madhouse.” On the flip side, it has enriched my 
experiences as a physician, a neighbor, a traveler, and a 
member of the society I live in. 
 
Worries (Feld 
2012) 
Yes. 
Disclosure 
about cancer   
Anxiety permeating her life around breast cancer surgery.  
“… will my 
lymph nodes be cancerous or not”? 
 
Its Never Too 
Late 
(Fitzgerald 
2011) 
Yes. Anxiety 
about age 
A woman turning 40 wants to return to university and 
pursue a research career.  
The Gift: 
Hy’shqe 
Siam(Freeman 
2011) 
Yes. Desire to 
be an 
anonymous 
kidney donor 
I came to regard my donor kidney, whichever one it would 
be, as not mine but the recipient’s. I was its custodian, 
responsible 
to preserve its health. 
 
You Have No 
Idea (Frey 
2011) 
No. 
Reminiscences 
of HIV fears 
Talks about his experience practicing when AIDS epidemic 
began, but says little about his inner experience  
The Columbo 
Phenomenon 
(Frolkis 2013) 
No. 
Editorializes 
about models 
of care  
“The success of team-based care will depend on effective 
interprofessional training and the acquisition of core 
skills like active listening” 
 
Goddess 
Night 
(Garment 
2012) 
Yes. Describes 
close 
relationship 
with patient 
“As scared as she must have been, she had protected me. I’d 
never met a patient outside the hospital or office, and 
I’d certainly never been to one of my patients’ homes”. 
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In the Still of 
the Night 
(Gold 2011) 
Yes. 
Description of 
stillbirth 
experience 
“But this has been a difficult tenth anniversary year. The 
grief and trauma have come back with great force”. 
 
Ask Me if I 
Cleaned My 
Hands 
(Gordon 
2012) 
No. Describes 
experience 
confronting a 
senior 
physician 
“if people like my friend the medical educator or 
my friend the senior surgeon are reluctant to intervene, how 
could anyone possibly imagine that patients who are sick 
and vulnerable can advocate for themselves?” 
 
A Pain in the 
Tuches 
(Gropp 2012) 
Yes. 
Experience of 
pain 
“That was an existential experience that severely 
rattled the calm that I had so meticulously cultivated” 
 
The Tyranny 
of Reality 
(Henry 2011) 
No. Describes 
an idealized 
professional 
self 
“I resolved daily to learn from my patients, 
listen attentively, and provide culturally appropriate, 
patient-centered care”. 
 
Donor Diary  
(Higgins 
2011) 
Yes. 
Experience of 
being stem 
cell donor 
“It’s hard for me to describe my emotion at that moment. 
After so many twists and turns, my gift to her was finally 
being delivered”. 
 
Impact Factor 
(Hirschtick 
2011) 
No. 
Comments on 
importance of 
clinical exam 
over 
technology 
“while embracing technology we 
should not underestimate the impact factor of cool stuff like 
jugular venous distention or precordial palpation” 
 
John 
Lennon’s 
Elbow 
(Hirschtick 
2012) 
Yes. Insight 
into power 
relations in 
making 
clinical facts 
“My key points were no keyer than the residents. My place 
in the pecking order makes me the default expert and my 
scale the gold standard for weighing keyness.  
Subjective 
Case 
(Hirschtick 
2012) 
No. 
Commentary 
on medical 
education 
“Residents and students expend a great deal of time and 
energy constructing EMR progress notes”. 
 
Falling Off 
the Edge 
(Inouye, 
O'Connell et 
al. 2013) 
No. 
Commentary 
on 
homelessness 
“I have confirmed my initial impression about accelerated 
aging in the homeless population, yet more importantly, I 
realized the substantial role that cognitive impairment may 
play in contributing to chronic homelessness”. 
 
Next: Text. 
(Kahn 2012) 
No. 
Comments on 
technology to 
communicate 
with patients 
“Using technology is a way to reassure a person that they 
can self-direct their care, and self-directed care based on 
knowledge and understanding leading to insight is a 
powerful moment”. 
 
Drowning in 
Plain Sight 
(Kim 2012) 
No. 
Comments on 
positive 
“Her well-intentioned physicians carefully tried to 
protect the pregnancy without protecting the mother.” 
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aspects of 
using psych 
drugs in 
pregnancey 
Throwback 
(Kravitz 
2011) 
Yes. Fears of 
irrelevance 
“The practice of 30 years of medicine can be diminishing 
for a family physician”. Describes sense of becoming 
irrelevant in a specialist-driven medical system.  
 
Putting the 
“Art” in 
“Crash Cart” 
(Kushin 2012) 
No. 
Comments on 
value of 
painting as 
stress 
management 
“following the graduation of my residency 
class, a person has yet to take the reins leading newer 
generations of residents in informal art therapy sessions” 
 
Learning to 
Talk (Landrey 
2012) 
No. 
Comments on 
need to 
communicate 
better  
“I felt like I had made a connection. 
This is a feeling I want to have more as I continue in 
my development as a budding primary care physician”. 
 
One Last 
Teaching 
Moment 
(Longmaid 
2013) 
No. Describes 
relationship 
with dying 
mentor 
“Tears of hundreds wet my cheeks as our eyes met. I tried to 
speak, but I could not find the language I needed for this 
moment”. 
 
Warning Shot 
(Maldonado 
2012) 
No. 
Comments on 
experience 
having a 
doctor break 
bad news. 
“Leaving the physician’s office, as a clinician-educator, I 
couldn’t help reflecting on how he broke the news. Bravo, 
Doctor. You knocked it out of the ballpark”. 
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Appendix E:  
 
Coroner’s Verdict Explanation, Marc Daniel Case  
(McCallum 2008) 
 
The jury heard the testimony of fifty-one witnesses over the course of the inquest. 
There were one hundred and seventy six exhibits entered in evidence. There were 
34 days of testimony, one day of submissions by counsel, one day for the coroner to 
charge the jury and a final day for the jury to deliver their verdict. 
Evidence was heard that Lori Dupont, a recovery room nurse at Hotel Dieu Grace 
Hospital (HDGH) in Windsor, and Marc Daniel, an anesthesiologist at the same 
hospital, were involved in an intimate relationship that had begun sometime in 2004, 
after Dr. Daniel separated from his wife. Several witnesses indicated that Dr. Daniel 
pursued Ms. Dupont and pressed her first to have a relationship with him, and then 
to allow him to move into the house that Ms. Dupont had purchased for herself and 
her daughter. He provided funds to finance the largest portion of the purchase price. 
Various witnesses testified that Dr. Daniel was involved in various disputes and 
altercations at work before and during this time. He had verbal disputes with coworkers 
and with the nurse manager of the operating room and recovery room. A 
nurse's finger was broken when he wrestled a pillow out of her hands (pillows were 
apparently viewed by him as essential equipment for inducing anesthesia). A nurse 
had made a written complaint after Dr. Daniel excluded her from the operating room 
he was working in, but this case had not been resolved by the time of the deaths 
some sixteen months later. The nurse manager had filed a written complaint 
regarding abusive language directed at her by Dr. Daniel. This had resulted in Dr. 
Daniel being investigated by the hospital. After negotiation with Dr. Daniel and his 
counsel, Dr. Daniel signed a Memorandum of Agreement whereby he was placed on 
probation in January 2005, agreed to abide by the hospital's Code of Conduct and 
workplace harassment policy, and was required to undergo anger management 
therapy. 
 
On February 27, 2005 Dr. Daniel attempted suicide using intravenous drugs 
commonly used to induce anesthesia. He did this in the presence of Lori Dupont, 
and a statement of Lori Dupont's filed as an exhibit contained information that he told 
her that she had "done this to him". Several witnesses testified that Dr. Daniel had 
previously and repeatedly used the threat of suicide to control Ms. Dupont. Ms. 
Dupont and her mother performed CPR on Dr. Daniel, and he was transported to 
HDGH where he was admitted and treated. He was initially in the ICU and then 
involuntarily admitted to the acute psychiatric ward. Nurses and the physicians who 
treated Dr. Daniel testified that he told them that pressures at work had led to his 
suicide attempt. However, both Lori Dupont and her mother were recorded as having 
called the unit to advise the staff that Dr. Daniel was not telling the truth about the 
reason behind the suicide attempt and that, in fact, he made the attempt to try to 
control Ms. Dupont who was not following his wishes that she not leave the house to 
go shopping. Further, Ms. Dupont's mother advised that she feared for her 
granddaughter's and daughter's physical safety. Barbara Dupont spoke with Dr. 
Daniels and informed him that he would not be allowed to contact her daughter in the 
future. Ms. Dupont informed Dr. Daniel that the relationship was over at that point. 
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On March 10, 2005, Dr. Daniel was discharged from the HDGH's psychiatric ward . 
. His care was transferred at his request from the initial treating psychiatrist to another 
psychiatrist. He also began psychotherapy with a psychologist. This psychologist 
was the only witness who testified that she viewed Dr. Daniel's suicide attempt as an 
aggressive act. 
 
During the initial days after discharge, Dr. Daniel repeatedly attempted to contact 
Lori Dupont. Witnesses stated that he was observed attending in the operating room 
and recovery room area, even though he was on medical leave and that he 
appeared to be watching Ms. Dupont. Ms. Dupont's parents interceded to prevent 
him contacting her. On or about April 5, 2005, Dr. Daniel placed a potentially 
embarrassing photograph of Ms. Dupont on her windshield according to witnesses. 
Apparently, no other person in the workplace viewed this photograph, but its 
contents were sufficiently embarrassing to Ms. Dupont that she was upset by his 
threat to distribute it. Dr. Daniel also met with Ms. Dupont's father at his place of 
work and made a further threat to distribute the picture unless all funds he stated 
were owed (from the house purchase) to him were returned. On April 8, 2005, Ms. 
Dupont attended a meeting of security, supervisory and legal personnel at the 
hospital at their request to discuss what action ought to be taken in light of this act by 
Dr. Daniel. Witnesses testified that Ms. Dupont was a very private person who 
simply wanted Dr. Daniel to leave her alone so that she could continue without him. 
 
As a result of that meeting, Ms. Dupont sought a peace bond, but this was 
repeatedly delayed, and in fact, the final hearing was not scheduled until some 
weeks after her death. The hospital cancelled his security card access and asked 
him to get his psychotherapy and pick up his mail elsewhere, which he agreed 
through his counsel to do. 
 
During this period, the Physicians Health Program (PHP) of the Ontario Medical 
Association became involved after Ms. Dupont and a colleague of Dr. Daniel notified 
them. The Physicians Health Program provided a contract for Dr. Daniel specifying 
certain information could be shared with workplace monitors and his psychiatrist, 
among others. However, his psychiatrist did not receive information from the 
workplace, and he testified that he was not aware of the extent of Dr. Daniel's 
behaviour in the workplace. Further, it appeared that Dr. Daniel notified the 
psychiatrist of his readiness to return to work, and that the psychiatrist then wrote to 
the Physicians Health Program, which in turn accepted that Dr. Daniel was ready to 
work. The hospital was notified of this by the PHP, and Dr. Daniel returned to work 
without the input of nursing staff and Ms. Dupont. The treating psychiatrist and 
psychologist testified that they were bound to respect Dr. Daniel's confidentiality and 
therefore could not seek corroborating or independent information on his progress or 
accept unsolicited information as they said that to do so would acknowledge that 
they were treating Dr. Daniel, which would itself be a breach of confidentiality. The 
jury heard a repeated theme from the mental health professionals that the bounds of 
confidentiality prevented them from getting a 360-degree assessment of Dr. Daniel. 
Dr. Daniel returned to work at the beginning of June and almost immediately there 
began to be incidents of problematic behaviour on his part. Evidence was heard that 
he kissed a nurse on the cheek and offered to rub the naked back of another nurse. 
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Further, staff began to be concerned about his staring at Lori Dupont in the Recovery 
Room when he brought patients there after cases.  
 
The jury also heard testimony from two sisters who were friends of Lori Dupont. One 
of the sisters worked at HDGH and in early June 2005 she approached the hospital 
risk manager who is also a lawyer to express her and her sister's concern for the way 
in which Dr. Daniel had returned to work and the effect that his behaviour had on Ms. 
Dupont. She testified that the risk manager had said that it was difficult to remove a 
doctor's privileges. The risk manager disputed this version in her testimony, stating 
that she had not read the detailed email sent by the sister, nor did she know the full 
extent of the concerns. 
 
A number of hospital witnesses were asked why Dr. Daniel's contraventions of the 
Memorandum of Agreement after his return to work in June 2005 did not lead to 
further action on the part of the hospital.  
 
The hospital's Chief of Staff testified that he viewed Dr. Daniel as ill and the behaviour as 
a symptom of his illness, and he thus wanted treatment for Dr. Daniel as opposed to 
discipline. No other explanation was offered by any other witness. 
 
The case manager for the Physicians Health Program testified that the week prior to 
the deaths, Dr. Daniel met with her and spoke obsessively about Ms. Dupont. This 
concerned her and she asked the psychologist to reassess Dr. Daniel. Unfortunately, the 
deaths occurred before this could be done. 
 
         The jury heard the testimony of three expert witnesses. The first two; a physician 
who is a senior executive in an Ontario hospital and a lawyer who specializes in 
physician privilege issues provided an expert report and also testified as a panel. 
These experts testified that the current legislation governing physicians' privileges in 
Ontario hospitals, the Public Hospitals Act, could be simplified with the benefit of 
allowing hospitals to deal with problematic physicians more expeditiously.  
 
The senior executive physician recommended the adoption of the Disruptive 
Physician Behaviour Initiative approach of the College of Physicians and Surgeons 
of Ontario as a means of dealing with a disruptive physician, along with enforcement 
of a code of conduct, and addressing behavioural issues during the initial application 
process and at the annual re-application process.  
 
He recommended that the Physician Health Program have a standard template for reporting 
to them on physicians that they are monitoring, and that the PHP do a 360 degree 
evaluation prior to a physician's return to work. 
This witness also gave testimony in which he stated that the "picture incident" in April 
2005 was a "sentinel event".  
 
The final expert witness was an expert in domestic violence. His comprehensive 
expert report was provided to the jury as an exhibit. He testified that a worker who is 
off work due to behavioural or mental issues should not be allowed to return to work 
until a full assessment of fitness to return is done. This assessment, he testified, 
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should include seeking the consent of the worker at the outset of therapy to obtain 
information about the worker from peers, subordinates and supervisors at work as 
well as from the worker. In this case, the evidence was that the only information that 
the therapists had about Dr. Daniel and his state of mind at the time he returned to 
work was from Dr. Daniel himself. After Dr. Daniel had been back at work, there was 
virtually no information about his increasingly problematic behaviours given to the 
PHP or his therapists until several days before the deaths. 
The domestic violence expert also testified that there are a number of factors 
associated with the risk of lethal domestic violence. In hindsight, Dr. Daniel exhibited 
the majority of these, most notably, clinical depression, suicide attempt and recent 
separation from his domestic partner.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
